43. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • Need for an Examination of Military Procedures in Korea

There have been a number of instances over the years in which US airplanes and helicopters have strayed across the DMZ. Some of them have gone undetected; others have led to politically costly verbal concessions at Panmunjon when we have undertaken to ransom the pilots.

On the ground, the circumstances under which four US soldiers were murdered within the DMZ2 suggest that operating procedures are too relaxed for such a zone of tension.

Such incidents may lead to further diplomatic humiliation and unnecessary loss of life. They could, conceivably, result in something much more serious. The particular combination [1 line not declassified], coupled with the evidence of North Korean daring provided by the Blue House raid, suggest one such possibility.

I believe that an effort was made to tighten up the aerial navigation regulations, after the May 1963 helicopter incident, but the steps clearly have not been adequate.

More stringent controls may be necessary, such as

  • —instituting procedures whereby no soldiers enter the DMZ without adequate cover.
  • —grounding aircraft with limited navigational equipment in all except contact conditions.
  • —improving navigational aids and carrying out training flights in areas other than the border (the latest helicopter incident apparently was a training flight).
  • —monitoring our own flights with radar in the border area.
  • —prohibiting non-essential flights in the vicinity of the DMZ.

This seems an appropriate subject for a report by DOD to the Under Secretaries’ Committee.

[Page 116]

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Under Secretary Richardson at Tab A.3

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger noted on the memorandum: “Al—Should see if this maybe is better to have DOD report to us? What do you think?”
  2. On October 18, four American soldiers were ambushed and killed in the DMZ.
  3. Kissinger evidently did not sign the memorandum to Richardson, which is attached. An October 29 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger stated that “nothing would be more self-defeating than to ask for an examination of our military procedures in Korea by the Under Secretaries Committee. I believe this would open the door to the extent required for Under Secretary Richardson, with Dave Packard’s acquiescence, to table the Porter proposal that we relocate all US forces in Korea to a position south of the DMZ. This, of course, would be the preliminary to a subsequent proposal for a substantial reduction in our forces there.” Haig instead recommended that Laird be asked to examine the “existing procedures for military operations along the DMZ and keep the problem within Department of Defense channels.” Kissinger wrote “I agree” in the margin of Haig’s memorandum and signed a revised memorandum to Laird, October 29, that requested a Department of Defense report be submitted to the President. (Ibid.)