Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974

203. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 17, 1974, 6:50 p.m.

D: I just wanted to say goodby to you.

K: Are you going home?

D: Why not?

K: That’s good news. That means things are calming down.

D: Not really. My intention was to say goodby. No, I just received a telegram and I want to send it to you.

K: Let me hear the bad news.

D: Not really. You are going to San Clemente?

K: Yes, for a day, tomorrow night. I wanted to tell you we are sending Sisco to London to talk to the British and Turks about that situation. We are not going to support the Sampson regime.²

D: This is good news. They are asking me to give you their statement of the Soviet Union in connection with the text of the statement of the government. I do not have it yet. When I get it, should I give it to Scowcroft? They are sending a text but it is a public statement.

K: How can you give it to Scowcroft? No, give it to Eagleburger.

D: Still leaning towards (Europe).

K: I think we should play this with restriction. We are not going to have (consultations) with Greek Colonels.

D: Really, my government asked me to tell you that they recognize that the United States is for the independence of Cyprus and you do not support Greek actions that are against the lawful government of Cyprus.

K: I think the first is correct. I would get carried away.

D: I understand. At some time they expressed that . . . not take any political steps to stop intervention . . . that you do not do it from your side and they hope your representatives of the Security Council will . . .

K: He didn’t say anything?

D: You didn’t want to take any political steps to stop this interference. They would like to hope that you and the President will consider what we mentioned before and you will take the ___________ to support the lawful government in Cyprus headed by Makarios. This is what they express.

K: May I make this suggestion. Anatol, I think the course of events, if we all behave in a restrained manner, will lead in this direction, but if anyone behaves provocatively it will get mixed up in the whole East/West debate.

D: I understand.

K: We have no interest in changing the situation as it was on the island last (month). Our problem is how to position it so that the natural balance is not affected. This you can tell them.

D: So, I can say that you hope the course of events will lead to a little-by-little restoration.

K: Certainly. To a restoration of a constitutional government.

D: OK.

K: I don’t want to make a decision on names but we have no fixed view on that.

D: OK. This I will mention to Moscow.

K: Tell them if they send messages to send the second draft, not the first, since you are not here to mediate. Give my warm regards to Brezhnev and Gromyko.

D: OK.

K: And I am planning to be there in October.

D: I sent a telegram yesterday to Brezhnev.

K: We ought to make some progress. Senator Fulbright is here and we are planning détente hearings August 8 when I’m going to testify. It couldn’t happen at a better time.

D: I understand.

K: It turned out to be the best time for it. Well, have a good vacation and give my warm regards to everyone.

D: And to Nancy³ please give my best wishes.

K: Thank you and I may call you once to ruin you in Moscow. Tell them to get all the recording equipment ready.

D: Alright. (laughter).

K: Thank you.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. Unclassified. All blank underscores are omissions in the original.
2. Nikos Sampson came to power in Cyprus after the overthrow of Makarios.
3. Nancy Kissinger.