9. Editorial Note

On February 1, 1969, the National Security Council met to discuss the Middle East. President Richard Nixon listened to briefings by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms and by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler. According to minutes of the meeting, Helms described Soviet interests in the region as follows: “USSR has leapfrogged Northern Tier. Soviet naval expansion—steadier, more effective than Khrushchev’s rather opportunistic move to put missiles in Cuba.” Nixon asked, “You talk about USSR’s ‘measured, effective plan.’ Does this emanate from military strategy or something that just happens? Do they have a meeting like ours here today, decide on policy and then execute it? Or do they just muddle along?” Helms replied, “Highest level decision. Considered policy.”

General Wheeler’s briefing on the significance of the Soviet fleet and U.S. contingency plans for conflict in the region generated the following comments and queries from Nixon: “I understand your contingency plan is based on intelligence estimate that local conflict [is] main possibility. I agree that US–USSR conflict remote, but what if one of Arab countries where Soviet fleet present is attacked?” Wheeler replied, “Possibilities we are examining: U.S. attack on Soviet bases in Siberia; sink one Soviet ship in Mediterranean; seize Soviet intelligence trawler.”

Nixon then asked, “Could you consider what we could do indirectly through the Israelis? Seems to me Soviet naval presence is primarily political. Therefore, we must be prepared for a less-than-military contingency.” Wheeler responded, “Primarily political. But Soviet presence in ports puts a Soviet umbrella over those ports. In a tenuous sense, fleet therefore does have military use.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1969)

On February 3, 1969, Kissinger sent Nixon a follow-up memorandum that summarized the policy recommendations made at the NSC meeting the day before. Kissinger urged that “we should particularly concentrate on U.S.-Soviet arrangements which could slow the pace of the Near Eastern arms race and serve as a restraining influence on the nations in the area—at least arrangements which would assure U.S.–U.S.S.R. disengagement if hostilities break out again.” Kissinger then layed out the pros and cons of a two-power dialogue with the Soviets as opposed to the advantages and disadvantages of the four-power (Great Britain, France, United States, Soviet Union) approach recommended by the French:

  • “1. The pros are:
    • “a. This reflects the power realities in the Middle East, and the Russians have assured us that they consider this the primary channel, [Page 24] even though they have accepted the four-power proposal. If there is to be a general settlement, only the USSR has the necessary leverage with Nasser to produce it, and only we come close to having the necessary influence with Israel.
    • “b. Each of us could consult directly with these parties while negotiating and yet retain the desirable UN umbrella by turning over our product to Jarring.
    • “c. It would be easier to position the Middle East on the U.S.–USSR agenda—particularly to establish the linkage to strategic arms talks—in a two-power context.
    • “d. It would also position the Middle East into the whole context of East-West relations with maximum control and linkage to other negotiations such as those on force limitations.
  • “2. The cons are:
    • “a. It might give the USSR credit for any settlement and enhance its position in the area to our detriment. The counters to this point are that all the Arabs know only the U.S. can move Israel; that settlement which has even a remote chance of Israeli acceptance would have enough elements unpalatable to the Arabs so that the Russians would not win popularity by pushing it; and that the U.S. can hold its own in peaceful competition with the USSR so should be willing to accept passing credit to the USSR, if any, for the sake of a settlement that would help us more than Moscow.
    • “b. We have no strong evidence that the Soviets want the kind of basic peace settlement we have been seeking. Although their intent is debatable, they seem to be aiming at a limited accommodation to reduce the possibility of a sudden crisis with dangerous and unforeseeable consequences. Limited accommodation would leave enough unsettled grievances for them to use in keeping the Arabs dependent on their support. If the Soviets are not sincere, we risk walking into a propaganda trap. The counters to this are that the Soviets are the ones who have persistently pushed this dialogue, that they have already moved toward our position and that we will never know their real position until we pin them down in negotiation.
    • “c. Israel will object to our negotiating their fate with anyone, though they are likely to react somewhat less sharply to the two-power than to the four-power approach. Agreement directly between them and the Arabs is fundamental to their position—and, they believe, to ours. They hold that a lasting settlement cannot result unless the parties themselves develop one they can live with. If we went down either the two-power or the four-power track, we would have to cope with vociferous Israeli charges that our position had weakened, that we had been taken in by Soviet blandishments and that, worst of all, we had undercut their position by compromising on the central point in that position.”

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In telling the President where to go from here, Kissinger wrote: “If you chose to follow the two-power course—either by itself or with the four-power track as an adjunct—you would have a choice between waiting for the USSR to respond to the U.S. note of January 15 and framing our own proposal and taking it to them. The advantage of waiting would be to test their seriousness. The last U.S. note asked them to clarify some obvious ambiguities in their December 30 [1968] note. But if we are going to wait, we should probably find a way to let Moscow know we are awaiting their reply. The advantages of taking the initiative would be to get our own plan on the table, to seize the propaganda initiative and to give the Arabs the impression that you are serious about wanting a just settlement. Of course, we must consider this in connection with other initiatives we plan with Moscow.” (Ibid.)

On February 4, when the National Security Council met again to discuss the Middle East, Kissinger circulated his memorandum on policy recommendations. According to minutes of the meeting, Nixon asked Kissinger to “talk about how we meld 2-power and 4-power [talks].” Kissinger replied, “Intimate relationship among all these things. On overall settlement, I’ll concentrate on 4-power and 2-power approaches. Other two options have little support—let Jarring go by himself or US mediation.” Kissinger then outlined the pros and cons from his February 3 memorandum. President Nixon concluded the discussion about the various approaches to a Middle East settlement with the following remarks: “Don’t be in any hurry to have anything done on the four-power front. At UN go to the two-power forum. Start talking with Soviets. Harmful if we give impression that four-power forum [is] where things will be settled. Main value as umbrella.” (Ibid.)

During a February 6 news conference, Nixon announced a five-pronged U.S. approach toward a Middle East settlement: “We are going to continue to give our all-out support to the Jarring mission. We are going to have bilateral talks at the United Nations, preparatory to the talks between the four powers. We shall have four-power talks at the United Nations. We shall also have talks with the countries in the area, with the Israelis and their neighbors, and, in addition, we want to go forward on some of the long range plans, the Eisenhower–Strauss plan for relieving some of the very grave economic problems in that area.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pages 68–69)