Attached, pursuant to your instruction, is a memorandum to the President
on Soviet developments (Tab A).
In this general connection, I understand that the President at the May 21
NSC meeting2 made a series of negative
decisions on East-West trade issues. I have only been intermittently
involved in the preparatory work for the NSC meeting, so that I am not familiar with the factors and
considerations that led up to this rather major decision in the area of
East-West relations.
But I consider it unfortunate that the Executive appears to have
surrendered a flexible instrument of policy vis-à-vis the East. I have
never believed that our trade (and cultural) policies will have more
than marginal impact on the evolution of Soviet policy. On the other
hand, I find it surprising that we should want to let the Soviets (and,
for that matter, the North Koreans and North Vietnamese) control our
policy toward all the Communist states of Eastern Europe. I believe that
the policy of treating different Communists differently, if pursued
without
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illusion and grandiose
expectations, is a wise one. But there is little, if anything, that we
can do in practice to implement it if we deprive ourselves of just about
the only instrument we have for doing so.
If the intention is to hold out lush vistas of trade as an incentive for
the Soviets to cross the threshold of “sufficient progress” it is
doubtful that we will be successful. The Soviets are unlikely to
consider the potential economic benefits of sufficient interest to
warrant political concessions; and since our present policy supports
their own efforts to rebuild a monolith in Eastern Europe, they will
hardly be inclined to pay us in order to get us to give it up.
More fundamentally, I find disturbing the apparent decision, as I
understand it, to withhold a “generous” Eastern trade policy until there
is “sufficient progress” in our “overall relations” with the
Communists.
It seems to me that this implies a concept of our relations with the
Soviets that can lead us into serious difficulty. The notion that there
is some definable threshold between insufficient and sufficient
progress—between confrontation and negotiation—is unrealistic. The
prospect is for a highly mixed relationship with elements of both. The
attached paper attempts to sketch some of the reasons why this is
so.
If we think of our relations with the Soviets in terms of milestones and
thresholds, we run the risk of arbitrarily proclaiming great new eras of
cooperation—much as President Johnson did for subjective reasons of his own in
connection with the most marginal housekeeping agreements or with a
summit of the most dubious achievement—when in fact little that was
fundamental had changed. We should not forget President Eisenhower’s
experience with his speech of April 16, 1953,3 in which he
established certain litmus paper tests for Soviet good behavior. After
the Soviets had met some of them (like the Austrian peace treaty) it
nevertheless turned out that we were small, if any, distance farther
along in improving “overall relations.”
In sum, rather than conditioning our minds and hopes to a vision of a
relationship with the Soviets that is moving in one consistent direction
of progress, we should anticipate that SALT and pepper will mark these relations for a long time
to come. If the past is any guide at all, the landmarks we are likely to
pass will not be ones of progress in overall relations as much as lines
we draw in our own imagination for reasons and purposes and at moments
of our own choosing. And the path along which these kinds of landmarks
are posted is likely to lead to disillusionment or worse.
Tab A
Washington, May 22, 1969.
Memorandum for President Nixon4
SUBJECT
If one had to summarize the view from Moscow in a word, it would be
“uncertainty.” Whether considering their internal situation or
surveying the external scene, the Soviet leaders must see a number
of problems and issues that are increasingly difficult and complex.
Even if the collective leadership were disposed to be more decisive,
which it is not, there are too many variables that impinge on their
calculations and over which they have only limited control and
influence.
A case might be made that the several pressures and uncertainties
with which Soviet leaders must cope may dispose them to seek
quiescence in their relations with us. Yet, for the most part these
pressures cut several ways, leading the Soviets into policy lines
that impede improved relations with us.
China
This problem is at the center of Soviet preoccupation because it
affects almost every other area of decision. The build-up which the
Soviets have made in the Far East will, by the end of this year,
have created stronger ground forces than the USSR has in Eastern Europe; this has
been and will be extremely costly, especially as the Russians create
tactical nuclear capabilities along the China border. This is an
entirely new aspect to the traditional squeeze on Soviet
military-economic resources, and one which Moscow should logically
want to alleviate.
Yet the Soviets find it difficult to cope with the China problem. The
results of the Chinese party congress offer little hope for the
future, if Lin Piao5 actually does
succeed Mao. Moreover, any forceful move greatly complicates the
situation in Europe, in the international communist movement, and
above all, would seem to call for a much more stabilized
relationship with the US and the West in general.
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There are significant barriers, however, to moving very far in this
direction.
Eastern Europe
The Soviets would prefer a tight, cohesive, ideologically orthodox
Warsaw Pact. But the two recent “summit” meetings exposed once again
the enormous problems of recreating such an alliance, without
provoking the gravest crises; meanwhile, Rumania remains determined
to create an independent position, and receives aid and comfort from
Tito, whose relations with Moscow are deteriorating.
Much the same applies to the international communist movement, which
will gather in Moscow on May 29 to prepare for the grand conclave of
June 5. The Soviets would like, of course, to lay down a new
“general line” on major issues—the imperialist threat, the Chinese,
the “Brezhnev doctrine,”6
the character of the international movement, etc. But sharp clear
positions are almost certain to provoke a showdown with the
dissident parties. So the result is likely to be a compromise which
will settle very little.
And in the background is Czechoslovakia. The situation there is, of
course, improved from the Soviet viewpoint. But they are not out of
the woods by any means. To the extent that Husak7 seeks to conciliate
Moscow and consolidate his own position, he courts popular
resistance. Yet if and as he succeeds, his strong personality and
sharp nationalist sentiments may confront Moscow with yet further
problems.
The net result is that the Soviets are reluctant to see a significant
relaxation of tension in Europe, despite propaganda exercises such
as the Budapest Appeal,8 since they are
concerned that the centrifugal forces already at work might be
accelerated.
Western Europe
At the same time, the Soviets recognize the attraction of “détente”
politics in the West, and still intend to play this line. The
uncertainties created by de Gaulle’s withdrawal,9 however, probably have upset all
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Soviet calculations. They
have already evidenced some concern over possible departures from
the Gaullist line by Pompidou.10
The principal Soviet concern, however, is whether the political
weight of Bonn does not automatically gain as de Gaulle leaves the
scene. Relations with Bonn, in any case, have been ambiguous. The
Soviets are tempted to promote a “dialogue,” especially while the
SPD is in the Grand Coalition,
and even open up the Berlin question. Recent trade overtures and
agreements with German industry also point in this direction. Any
extensive dialogue, however, creates problems for Moscow’s relations
with East Germany and Poland. Moreover, the NPT issue is a source of tensions between Bonn and
Moscow. While the Soviets have now decided to start the ratification
process, they will still withhold the final steps until the Germans
sign, which probably means after the German elections. Thus, the
issue may become acrimonious and an issue in German politics in
which the Soviets will try to involve themselves. It may also
complicate relations with us.
Middle East
On the Middle East, the Soviets have recognized the explosiveness of
the situation and the need for a breathing spell; hence their
interest in the four-power discussions and their fairly flexible
approach. But the question remains whether they believe a breather
is all that is necessary, or that a more durable settlement is
required. In the latter case, they would have to consider the cost
to their position in the Arab World of trying to reach a mutually
acceptable compromise. It is unlikely that they have faced the hard
decisions on the Middle East, since they do not seem to share our
concern over the recent deterioration of the situation.
Vietnam
A similar ambiguity seems to characterize the Soviet position on
Vietnam. In Paris they have been stonewalling and of no visible help
in the talks. Recently, however, there were some signs—in remarks by
Kosygin to Beam—that they might again take a
more active role in private talks; perhaps this was conveyed to Le
Duc Tho11 when Kosygin saw him.
The Soviets are probably still basically of two minds on Vietnam,
however. On the one hand, they could see the virtue in further
stalling, in expectation that domestic pressures in the US will
force new concessions in Paris. On the other hand, they may
recognize that Vietnam
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casts a shadow over relations with the US and may stand in the way
of proceeding on other issues. The Soviets may also be concerned
that the lack of progress in Paris vindicates the Chinese criticism
and reduces Moscow’s influence in Hanoi. But Vietnam is still a
critical issue over which the Soviets have limited leverage and no
compelling incentive to exert pressures on North Vietnam.
The US
Apparently, the uncertainties over Vietnam and the Middle East are
reinforced by doubts over relations with the US. The Soviets have
been notably patient about the SALT
talks and fairly calm in their criticism of the US ABM decision. They have also been
moderately positive in evaluating the new American administration.
And Brezhnev in his keynote
speech on May Day seemed restrained.
At the same time, the Soviets may have suspicions that the US is
improving its military position and attaching “preconditions” to
arms control talks.
SALT
That there is a greater uncertainty seems to be reflected in evidence
of a debate over military affairs. The military seem to be arguing
among themselves over weapons programs, including ABMs, and with the civilians over who
should have the last word on professional military decisions.
Civilian control is almost certainly not in danger, but concessions
to military pleading, say for new weapons programs, may affect the
political leaders’ attitude toward SALT.
Internal Pressures
These issues have been sharpened by the need to begin preparations
for the new Five Year Plan (1971–75). The Soviets are not facing an
acute economic crisis; nor are they faced with simple choices of
guns versus butter. The problems are more complex. The main one is
how to increase the rate of investment for future growth, which is
almost certain to decline further if investment rates are not
increased.
Eventually, enough political leaders may conclude that they should
cut into the military pie, which is probably exactly what the
marshals fear and are trying to head off in their contentious
articles of late.
While it can be argued that economic pressures push the Soviets in
the direction of a détente with the United States, social dissidence
and internal unrest draw the Soviet leaders into an increasingly
repressive, authoritarian mode of behavior. Some very ugly features
of the Soviet leadership are more and more apparent. Historically,
such trends in internal affairs are linked to a more defensive but
militant attitude toward the outside world.
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The Outlook
All of the foregoing does not add up to a crisis. Nor does it suggest
a more belligerent, forward policy abroad. Probably the leadership
will continue to manage, rather than solve, its principal problems,
and do so in the businesslike fashion which has characterized the
collective in Moscow since they assumed power.
From our standpoint, this may offer some opportunities. If the Soviet
leaders seem to be temporizing and are rather uncertain, then there
may be room for the US to influence decisions, especially on the
critical issues—the Middle East, Vietnam, and disarmament.
From the standpoint of the Kremlin, however, there may be those who
are impatient with a leadership which seems increasingly tired. A
change at the top, before the party congress next spring could be
one outcome. Another could be the development of a new “general
line” after the Communist conference, which is the next major
landmark which should provide us with considerable material for a
better view of Moscow’s foreign policy direction.
