Senator Percy had a long conversation over lunch with Ambassador
Dobrynin on March 27. The
Senator provided us a copy of his account of the talk and asked that I
inform you that he had followed up on your suggestion about seeing
Dobrynin. I already have
acknowledged Percy’s letter.2
Tab A
Washington, March 27, 1969.
Memorandum From Senator Charles Percy to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
TO
-
William Rogers, Secretary
of State
-
Melvin Laird, Secretary
of Defense
-
Richard Helms, Director
of Central Intelligence
- J. Edgar Hoover, Director of Federal Bureau of
Investigation
-
Henry Kissinger,
Assistant to the President
On May 27, 1968, I had lunch alone with Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy, at
his invitation, and there was a productive discussion. Last week I
invited Ambassador Dobrynin
to my home in Georgetown for luncheon. We met at 1:00 PM, Thursday,
March 27, 1969, and talked until 3:30 PM. Following are summary
statements that represent, to the best of my recollection, the
position and attitude taken on various questions. Ambassador
Dobrynin is extremely
articulate. He is very skilled, however, in talking a great deal,
seemingly in response to a question without ever directly answering
the question. It was necessary on several occasions to repeat a
question in a different way three or four times in order to get a
more direct response.
President Nixon
Percy: Do you feel that the answer I gave to your question last May,
“Is there a new Nixon?”, was
accurate and that he does appear to be a man who has a broad-gauged
view of world problems and, though firm, is not what you consider
rigid “hard line” and would approach the solution to problems with a
knowledgeable, open and reasonable attitude?
Dobrynin: Yes, the
description was not only accurate but coincided with my own
feelings. But of course we have had no real opportunity to negotiate
or work together yet.
Consular Treaty
Percy: I was pleased to see the Soviet suggestion that a consulate be
opened in one Soviet and one American city. Do you envision others
being opened?
[Page 103]
Dobrynin: There is every
reason to have additional consulates and we would have no objection
to others being opened.7
Bilateral Trade
Dobrynin: What is the outlook
for expanding trade between the Soviet Union and the United States?
We would like to do more business with your country and it would
benefit both economies. It is rather ridiculous for us to ship vodka
to Denmark and have them rebottle it and sell it to the United
States when we could sell it direct. When the Italians assured us
that they could purchase $30 million of machine tools for the Fiat
factory being built in Russia from the United States, we were highly
skeptical and we were proven right. America always puts politics
ahead of good sound economics and I am not optimistic about trading
opportunities between our two countries.
Percy: You have asked whether most favored nation treatment could be
extended to the Soviet Union and indicated that you feel no real
trade of significance compared with what went on for instance in
1930 could be carried on without such treatment. I would have to say
the chances would not be good for extension of this position to the
Soviet Union under the present circumstances. However, normalizing
East-West relationships has to be approached step by step and I
would suggest that it might be practical to consider extending
MFN treatment to some other
eastern European country such as Czechoslovakia, putting it on the
same basis as Poland and Yugoslavia, which would at least be a step
in this direction.
Dobrynin: This sounds logical
though I cannot see why Americans are so afraid of trading with the
Soviet Union.
Percy: It is directly related to the threats to American security and
the security of other nations. For instance, if the Administration
were to propose MFN being extended
to the Soviet Union today, the first opposition would come from
those who would talk about the amount of war materials being
supplied to North Vietnam by the USSR to kill American boys in South Vietnam and that
nothing can be done to just strengthen an economy with this the end
result. You have mentioned automobile manufacture but you also have
indicated that an agreement to manufacture trucks would be most
interesting from your standpoint. The provision of technical
assistance for the mass production of trucks would be directly
related to the kind of military assistance that you would be
providing to North Vietnam.
Dobrynin: We do not like to
think we need technical assistance as we are capable of making
anything we want to make. But it does stand [Page 104] to reason that we can benefit from mass
production techniques. But if we do not make agreements with the
United States we can always make agreements with European countries.
The machine tools that the United States would not furnish for the
Fiat factory are all obtainable in Western Europe and these
countries sell freely to us and are glad to have the business.
Leadership Relationships
Percy: I sat in on part of Secretary William Rogers’ testimony8 before the
Foreign Relations Committee today and brought you a copy of the full
text of his comments.
Dobrynin: Yes, I watched part
of his testimony on television and his positions were responsible.
However, I am concerned about the very strong reaction in Moscow
among our leadership against statements made by your Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird. I
tried to picture the average American sitting in front of his
television set watching Laird
talk about the Soviet intention to make a first strike on the United
States, thus depicting us as the worst kind of people. Even taking
into account the fact that we know he is trying to sell the American
people and the Congress on an ABM
system that is not very popular, he is going to extremes.9 After all, the leadership in
Moscow is only human and I am concerned about their reactions to
this kind of talk. I spent thirty days back home in January and
spent many days at a resort thirty miles from Moscow where Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorniy came with
their families and we all skied together cross country. I know their
wives and their children and I know their reactions as human beings.
They do not like to be put in the position of appearing to plot
millions of deaths or used this way for the purpose of selling an
American defense program. I am concerned about their reaction as
they have not formulated their judgment on the Nixon Administration and have tried
to hold back any judgments that might be premature. In fact, we have
not wanted in any way to poison the Russian people against the
Nixon Administration and
have not printed critical comments, hoping for the best. But time
may be running out on this.10
Disarmament
Percy: When in your judgment should talks get under way on
disarmament, how long will they take do you think, and what do you
foresee as the end result?
[Page 105]
Dobrynin: There is a growing
feeling in Moscow that the United States is really not interested in
disarmament talks.11 The Johnson Administration was ready to
go ahead with these talks, in fact anxious to do so, and a set of
principles had been laid down for such discussions. Then certain
advisers to Johnson started
to attach all sorts of conditions to these talks involving such
issues as Vietnam. We said that we would be glad to talk about
Vietnam or any other subject the United States wished to discuss,
but would not make agreements in advance. We were not particularly
anxious to have a summit meeting with an administration that had
only a few months left in office but were willing to do so. But it
never came about.
With the Nixon Administration
we are ready to have talks on disarmament tomorrow. We would also be
willing to discuss any other subject with the Administration, but as
recently as two weeks ago we were told that such talks could be held
within a period of “up to six months.” This did not reassure Moscow
that the United States was serious about wanting talks. The
Nixon Administration said
that it needed time to prepare for such talks. But look at the
amount of time it has been putting into appearing before Congress
and on television to try to sell an ABM system. It has also put in a lot of time analyzing
such a system and coming up with a program. This same amount of time
could have been put into preparing for disarmament talks that
certainly should not take six months if America considered them
important. It is a matter of priorities and the United States may
not think this is an important subject, at least that is the
impression they give.
Percy: The President may consider disarmament talks less meaningful
when we both possess the power to annihilate each other—even were
production stopped at the present level—if we leave unresolved
serious political difficulties that could bring about conflict.
Dobrynin: We are always
willing to talk about the problems of Vietnam or the Middle East or
any other subject the United States wishes to discuss, but
preconditions cannot be established if disarmament talks are to be
held.12
Percy: Does the USSR feel that it
requires an ABM directed against
China?
Dobrynin: Let me ask you how
you regard China and what your relationships should be with
China.
Percy: In my opinion it is dangerous to regard China as an “outlaw”
nation, and we should try to bring her within the community of [Page 106] nations providing she will
meet acceptable standards of conduct. But China has shown no
inclination to act as a civilized member of society. She has
steadily reduced her level of diplomatic contact with the rest of
the world, and it will be interesting to see how long she lets
Canada, where a good trading relationship could be built, cool its
heels on its suggestion for diplomatic recognition. We have had one
irrational ruler in our lifetime, Adolf Hitler, and it is always
possible that we could have another.
Dobrynin: China’s actions
against us on the border have been an interesting case in point.
They selected an unoccupied island which complicated our military
options. Had we moved across the water to their side, they would
have screamed that we were invading them, and yet they were able to
raid, withdraw and be in a position of challenging and even
embarrassing the mighty Russian Army.
Percy: Going back to disarmament, let me ask for your reaction to a
purely personal suggestion. What would you think of a mutual
moratorium by Russia and the United States on the emplacement of
missiles and nuclear warheads? Acceptable verification means are
available. Today there is a rough parity between the United States
and the Soviet Union. We do not know how long disarmament talks
would take to complete and, during the process of negotiation, an
extensive build-up of missiles by one side or the other might upset
the balance. This would seem, therefore, an excellent time for a
joint moratorium. It might provide an improved atmosphere for the
talks and the talks would have a better chance to succeed.
Dobrynin: Such a proposal
could certainly be considered but to even consider it we would have
to get talks under way and I see no real inclination to do this.
Percy: In his testimony this morning Secretary Rogers said that talks could begin
within a few months.
Dobrynin: I do not know what
your definition of “few” is. All I know is that I was told up to six
months and that does not appear to me as though there is any real
desire to get talks under way.
Percy: I am not a spokesman for the Administration and in fact
regretfully find that I differ sometimes with its judgments.
However, I will convey your impressions to the appropriate parties
and it would be my own hope that talks could be gotten under way
soon. However, the events in Czechoslovakia made it impossible to
hold talks heretofore and talks could be set back again if there
were other unfortunate happenings in that area.
Vietnam
Percy: I do believe it would be important to bring Vietnam into the
context of our talks since one act of easing tensions should relate
[Page 107] to another. I am
deeply disturbed by the lack of progress in the Paris talks. There
are, of course, some in this country who would withdraw from South
Vietnam regardless of the consequences, though I believe they are
very few in number. There are many more who feel that the cessation
of bombing by the United States has been used by the North
Vietnamese only to build up their own forces and has enabled them to
undertake another offensive which has cost many American lives.
There would be a strong body of support for the President ordering a
resumption of bombing in the North, particularly to cut off supply
lines. There are many who would support very heavy bombing on the
basis that representations to us have been betrayed and that the
North Vietnamese are making no serious effort to find the basis for
a negotiated political settlement.
Dobrynin: This would be very
foolish, in my judgment. First of all, it would be ineffective as
has been proved by all of the past bombing done by the United States
in North Vietnam. It merely unifies the North Vietnamese and
requires a greater level of support by both China and
ourselves.13 As soon as you bomb near China, she intensifies
her efforts. And were we called upon to provide a stepped-up level
of aid to a Socialist country, we could not possibly fail to respond
if we were to remain credible in the eyes of other Socialist
countries.14 The bombing of concentrated urban areas in
World War II failed to conquer a people or defeat them. That could
only be done by land armies. Of course if you intend to invade North
Vietnam with your land forces that would require a minimum of one
million men and would call for an equal or greater response by the
Chinese Army. Where would all of this get you? You already have a
great problem with world opinion. It is difficult to convince
people—the average person—that you are not a warlike nation. One of
the greatest difficulties I have when I go home is with my father
and his friends. I have been in the United States now going on my
eighth year. My father is a plumber, he works with his hands, he is
a simple man and so are his friends. But they are worried about the
intentions of the United States.
There are many Russians who believe that the United States is going
to wage war on the Soviet Union. All that our government would have
to do is say that we are going to cut back on housing, on consumer
goods and other forms of civilian production, and we are going to
double our output of armaments. We can do anything that we feel we
have to do and the Russian people will fully support us and back us
up.
[Page 108]
You must take into account that the military in the Soviet Union does
not have anywhere near the power and influence that it has in the
United States. Your Secretary of Defense sits in the Cabinet, and he
consults with the President more than almost any other top official.
Your military interests are strong in the Congress. This condition
simply does not exist in the Soviet Union. The head of our military
is not even a member of the Politburo and only infrequently sits in
on major political discussions affecting national policies.
Percy: On the other side of the scale you must take into account, and
the world should take into account, that the United States has not
used its power for the expansion of its own territories, and our
government must take into account in its planning the fact that the
Soviet Union is building either five or 25 megaton ICBM’s which do
not enhance the peace. Why is such explosive power of this magnitude
needed? There is talk that the Soviet Union is orbiting nuclear
explosives, and this is understandably disconcerting to our average
citizen.
Middle East
Percy: Before we finish we should at least have a word of the
Mideast. It is important to find a basis for settlement not only
because of the danger for the nations directly involved, but also
because we must try to avoid situations which could bring our own
two nations into dangerous confrontation.
Dobrynin: I cannot see the
situation improving in the near future. It is filled with danger and
there can be more serious outbreaks. We must do the best we can to
lessen the danger through successful four-power talks which will be
getting under way. I agree with you that the situation is dangerous
and we must act positively to lessen this danger.
On departing, Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that we get together again after
the Easter recess. The conversation was cordial and relaxed
throughout. On his arrival he was greeted by Loraine and our
children who were home from school on Easter vacation, and he was
extremely gracious to them. I highly recommend an informal home
atmosphere for relaxed discussions when an exchange of views, rather
than hard negotiating, is the purpose of the meeting.
