186. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, July 23, 1970.
SUBJECT
- Ambassador Dobrynin’s Reply
to the U.S. Mid-East Initiative
At Tab A is the text of Ambassador Dobrynin’s statement.2 At Tab B is a
detailed commentary on it.
Perhaps the most important element in the Ambassador’s exchange with the
Secretary was Dobrynin’s
categorical assurance that the cease-fire will also include a military
standstill. As we defined “standstill” in describing our initiative last
month, that would mean no major troop movements and no new installations
in the combat zone. This will be a key element in our approach to the
Israelis.
The Soviet response is:
- —mild and non-polemical in tone;
- —substantively complementary to the UAR response;
- —tantamount to a Soviet endorsement of the UAR acceptance with
no unexpected hookers.
While they do not refer explicitly to our formula for beginning of talks
under Jarring, they say that they
favor both a cease-fire and resumption of Jarring’s mission.
The Soviets have emphasized—as did the UAR—that it is essential for the
Four Powers to provide Jarring
with detailed guidelines. The next major issue then—if the details of
the cease-fire were confirmed and the Israelis accepted—would be debate
over how detailed the U.S.-Soviet agreement should be before Jarring begins talks. The
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U.S. would have a case for
resumption on the basis of its formula alone, but the Soviets could slow
the beginning of a substantive exchange pending more detailed
U.S.-Soviet agreement.
To put the Soviet reply in perspective, it must be kept in mind what the
Soviets are gaining and what they are conceding.
They would be getting indirect talks started—if
the Israelis accepted—and would be getting Israelis acceptance of at
least the principle of withdrawal. Whatever that may mean in precise
terms, it is more restrictive rather than less. The USSR also seems to see greater promise
than in the past that the U.S. is prepared to press Israel. If it is
genuinely concerned about further military escalation, it is also
getting an opportunity to stop the shooting while the Soviet involvement
appears on a rising trend of effectiveness.
They would be conceding a commitment to talk without a precise U.S. or
Israeli commitment to total withdrawal. If they honored the military
standstill, they would be stopping short of depriving Israel of air
supremacy over the Suez combat zone. They would also be accepting the
success of a unilateral U.S. initiative to get talks started. While they
have their own image of increasing military effectiveness along the Suez
Canal to rest on, they could also appear to have been influenced by the
firm stand taken in San Clemente. They would also appear to be
acknowledging tacitly their own desire to limit their military
involvement.
Above all, of course, it must be remembered that the Soviets will be in
an advantageous position if Israel does not accept. If Israel accepts,
the U.S. will have brought the situation over the first major political
hurdle but there will still be the cease-fire to be defined in credible
terms and hard bargaining ahead on both sides, perhaps even before a
serious substantive exchange can begin.
Tab B
Washington, July 23, 1970.
Paper Prepared by the National Security Council
Staff
COMMENTARY
- 1.
-
The USSR reaffirms that it
continues to seek “a settlement of this conflict through
political means on the basis of the UN Security Council
resolution.”
Comment: The USSR has been consistent on this general point.
The issue has always been the price to be paid for a
political settlement.
- 2.
-
The USSR agrees to “the
necessity of resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his
mission.”
Comment: The USSR nowhere specifically mentions the U.S.
formula for getting Jarring started. It seems implicit that the
UAR response, in Soviet eyes, takes care of that. Therefore,
the Soviets seem to be saying that they are willing to
facilitate resumption of talks on the terms the U.S. has
proposed, although that is not explicit.
- 3.
-
The USSR’s “attitude is
positive” toward Egypt’s and Jordan’s expressed “readiness
to cease fire for a definite period of time if Israel also
takes upon herself the same obligation.”
Comment: We have had no response from
Jordan ourselves, so it is interesting that the USSR is speaking for Jordan.
This may partly result from a slip in Egyptian coordination.
The main point is Soviet endorsement of the cease-fire. What
remains imprecise is whether both Egyptians and Soviets
accept the U.S. definition of cease-fire to include military
standstill—no major troop movements and no new
installations.
- 4.
-
Jarring’s success
“requires that both sides unequivocally declare their
readiness to implement” the UN resolution in all its parts.
The UAR and Jordan have declared their readiness. It is
“necessary that Israel should also clearly state her
readiness …”3
Comment: This introduces an element
of uncertainty. There has been a theological argument for
more than two years over the word “implement.” Because the
UAR claims that the Security Council resolution intends
total Israeli withdrawal, it contends that agreement to
“implement” the resolution is agreement to total withdrawal
and that all that is needed is a timetable for withdrawal.
Because the Israelis claim that the resolution only intends
negotiation of an agreement on final boundaries, it has
refused to use the word “implement.” We have supported the
Israeli argument that negotiation must precede
implementation. The element of uncertainty grows from the
fact that the U.S. formula for beginning talks—which the UAR
has now accepted—avoids this argument. It does not seem that
the USSR is setting a new
condition for beginning talks—it does not suggest a
modification of the U.S. formula to include this and seems
tacitly to leave that to the UAR. On the other hand, it does
say that Jarring’s
success “requires” such a declaration by Israel.
- 5.
-
“… in the interests of success of Jarring’s mission it is important that he
should have a definite enough understanding as to the basis
upon which contacts should take place between the sides in
search of ways to implement ‘the UN resolution’… . first of
all a direction is required on the main questions of
settlement—the withdrawal by Israel from the Arab
territories occupied during the conflict of 1967—including
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the question
of secure and recognized boundaries along the lines which
existed prior to the conflict in June 1967—and the
simultaneous establishment of a just and stable peace in the
Middle East.”
Comment: The UAR in its written
response also made the point that Jarring must have detailed
guidance. What this means is that the Arabs and the Soviets
would like the U.S. and the USSR to do the preliminary negotiating and
drafting while Jarring tries out various drafts on the
parties. The U.S. preference is for the big powers to do
less of this formally and turn over the bulk of the drafting
job to Jarring with
help from us in the wings.
- 6.
-
The USSR is expecting a U.S.
reply to its June 2 proposals.
Comment: Pressure for U.S. response
is consistent with the above point. The Soviets want the
U.S. to re-engage in the big-power talks.
- 7.
-
Parallel to resumption of Jarring’s activities, the Four Power talks
should be “made more active to work out agreed guidelines
for Jarring.”
Comment: It is difficult to know what
to make of Soviet emphasis on the Four Power forum in their
formal document, except that the Soviets have had some
success in establishing better cooperation with the French
in the last couple of months. We prefer the two-power forum.
In the supplementary note on top of the basic Soviet paper,
Dobrynin did make
it clear that Moscow wants the two-power talks to continue
active.
