146. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, March 21, 1970.
SUBJECT
- Letter From You to Premier Kosygin
At the WSAG meeting on the afternoon of
March 19,2 it
was agreed that one of the political moves which we might carry out in
response to the situation in Laos would be to go back to the Soviets
with a tough letter from you telling them that it was their duty to
support the Geneva Agreements. In this letter we would make plain that
we would not accept their contention that they had no responsibility and
add that such a reaction might have an adverse effect on US–USSR relationships.
A letter to this effect from you to Premier Kosygin is at Tab A. I consider that this letter, which
was drafted by State, appropriately conveys the message which we want
the Soviets to receive, and also lets them know the gravity with which
we view developments in Laos. I believe that your sending the letter to
Kosygin would be a useful
move. State proposes that we follow it up by sending letters from you to
each of the other Geneva signatories calling attention to the threat to
Laotian neutrality which now exists, and observing that the signatory
powers accordingly have the responsibility of supporting Prime Minister
Souvanna’s appeal for consultations under Article IV of the Geneva
Agreements on maintaining the neutrality of Laos.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter to Premier Kosygin at Tab A.
[Page 450]
Tab A3
Washington, March 21, 1970.
Letter From President Nixon to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the Soviet Union Kosygin
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I wish to thank you for your assurance that you and your government
are concerned about the situation in Laos and have considered steps
that might be taken to permit peace to return to that country. While
I agree with you on the importance of internal consultations among
the Lao themselves, I am unable to share your view that
consultations among the signatories of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on
Laos are unrealistic and would not be helpful.
Indeed, I find the position of your government illogical and
unconvincing. In your letter4 you connect the
problem of Laos with the general situation on the Indo-China
peninsula and refer to American interference in the affairs of Laos.
Therefore, even though you do not refer to the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam’s flagrant violations of the independence, neutrality and
territorial integrity of Laos or its use of Lao and Cambodian
territory for aggression against the Republic of Vietnam, you
clearly recognize the international character of the problem of
Laos, including violations of the Geneva Agreements of 1962 on Laos.
A solution to the international aspects of the Lao problem is the
proper responsibility of the mechanisms established by the 1962
Conference. I would be less than frank if I did not point out that
the opposition of your government to the holding of consultations
under Article IV of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos is
totally indefensible given your admission that you consider there
have been violations of the neutrality of Laos. It is not a question
whether the present situation is “good” for such consultations; it
is precisely because the situation is not good that such
consultations must be held. I call upon you, Mr. Chairman, as the
head of one of the two governments most specifically charged by the
Geneva Agreements with the supervision over their observance to
fulfill your responsibility and, together with the United Kingdom,
to call for consultations to consider measures which might prove to
be necessary to insure the observance of the sovereignty,
independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of
Laos.
[Page 451]
As I noted in my previous letter,5 the principal
cause of the present hostilities in Laos is the presence there of
over 65,000 North Vietnamese troops. The restoration of peace in
Laos cannot, therefore, be accomplished solely through consultations
among the political forces there as you suggest. Such internal talks
can serve a useful purpose, as they did in 1961 and 1962, as an
adjunct to international actions dealing with the basic cause of the
Lao problem, North Vietnamese aggression in Laos and use of Lao
territory for interference in the internal affairs of other
countries. I need hardly remind you that the United States air
activities in Laos are in response to these antecedent North
Vietnamese actions.
I assure you that the United States Government will spare no effort
to bring peace to Laos through full implementation of the 1962
Agreements. I welcome your assurances that the Soviet Government
will continue to make efforts aimed at the cessation of military
actions in Laos and the creation of conditions for the
re-establishment of peace and neutrality. For there can be little
doubt that failure to bring peace to Laos will have repercussions
beyond the confines of that region of the world and adversely affect
our relations. I confirm my Administration’s desire to base our
relations on the principle of negotiation rather than confrontation
and I therefore call upon you to reconsider your position concerning
consultations under Article IV of the Declaration on the Neutrality
of Laos. I again urge that your government join with mine and the
governments of the other signatories in fulfilling the
responsibilities we assumed in 1962.
Sincerely,