Tab A
Washington, December 16,
1969.
Extracts From Central Intelligence Agency
Intelligence Memorandum
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW AND
PEKING
Peking’s Perspective: A Siege Mentality
A recent tour d’horizon [1½ lines of source text
not declassified] has given us a good example of this
conspiratorial and somewhat distorted Chinese world view. Candidly
admitting that Peking had been forced into the border talks under
the Soviet gun, [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] launched into a fascinating Chinese-eye
view of Soviet foreign policy. [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] asserted that in seeking a
European security conference and attempting to improve relations
with West Germany the Soviets are trying to create a “quiet Western
front” so as to be able to “deal with China in the East.” The
clincher [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] was the Soviet-US negotiations on Seabeds and
SALT: he implied that before
coming to final grips with the China problem, Moscow feels compelled
to reach an understanding with its sometime enemy/sometime partner
in counterrevolution, US imperialism.
Meanwhile, such verbal expressions of concern over Moscow’s designs
against China are being reinforced by a “war preparations” campaign
that has been under way among the civilian population since the
beginning of the present border conflict last spring. According to a
series of [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] reports, the latest aspects of this drive are
the digging of trenches and underground personnel shelters, frequent
air raid drills in the cities, and the dispersal of a portion of the
urban population. This does not mean that Peking is anticipating an
imminent Soviet attack; fundamentally, much of what is billed as
“war preparations” is designed to promote national unity and
unpopular domestic programs. Nevertheless, such highly visible civil
defense exercises also demonstrate to Moscow that China is prepared
to resist Soviet pressure and is maintaining at least a minimum
level of readiness against an attack. According to a recent [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] report [less than 1 line of
source text not [Page 341]
declassified] the Chinese leadership, has explained the
“war preparations” campaign [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] in precisely these terms.
Noting that the campaign was aimed at the USSR rather than the US, [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] expressed a belief
that Chinese “readiness” would help deter a Soviet attack and added
that “if we did not prepare, the Soviets would certainly
attack.”
The New Sino-Soviet Equation
Whatever the course of the talks,3 this much seems clear: they are not likely to
alter significantly the present realities of the Sino-Soviet dispute
or in any way diminish the ideological and political gulf separating
the two sides. Moscow, painfully convinced of a long-term menace
posed by a Maoist China and encouraged by its success in
intimidating Peking, can be expected to maintain a hard line in
dealing with the Chinese. Even if the border remains calm the
Soviets will almost certainly see fit to continue and perhaps
increase their massive military superiority along the frontier—a
very real form of military pressure. By the same token, Moscow
appears committed to its diplomatic policy of “containment” and is
not likely to back away from its efforts to isolate China within and
without the Communist world.
It is difficult to overemphasize the impact of this Soviet policy on
China’s future domestic and international course. Peking will of
necessity remain the vulnerable and defensive party in the dispute
and the formulation of future Chinese policy may be increasingly
influenced by the shadow of Soviet hostility. On the domestic front,
such questions as proper military tactics and planning to cope with
the Soviet threat will almost certainly become contentious issues as
Peking continues its efforts to construct a new domestic order out
of the political wreckage of the Cultural Revolution. In terms of
Chinese diplomacy the effects of this new Sino-Soviet equation have
already surfaced. The recent attempt by Peking to repair its ties
with North Korea, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia were doubtless
encouraged by China’s growing awareness of its weak international
position vis-à-vis Moscow. The future course of Chinese foreign
policy will probably be increasingly motivated by Peking’s desire to
do what it can to correct this diplomatic imbalance. The fact that
Chinese diplomats in Warsaw have just received the US Ambassador for
exploratory talks is further evidence of this state of mind.
