Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

83. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, June 29, 1971, 10:40 a.m.

S: I am going to send you over a copy of the bureaucratic talking papers² for your trip to India and Pakistan. I have written a personal chit on each one and said what I think you need to do and said it in direct language and what the problems are with India and Pakistan.

K: India wants to attack Pakistan.

S: India eating its cake and wanting it too. They are supporting the guerrillas. In East Pakistan. They call on Pakistan to put army in barracks but how can they with the guerrillas. Then they say the international community must give maximum support but they tell the refugees you cannot return to Pakistan until Yahya lets [omission in the source text]. When the High Commissioner went to Delhi (?) he tried to get them to insure a U.N. presence on border so the Pakistanis could cross and this would hurt their efforts with [omission in the source text] and get the Indians [omission in the source text]. The Indians turned him down. They said it would [not?] create tensions [conditions?] where people can return and feel they will not be hurt. Get the U.N. on Pakistan side of the line. Thatʼs fine. Indians keeping the pot boiling. Itʼs difficult from the telegrams to get this and you wonʼt get it from Keating.

K: Does the Secy. agree with you?

S: I donʼt know but itʼs true. On Pakistan side, one thing you have to get across. Yahya is trying. He is surrounded by the military and not entirely free agent. He made that speech yesterday and the emphasis is fine—wants the people back. Major weakness is that while announcing program on putting together a new constitution and people elected in provisional election will come in the assembly if free elections but he has barred Awami League. Itʼs like telling Ted Kennedy not to be a Democrat. For him to maintain ban on Awami League there will be no political solution.

K: What about the AID program.

S: We tried to clarify the article³ on Sat.⁴ Made it appear that all consortium members had decided not to give aid. Not true. The World Bank representative gave a report but nothing done. A hardy defense in [omission in the source text] of Kennedy committee in favor.

K: Wonʼt we run out soon? Wonʼt we have to [omission in the source text].

S: Itʼs key and we will have to do it.

K: When? I donʼt think India should tell [us?] how to deal with Pakistan.

S: A problem on both sides. When do you leave?

K: Thurs.⁵ night.

S: You will come away with one thing. The impression of how serious this situation is. I have the feeling that you people in the WH donʼt understand how serious it is.

K: We know.

S: Not that it will explode in the end of the week.

K: No at the end of the monsoons, India will attack.

S: You have to be more pointed than Keating. Say we know you are supporting the guerrillas.

K: I will say that.

S: You will. Thereʼs too much kiss ass on this thing.

K: Thatʼs not my specialty.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2. Briefing materials for Kissingerʼs trip to South Asia in July are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1072, Briefing Books for HAKʼs SEA and PRC trips.
3. Not further identified.
4. June 26.
5. July 1.