Attachment
Washington, September 1, 1971.
Memorandum From Harold
Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National
Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)4
SUBJECT
-
Sisco–Hilaly–Yahya on the Military Aid Pipeline
[Page 375]
Ambassador Farland has cabled to
you Yahyaʼs reaction to a recent
conversation between Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Hilaly in which Sisco indicated that the possibility of the stoppage of
economic aid to Pakistan could be averted if the arms flow were shut
off. We have no record of the Sisco–Hilaly
talk—although the Paks have now provided us with the text of Hilalyʼs report5—and
were not previously informed about this approach.
Siscoʼs Proposition
According to Hilaly, Sisco called him in on August 23 and
made the following major points:
- —the question of arms shipments had become an important
internal political issue in the US with the passage of the Gallagher
amendment.6
There was every likelihood that the Senate would pass a similar
restriction which would also insist on the stoppage of economic
aid until there is a satisfactory political settlement in East
Pakistan.
- —The possibility of such a stoppage of economic aid could be
averted if the Administration agreed to cut off military supply
to Pakistan. If the delivery of some of what little remained in
the pipeline could be speeded up and the Paks agreed to
sacrifice the remainder, the Administration could then placate
the Senate by saying the pipeline had been closed and that “no
Defense stores whatsoever would move to Pakistan in the
future.”
- —Pakistanʼs stake in the “immediate resumption” of economic
aid from the consortium was much longer than its stake in the
small amount of arms remaining in the pipeline.
- —It was a mutual problem and both governments needed to help
each other and devise a political strategy that could ensure the
resumption and increase of economic aid. Sisco, “confidentially and
unofficially” suggested that both governments sit together
secretly as friends to look at what remained in the pipeline
with a view to “announcing” its final close.
Yahyaʼs Response
According to Foreign Secretary Sultan
Khan, Yahya
instructed Hilaly to inform
Sisco7 that (1) the gesture of initiating prior unofficial
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and confidential
consultation on this matter of “vital importance” is appreciated; (2) he
agreed that this was a mutual problem which required a common political
strategy.
Yahya then went on to ask that
President Nixon be informed that:
- —“We” would do well to consider the effect a public
announcement of the kind suggested by Sisco would have on Pakistan
internally and externally and on the image of US-Pak relations. Internally, it
would be a “setback” to the “strengthened good feeling toward
the Nixon Government” in
Pakistan. Externally, other states might also cut off military
supply and the impact would “merit very serious
consideration.”
- —Pakistanʼs difficulties with India would be “compounded.” It
is for “serious consideration” whether it would not be in the
US interests in South Asia to
prevent development of a “precarious imbalance” between India
and Pakistan.
- —Then (almost as an afterthought in his instructions to
Hilaly) Yahya added that the President
be informed that he “in no way wishes to weaken the position of
the Nixon Government.
Therefore, should President Nixon feel that the proposed announcement would
enable him to defeat the Democratic designs to make the existing
position a political issue for the Presidential election,
Pakistan will accept it despite the sacrifices it involves.” If
this is the case, then Yahya would at least hope that the announcement
would say “shipments of military stores to Pakistan have
terminated, and their resumption will depend upon the
improvement of the situation in East Pakistan,” and he would
hope that under these circumstances “essential supplies” could
later be “quietly resumed.”
- —Finally, Yahya “notes
with deep appreciation” the assurances that the cut off would
help the Administration to (1) save economic aid for Pakistan
(2) take a stronger line with Congress for resumption of
economic aid to Pakistan and (3) to take the lead in the
consortium for immediate resumption of international aid to
Pakistan.
Comments
Unless you have talked to Sisco or
Secretary Rogers had the
permission of the President, Sisco has been free-wheeling again. We had no idea until
this cable was received from Islamabad today (September 1) that he had
made this approach on August 23.
That issue aside, however, Yahyaʼs
response raises some important substantive questions.
- 1.
-
Yahya realizes that there is
very little (about $2.6 million) in the pipeline and that there is
virtually no chance with Congressional pressure that more will be
made available in the foreseeable future. This being the case he may
well see this as a unique opportunity to trade
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virtually nothing in military supply
for vital US economic aid and
leadership in the consortium.
- 2.
- Resumption of economic aid to Pakistan and US pressure on the consortium governments to resume aid
raises bureaucratic, Congressional and policy problems. As Sisco indicates, we might save the
possibility of resuming aid by cutting off military supply but we
will be right back in the soup again with Congress if we do this
without first having some sort of national development plan such as
the Congress expects. Taking the lead in the consortium raises the
same problem and it is doubtful we could achieve much anyway in the
consortium without such a plan. Finally, AID is no more aware of this approach than we.
Sisco has promised much
more than we may be able to deliver soon.
—A cut-off of military supply to Pakistan might gain us some points in
India but we have already been so damaged there on this issue that a
cut-off when the pipeline is almost dry will not recoup much. Moreover,
there is some question whether we really want to send the Indians this
kind of a signal now.
In short, Sisco is talking about a
trade-off that might make sense when the Senate reconvenes. But he has
raised it with the Paks without authority, without much sense of what it
would take to resume aid and over-arousing Pak expectations about
resumption.
