Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971

105. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 23, 1971, 4:10–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• South Asia

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • John N. Irwin, II
  • Joseph Sisco
  • Thomas P. Thornton
  • Christopher Van Hollen
• Defense
  • Armistead I. Selden
  • James Noyes
  • B/Gen. Devol Brett
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • Col. James M. Connell
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
  • John Waller
• AID
  • Maurice Williams
  • Donald McDonald
• NSC Staff
  • R/Adm. Robert O. Welander
  • Harold H. Saunders
  • Samuel Hoskinson
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that

• —The State Department will prepare by early next week a paper outlining what we see as a desirable outcome of the imbroglio in East Pakistan and a scenario for discussions with the Pakistanis, the Indians and possibly the Russians, including some concrete ideas on what we want each side to do.
• —We will get a statement of food requirements in East Pakistan, what is already there, the distribution problems, and the amount of the shortfall.
• —Mr. Kissinger will raise with the President the question of the lapsing on August 10 of the licenses for further shipments of military equipment to Pakistan to determine if the President wishes to put this degree of pressure on Pakistan at this time.
• —The SRG will meet again on the question late next week (subsequently scheduled for Friday, July 30).

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we should have a review of South Asia growing out of the NSC meeting² last week. Since I see our whole SALT position is in the New York Times today, I am beginning to think we should have a responsible newsman sitting in on these meetings.

As you know, the President has asked for a game plan for the next two or three months, and we have a number of problems. I want to be sure everyone understands that there is to be no India–Pakistan war if we can prevent it; we are to do absolutely nothing that might egg anyone on. There should be no doubt in anyoneʼs mind that there will be a drastic U.S. reaction if anyone resorts to military measures. I think the President made that very clear, but I can get it restated for you if necessary. The Indians should be under no illusion that if they go to war there will be unshirted hell to pay. We want to avoid a war and we will do the right things to prevent it.

Mr. Sisco: I agree: It is in our overriding interest to prevent a war. But the way we handle the Indians can either deter them or move them toward war.

Mr. Kissinger: Thatʼs true.

Mr. Sisco: If we assume that the only way to move the Indians is with a stick, I donʼt think we understand the Indian psychology. We need a combination of carrot and stick and some concentration on the proper way to use our leverage. Psychology and mood are important in terms of making the Indians believe that we are doing what we can to be helpful.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, and we are quite prepared to do that, but the Indians must not be under any misapprehension. We will do everything we can to ease the refugee problem as long as India understands the consequences of any rash action on their part.

Mr. Irwin: This is the key to the situation. The Indians are suspicious of us—they think we are pro-Pakistan. They will understand pressure if they believe we seriously want to help. But such pressure wonʼt work unless we continue to push the Pakistanis so that the flow of refugees slows or stops, with some possibility of the return of the refugees to East Pakistan or the achievement of some political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree; we must make the greatest effort to get the refugee flow to stop. The Indians are not generating any refugees, are they? Or are they just discouraging them from going back?

Mr. Sisco: This will take simultaneous action on both sides. So that, as far as Pakistan is concerned, political accommodation is at the root of the problem. There are, of course, certain limitations on what Yahya can do. In his June 28 speech, he promised a turnover of power in East Pakistan in four months. I may think this is as far as he can go. We must recognize, however, that real progress is unlikely if a turnover of political power is coupled with a banning of the Awami League. The June 28 speech was a step forward but it was inadequate in producing a serious prospect of political accommodation, and we must encourage Yahya to do more in this regard. Yahya has been very good about accepting a UN presence and in declaring amnesty and inviting the refugees back to their villages. But he has not moved the army back to their barracks, primarily because they are still needed to deal with incidents throughout East Pakistan. India is still supporting the liberation movement including assisting border crossings. Any advice we might give Yahya to put his army back in their barracks wonʼt get anywhere as long as the situation prevails. On the other side of the coin, although we gave India $50 million to help with the refugees, they are refusing U Thantʼs request for a UN presence on the Indian side of the border.

Mr. Kissinger: The Indian Ambassador told me they considered the UN request for observers an unfriendly act.

Mr. Sisco: I agree, we have to support the Secretary General on both sides. India is linking the return of the refugees to some political accommodation. To the degree to which this is likely, that is all to the good. But these actions must be taken in parallel. We also should possibly find a way to begin to engage the Russians.³ We have a common Soviet Union might encourage military adventures by India. Dobrynin replied that the Soviet Union was providing political support to India but was actively discouraging military adventures. Kissinger warned that a war between India and Pakistan could not be localized in East Pakistan and might not be confined to the subcontinent. (Memorandum of conversation, July 19; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7, Part 2) interest here to see that the situation does not explode. There are responsible actions which need to be taken by both sides, accepting the fact that they are operating under some limitations.

Mr. Irwin: I agree basically. But in order to get India in a position to move, it would be helpful to get the UN moving on the Pakistani side. It would be helpful if we could get the flow of refugees down to the point where the UN could say “now we need a UN presence on the Indian side, too.” We should continue to push India toward moving the refugees back but we may not be successful until there is broader pressure. One way would be to move the UN into Pakistan first.

Mr. Kissinger: Yahya is not making his acceptance of UN presence dependent on acceptance by India.

Mr. Sisco: Thatʼs right; the Pakistanis have already responded favorably.

Mr. Kissinger: There is no question that this is an issue of profound emotion to the Indians. My impression is that the Indians have a tendency to build to hysteria from which they wonʼt know how to escape. They could bring about a major confrontation, and I am not confident that China would not come in in the circumstances.

Mr. Sisco: I agree that the Indian psychology is such that they may well paint themselves into a corner to the point that the only alternative they can see is the use of force. Given this mood, something like a continued supply of arms to Pakistan could build up disproportionately until the Indians lock themselves in.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Indians know that the amount of arms that is moving is rather small. They know we have held in abeyance the one-time exception, and that that was a big step. They also know they have received more U.S. aid than any other nation. However, when I was there, their press was vicious and they made no effort to calm it down. I wonder whether this is the result of the situation or whether it is helping to create it. If we assume that the question of human suffering is a big factor in the Indian outrage (although I have my own views on the Indian attitude toward human suffering), if they knock off East Pakistan, it will produce an upheaval, with untold additional human suffering in West Pakistan. I donʼt think the Indians have a master plan but they could slide into a major crisis.

Mr. Irwin: With regard to military equipment to Pakistan, we might consider my talking to Jha and telling him exactly how much is involved to prove to him that the amounts are very small.

Mr. Kissinger: I have told them that. I have no specific view on your suggestion, but we must strike a balance between excessive reassurance and excessive frightening.

Mr. Irwin: Jha has said that we have helped them economically but never politically. Theyʼre really schizophrenic. They appreciate what we have done for them but are distrustful of us. Of course, they have never been with us politically.

Mr. Sisco: When many Americans think of India they think of Krishna Menon, and thatʼs not an inaccurate image.

Mr. Kissinger: On the Pakistani side, it is my impression that Yahya and his group would never win any prizes for high IQs or for the subtlety of their political comprehension. They are loyal, blunt soldiers, but I think they have a real intellectual problem in understanding why East Pakistan should not be part of West Pakistan. You will never get acceptance of the Awami League from the present structure. If India attacks, it will be in the next six months. The Pakistanis will not put the Awami League back in power in the next six months. It seems inevitable that any political process will end with some degree of autonomy for East Bengal. Can we get a program that separates the refugee issue while still leaving a vista for political accommodation? The Pakistanis donʼt have the political imagination to do this themselves.

Mr. Helms: I agree Yahya simply does not see any political solution.

Mr. Sisco: If the Indians come to the conclusion that there is no hope of any accommodation, this continued frustration could lead to what we would consider irrational Indian action.

Mr. Kissinger: The Indians have a right to want to get the refugees off their territory but they have no right to insist on any particular political formula to do so.

Mr. Irwin: I know the Prime Minister told you they would not insist on any formula but Jha is insisting on reinstitution of the Awami League.

Mr. Kissinger: Thatʼs true. They are at the same time supporting a liberation movement and saying that the Awami League has to come back. If we can get a planned program geared to the refugees coming back we might have a chance to pressure Yahya. He has been pretty good about the refugees.

Mr. Irwin: He has been good in what he says but we have some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indications that this is just a front. (to Mr. Helms) Does Yahya really intend to get many Hindu refugees back?

Mr. Helms: We just donʼt know with any certainty.

Mr. Sisco: There were two factors in the use of force against the Hindus: (1) the fact that the primitive Punjabi peasants really took it out on the Hindus, and (2) the basic Pakistan policy of getting rid of the Hindus. If Yahya does what he says he will do, I think he will get 90–95 percent of the Moslems back and maybe 50 percent of the Hindus. Our posture has to be that all refugees come back.

Mr. Kissinger: We could press Yahya on that, but not on accepting the Awami League. If we press him on the Awami League and he refused, that could be the basis for an Indian attack.

Mr. Sisco: We will have to nudge Yahya toward the Awami League. We will also have to do what we can to see that he does not try Mujib.⁴ I will weigh in with Hilaly on that.

Mr. Helms: But as long as the liberation forces are shooting up East Pakistan, nothing will really help.

Mr. Irwin: Are there any Awami Leaguers left in East Pakistan that Yahya could deal with?

Mr. Kissinger: Yahya claims he could get 45 to 60 out of the 167 Awami Leaguers.

Mr. Van Hollen: That estimate is high.

Mr. Irwin: It would help if he could find a few Awami Leaguers who still had some respect in East Pakistan with whom he could deal.

Mr. Kissinger: He says he could get 45 to 60 of them and hold by-elections for the seats of all the others. We could either see him disenfranchise 167 out of 169 Assembly members or ask him to do something he might not be able to do. I talked with the Army Chief of Staff and he was harder than Yahya.

Mr. Sisco: I agree that Yahya does not have complete freedom of movement.

Mr. Kissinger: I am no expert but I think the situation could be building toward war. India is torn between wanting the refugees to go back and wanting to use them as a pretext for a move against Pakistan. Pakistan is most flexible about wanting the refugees back but is least flexible about the possibility of restoring the Awami League.

Mr. Williams: I think thatʼs too sharp a dichotomy. In the first place, I donʼt think Yahya can be talked out of his attitude toward Mujib. And the refugees canʼt be talked into going back unless there is some political accommodation.

Mr. Helms: But first we have to get the Indians to stop screwing around in East Pakistan.

Mr. Williams: And when the famine conditions increase, we will have even more refugees.

Mr. Kissinger: Dickʼs (Helms) question is crucial. If the Indians are serious, they should stop screwing around with the liberation forces.

Mr. Irwin: Jha takes the position that the overall fighting has stopped but that the refugees continue. He claims this is the result of selective pressure by Pakistan which is forcing out additional refugees. Until this stops, he claims, there wasnʼt much India could do but help the guerrillas. If the refugee flow could be reduced to a trickle the Indians wouldnʼt have that excuse. Itʼs a chicken-and-egg situation.

Mr. Helms: Itʼs a see-saw.

Mr. Sisco: It is the result of Pakistanʼs use of force in the early days. Also, of the continuation of guerrilla action and of the general dislocation in East Pakistan. We canʼt tell Yahya to put his army back in their barracks when India has training camps on the border, is engaged in border crossings and is actively supporting the liberation movement.

Mr. Helms: (to Mr. Sisco) You mentioned a possible Russian role. I never like to see us get involved with the Russians any more than we have to, but the Russians did a rather good job at Tashkent and they do have some swot with India. This may be one way of getting at them.

Mr. Sisco: In any question of a UN presence, we will certainly want the support of every Security Council member. Also, Russia can influence the Indians. We canʼt afford another Palestine refugee operation with the Russians standing on the sidelines. We would need them both politically and financially. That makes it more important that the question of the refugees be depoliticized and that the humanitarian aspect is emphasized. If India wonʼt accept even a limited UN presence, there will be political problems all across the board. Absolutely nothing will move and the situation will continue to deteriorate.

Mr. Kissinger: Where does that leave us?

Mr. Sisco: With what we are doing now—trying to hit all things simultaneously.

Mr. Irwin: I think we can and should talk again to the Indian Ambassador here and possibly to the Russians.

Mr. Kissinger: I would like to get a better conception of exactly what it is we are trying to accomplish. If we are going to talk to the Russians, we had better be goddam sure we know what we are going to say.

Mr. Irwin: We will get together a scenario on exactly what we would say to the Indians, the Pakistanis and the Russians.

Mr. Helms: Thatʼs very important.

Mr. Kissinger: We must be clear in our own minds what constitutes a desirable outcome. What do we want the Pakistanis to do precisely?

Mr. Irwin: We want to reduce the flow of refugees to a trickle.

Mr. Kissinger: The Pakistanis will agree with that objective but we will have to tell them what to do to bring it about. Both the President and I have some money in the bank with them. We might get them to do something if we know what we want them to do.

Mr. Sisco: In approaching the Pakistanis I think we should say that we are prepared to take certain actions with the Indians. We will tell India to hold down its logistic support of the guerrillas. I think we should draw a distinction between logistical support and actual border crossings. We will tell India to accept a UN presence and to cooperate with it. If we do this with India, what will you—the Pakistanis—do to create more normal conditions in East Pakistan? We could suggest to them that they cut down Pakistani army activities in East Pakistan, even get the army back in their barracks. We could say that we assume Pakistan will cooperate with the UN. We also think Pakistan should implement what Yahya has said they will do about the refugees. We also think that they should do what they can in terms of the political process. For example, Yahya has said he will transfer power to East Pakistan within four months. Could they speed this transfer to two months? Could they try to get as many Awami League people back as possible?

Mr. Williams: As long as the Pakistani army is both fighting and running the country they wonʼt be able to do much. It is absolutely necessary to get the army out of the civil administration. They donʼt give a damn and they arenʼt very good at it. That means speed up the process at least to get a quasi-Bengali political apparatus in East Pakistan.

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Selden): What does Defense think?

Mr. Selden: Itʼs a good idea. We need a scenario.

Adm. Moorer: Before we can get the Pakistanis to do something, India must give some visible evidence that they are not engaging in these border crossings. Just the other day they destroyed a bunch of powerhouses and they are attacking the soldiers in their barracks. As long as there is military activity by India, Pakistan wonʼt move. It has to be simultaneous. I am not sure India does not want to see this turmoil continue.

Mr. Selden: Where do we get these refugee figures from? Are these Indian figures?

Mr. Waller: They are fairly accurate.

Mr. Sisco: They are using the figure of 7 million but it wouldnʼt make much difference if it were 5 million. The Pakistanis donʼt seriously question the figures.

Mr. Kissinger: If we have only three plus months and plan on talking to Hilaly and Jha, we must come up with some concrete ideas on what we want each side to do. If we then make this a yardstick for what we will do, we might have a chance.

Mr. Irwin: We will put something down on paper.

Mr. Kissinger: There is a related problem. Mr. Williams has pointed out that the food situation in East Pakistan may generate a new flood of refugees. Can we set up something now to help in a food crisis? Can we do something to help them return to normal distribution procedures?

Mr. Williams: This is why I am stressing the weaknesses in the administrative structure.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we express what we want in terms of an administrative structure? Can we internationalize food relief? We shouldnʼt just let this famine hit us unprepared.

Mr. Helms: The difficulty is that they need 3.5 million tons of food and can only distribute 2 million.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we put them in a position to distribute more?

Mr. Helms: They have put a very weak man in charge of this.

Mr. Van Hollen: They have recently appointed Malik who has only limited competence. The best thing in his favor is that he is a Bengali.

Mr. Sisco (to Mr. Williams): Can you tell Henry what we have done specifically?

Mr. Williams: When M.M. Ahmad was here we told him he had a serious food problem coming up. We had a whole list of concrete steps that could be taken, including giving them $2 million to charter transport, but the army just doesnʼt give a damn and isnʼt good at this kind of thing anyhow, and the Bengalis wonʼt level with the army about what the problems really are.

Mr. Kissinger: We can expect that every one of these problems will get worse over the next few weeks. If famine is inevitable with the resulting increase in the outflow of refugees, there will be strong pressures here at home. Should we be prepared to squeeze the Pakistanis on this? Maybe if we organize ourselves here, we can get them to do something there.

Mr. Williams: One of the big problems, of course, is that most food relief operations are close to the border and susceptible to Indian interdiction.

Mr. Kissinger: But if the food programs are internationalized, this might be a way of restraining the Indians. They may be less likely to blow up an international transport. (to Mr. Irwin) Put into your paper a detailed program of what you want. We in this building are prepared to press Pakistan to do whatever will help but we need to put our greatest weight on the things that matter.

Mr. Williams: The Pakistani Army is very thinly stretched in East Pakistan. They are extremely short of transport and they have been commandeering trucks. The real problem is in getting an effective operation going.

Mr. Sisco: We might think in terms of a massive emergency movement of transport which could be monitored by us or by an international group to see that it gets to the right place. We have two problems: the food that is getting there is not adequate for three months from now and the administrative structure cannot cope with its distribution.

Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Williams): Have we got all the food into the port⁵ that the warehouses can take?

Mr. Williams: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a statement of their requirements, what is actually there, and what the shortfall will be. The food situation can only get tougher. We should start to do our part now.

Mr. Helms: This will make Biafra look like a cocktail party.

Mr. McDonald: We have prepared a detailed plan on this. A Department of Agriculture man came out and did a detailed study⁶ which we understand Yahya read personally. It spelled out specific policies and actions but none of its recommendations have been carried out.

Mr. Kissinger: Maybe Yahya canʼt do it; maybe it requires an international effort. If Yahya were willing to have international observers in the villages maybe he could get the refugees back.

Mr. Williams: A UN structure has begun to be staffed.

Mr. Kissinger: It is true that the UN was very slow in supplying personnel?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but it is moving pretty well now.

Mr. Williams: They are getting some people there and beginning to build a structure.

Mr. Sisco: They are still trying to get Indian agreement, of course.

Mr. Kissinger: Letʼs get a scenario early next week and have an other meeting on this later in the week.

Letʼs talk about military assistance now.

Mr. Irwin: You know our views. However, we now only have $14–$15 million to go and thatʼs not going to go in the next two weeks. We would have originally recommended a complete embargo but now this may not be so significant. By August 10, $10 million of the outstanding licenses will have expired, with only $4 million left outstanding.

Mr. Sisco: We can let the pipeline slowly dry out. In part, of course, we will be influenced by the degree of success we have in modifying the Gallagher Amendment⁷ to permit us sufficient latitude.

Mr. Noyes: If we are talking about a confrontation with Pakistan over military supply, the fatʼs already in the fire.

Mr. Sisco: We have put a hold on the one-time exception to our arms policy involving 300 APCs and some aircraft. We believe this hold should be maintained. Nothing has been delivered and nothing is scheduled to be delivered. Since March 25 no new licenses have been issued and we do not intend to issue any new licenses, although we have a hundred requests. There is about $15 million in the pipeline based on licenses issued before March 25.

Mr. Kissinger: I am not aware of any Presidential decision not to issue licenses.

Mr. Sisco: This was considered at your last SRG meeting.⁸

Mr. Selden: I think we need a definition of “arms.”

Mr. Sisco: We will put in our paper what we think the policy is.

Mr. Kissinger: The Pakistanis complained specifically to me about a motor for some experimental tank. I just want to be sure we understand where we are. I agree the Pakistanis are not upset about arms now.

Mr. Sisco: Not at all; they are grateful that we havenʼt stopped entirely.

Mr. Kissinger: What happens when the licenses expire?

Mr. Sisco: It will be a year before everything that is in the pipeline has been delivered. But we have agreed that we will not renew licenses or issue new ones.

Mr. Selden: We still need a definition of “arms.” Are we talking about such things as tires and spark plugs?

Mr. Kissinger: I donʼt want to reopen the whole question of arms for Pakistan.

Mr. Sisco: It would be suicide to resume deliveries.

Mr. Kissinger: And the Pakistanis donʼt want it.

Mr. Sisco: We will get a statement of our position on paper.

Mr. Kissinger: Do the Pakistanis understand that the pipeline is closing on August 10?

Mr. Sisco: Let me be sure you understand. By the middle of August $11 million of the $15 million worth of licenses will have been used or will have expired. This does not mean that the material will have been delivered. It will be somewhere in the pipeline.

Mr. Kissinger: Can it be delivered after August 10?

Mr. Van Hollen: Some of it will have been shipped by August 10.

Mr. Irwin: But if it isnʼt shipped by August 10 it would not be permitted to be shipped.

Mr. Kissinger: How much of the $10 million will be shipped? Do the Pakistanis know they are under the guillotine?

Mr. Sisco: They will still have $4 million left.

Mr. Kissinger: Not even the Indians can make something out of that. In other words, by August 15 we will have done exactly what the President did not want to do in June except for $4 million.

Mr. Saunders: I donʼt think anyone here understood what the effect would be.

Mr. Noyes: You understand that everything from the Defense Department is still under a complete hold.

Mr. Irwin: We hope that when the military supply fades out, we can get the same effect from humanitarian and food assistance.

Mr. Kissinger: Isnʼt this a stricter embargo than 1965?

Mr. Van Hollen: No, we had a complete embargo for some months in 1965–66. In 1966 we began providing non-lethal equipment and in 1967 we began giving them spares for equipment that was considered lethal.

Mr. Irwin: Of course, they can buy spark plugs and things commercially. They are only barred from getting them out of FMS stocks.

Mr. Kissinger: So we have cut off economic and, in effect, we are cutting off military assistance by indirection. All we did was give them an additional six weeks.

Mr. Sisco: What do you mean “six weeks”?

Mr. Kissinger: In June the President specifically did not approve cutting off the supply of military equipment. Now you are getting it by indirection.

Mr. Sisco: We have done nothing differently. The deliveries to which we were committed are already made. It is a question of whether or not we make new commitments.

Mr. Van Hollen: The Presidentʼs reply to our recommendation was to continue present policy.

Mr. Kissinger: I will find out exactly what he thought present policy was. I thought it was that the licenses were to continue. I will find out if it is the Presidentʼs policy to put this degree of pressure on Pakistan at this time. How much of the $11 million will be shipped by August 10?

Mr. Van Hollen: The Munitions Control Group say they canʼt determine the amount but it will be substantially less than $11 million. The licenses are valid for only a year.

Mr. Irwin (to Mr. Van Hollen): Can they be extended?

Mr. Van Hollen: No.

Mr. Kissinger: You can damn well extend them if you are told to. If 90 percent of the material is shipped and then the licenses lapse, thatʼs one thing. If 5 percent is shipped, thatʼs another. The Pakistanis donʼt know what we are doing to them. They are not pressing for new licenses. It has not penetrated that of the material that was licensed in March, 90 percent may be cut off on August 10.

Mr. Van Hollen: It should have; we have told them.

Mr. Kissinger: But they may not realize that goods purchased under license and not yet shipped canʼt be shipped. We donʼt want the Pakistanis to believe that we have put it to them in a devious way.

Mr. Sisco: No one can tell us how much of the $11 million will have been shipped by then.

Mr. Van Hollen: But the feeling is that a substantial proportion will not be shipped.

Mr. Irwin: We should make sure the Pakistanis understand this.

Mr. Van Hollen: The Pakistani Military Supply Mission here knows the exact status of the shipments. They bug Defense about it all the time.

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Noyes): Do I understand you think some spare parts should be opened up to them?

Mr. Noyes: We have $11 million in Defense stocks that are being held completely. These are mostly spare parts and the Pakistani military are constantly asking us about them.

Gen. Brett: Just today the Pakistani Group Captain asked me about starting cartridges for the B–57s. The shipments have been licensed but are still being held in our depots.

Mr. Kissinger: When was this hold order issued?

Gen. Brett: April 4.

Mr. Kissinger: Who issued that order?

Gen. Brett: Mr. Packard. Then, following the April 19 SRG meeting, the supplies were opened up again. Then we understood Mr. Packard and Mr. Sisco had agreed to reinstitute the hold and we got an order from Packard in writing to hold back.

Mr. Kissinger: Thank you.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting was prepared in OASD/ISA by the Director of the Near East and South Asia Region, Brigadier General Devol Brett. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan–Jul 1971)
2. See Document 103.
3. Kissinger discussed the emerging confrontation between India and Pakistan with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 19. Kissinger said that he had received reports that the
4. The Embassy in Islamabad reported on July 22 that rumors were circulating that the Martial Law Administration was preparing for an in-camera trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. (Telegram 7430 from Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 PAK)
5. Reference is to the port of Chittagong in East Pakistan.
6. See footnote 3, Document 102.
7. Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher (D–New Jersey) offered an amendment to pending foreign assistance legislation that called for the suspension of all military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan until the President could report to Congress that Pakistan was facilitating a return to stability in East Pakistan, and until the refugees from East Pakistan were permitted to return to their homes and to reclaim their lands and property. (Subsection (V) (1) of Section 620 of Chapter 2 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted in favor of the Gallagher amendment on July 15. On October 5 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted the language approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
8. See Document 32.