Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

333. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

January 23, 1973, 1815Z.

WHS 3109. Deliver at opening of business.

1. Everything went smoothly in my meeting with Le Duc Tho and we initialed the agreement and protocols at about 1 o’clock.² We got a textual change on the arms for police forces, and unilaterally stated our views on the definition of police forces in Article 1 of the ceasefire protocol versus Article 6.³ I also explained to Tho privately the South Vietnamese concern about release of their military and civilian personnel captured or detained outside of South Vietnam.⁴

2. I saw Foreign Minister Lam and the other South Vietnamese officials in Paris immediately upon my arrival Monday night and after today’s meeting for lunch.⁵ I listened sympathetically to their residual concerns on the protocols before today’s meeting with Tho and briefed them on the results. We ended on a warm note, with Lam thanking us for our efforts on their behalf and a mutual recognition for unity in the period ahead. I took every occasion to publicly associate myself with Lam and the South Vietnamese while I was in Paris.

3. With respect to Thieu’s concerns about the release of the texts, it is just impossible to change the schedule at this point. Lam also raised this concern with me and I explained why we couldn’t delay. As I told him, the release time is now set for 1000 repeat 1000 instead of 1100, Washington time, January 24. We are forwarding immediately the final Vietnamese texts of all the documents which the GVN will need at that end as soon as possible. It is impossible to have a three-day hiatus between the initialing and the signing during which the provisions of the agreement would not be released. There is no way to keep these provisions secret, given the number of people who are now privy to them, and we would run the great risk of selective or distorted revelations. The U.S. Congress and press would be merciless in ferreting out the information. Under the present procedure we can immediately take the initiative in presenting the agreement in positive fashion. In short, you took the correct line at your end and you should use the above arguments to the extent that you think it would be helpful.

4. On Monday night Lam asked us also to delay the signing until after Tet. Tuesday morning we sent him a note explaining that the President had considered their request carefully but that it was impossible to change the schedule. Lam also asked for understandings associated with the agreement. We provided him with the following, copies of which Haig gave you: Laos and Cambodia; reconnaissance; definition of the parties in Article 8; and our unilateral statement on Cambodia. You need not provide these to the GVN at that end and should not refer to any others.

5. During this most rewarding day, I have thought warmly of your outstanding performance at that end, without which we could not have made it.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger was en route to Washington from Paris.
2. Kissinger also sent a very short note, Hakto 9, January 23, 1505Z, to Scowcroft which reads in part: “Everything went smoothly at the meeting with Le Duc Tho. We tied up all loose ends without difficulty and the actual initialing took place around 1300.” In the message he also told White House staff to release the texts of the agreement and accompanying picture at a set time, to order the Department of State to tell the Canadians and Indonesians to put their forces on a three-day alert, and to “Please keep us fully informed about the public/press/bureaucratic state of play in the U.S. so that we have a running start when we arrive.” (Ibid.) The agreement and protocols were released by the White House on January 24.
3. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting, January 23, 9:35 a.m.–1:20 p.m., is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 866, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David Memcons, January 8–13, 1973 [January 23, 1973].
4. Kissinger failed to mention in this message the topic he and Le Duc Tho discussed at greatest length during the almost 4-hour meeting—United States funding of postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam. Their dialogue about funding economic reconstruction takes up 10 of 31 pages in the transcript. According to Kissinger’s memoirs, “Le Duc Tho managed even on this solemn occasion to make himself obnoxious by insisting on ironclad assurances of American economic aid to North Vietnam. I told him that this could not be discussed further until after the agreement was signed; it also depended on Congressional approval and on observance of the agreement.” (White House Years, p. 1472)
5. Memoranda of conversation of the January 22 meeting (11:35–12:35 a.m.) and the January 23 meeting (1:30–2:35 p.m.) are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 104, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam, South Vietnam, GVN Memcons, November 20, 1972–April 3, 1973 [1 of 3].