332. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig)1

0911—Secure Telecon/Out—Gen Haig, USA (WH)—Tue, 1/23/73

CJCS—Welcome back, Al,2 I know you are pretty busy, but there are two or three things I’d like to discuss. We are just kind of standing by over here in a vacuum so to speak. I have been of course following HAK’s instructions which were passed down from the President in which he wanted us to lay on a heavy effort in Cambodia which is the [Page 1153] least stable area of all. Now I am getting a lot of questions from Laird. He wants to know how did I figure out the targets—what intelligence I have—how many civilians have been killed—it’s a typical Pursley-gram and it is supposed to be due in tomorrow but I think he’ll be gone by then,3 but I just wanted you to know that.

Haig—We are talking about a period of about a week here and if there should be a Ceasefire during the period following the Ceasefire we want to keep going in Laos.

CJCS—You mean a Ceasefire in Cambodia?

Haig—No, in SVN if there is one Lon Nol will announce unilaterally that he is also terminating all offensive operations in Cambodia. He will do that to put the pressure on the other side for a de facto Ceasefire. They may not want to abide by it. So what we have to do is cut down on our air activity in Cambodia as soon as the Ceasefire which might go into effect in SVN.

CJCS—Coincident with the announcement of Lon Nol’s?

Haig—So that the onus is not on us of escalating the war and we’ll watch the attackees or anything else and once they break that unilateral action he has made we are going to start pouring it in there. In the case of Laos there is no difference we just continue to overfly SVN south of the DMZ to support Laos and our base stuff in Thailand.

CJCS—Continue to operate the carriers in the Tonkin Gulf south of the DMZ.

Haig—But we cannot use any landbased air and in Vietnam you have those two Marine Squadrons that you’ve got to get out and we’re talking for planning purposes about Saturday night our time.4

CJCS—It goes into effect?

Haig—In SVN, and you should not say to anyone what I’ve just told you and it’s just for your own thinking.

CJCS—I think that makes it all set. We haven’t made a move at all towards any action in preparing for minesweeping or sending an advance party to Thailand or anything like that.

Haig—And it shouldn’t be as it is still dependent upon some things still to be done.

CJCSHAK is on his way back now?5

Haig—Yes.

CJCS—Is that going to be explained?

[Page 1154]

Haig—We’ll have something out very shortly. We will be in touch with you immediately. You’ll be the first to know but it will be fairly evident.

CJCS—Okay, thank you, you can’t get away from over there?

Haig—No, but I don’t mind on this one.

CJCS—You seem to have some doubt about the Ceasefire?

Haig—Not really.

CJCS—Okay.

Gen—Okay, my friend, stay with them.

Adm—Right, thank you for calling.

Gen—Good to talk with you.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Secret.
  2. Haig returned on January 21 from his trip to South Vietnam and other Asian nations.
  3. Laird’s tenure as Secretary of Defense ended on January 29.
  4. January 27.
  5. Kissinger was en route to Washington from the initialing ceremony in Paris.