Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

269. Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Paris¹

Saigon, January 12, 1973, 0538Z.

Tohak 100/322. Deliver opening of business. Deliver by 0700 Paris time. Ref: Hakto 21.²

1. Thank you for another encouraging report. Concerning the questions you asked (paragraph 10, reftel):

Signing formula. I think the phrase “acting in concert with” would be more acceptable to the GVN than “with the concurrence of” although I do not think the advantage such as to warrant another prolonged argument. I believe the arrangement by which the US and the GVN would sign on one page and the DRV and PRG on another page should appeal to the GVN maintaining, as you say, the two sided character of the Paris conference which the GVN has always insisted on emphasizing.

• —I do not have anything additional to suggest on the signing procedure except to repeat that I think the GVN would prefer one document with the preamble referring to the “parties participating in the Paris conference on Viet-Nam”, but I assume that is not in the cards.
• —I would plan to inform Thieu about Haig’s trip on Saturday, January 12, Saigon time. I would plan to say “The DRV has shown a more constructive and reasonable attitude during the talks held this past week and in view of the progress which has been made, the President has asked General Haig to come to Saigon again to report on the status of the negotiations. We believe that we now have reached a point where we are in a position to conclude the agreement and, of course, we expect to move along together.” Please let me know whether this is satisfactory and whether there are additional points you think it advisable to make.

2. I hope that Haig will be authorized to repeat the assurances the President gave to Duc,³ provided the GVN joins the US in a positive fashion, i.e.:

1) He will make a statement at the time of signing that the US recognizes the GVN as the only legal government of South Viet-Nam;

2) The US does not recognize the right of any foreign troops to be present on GVN territory;

3) The US will react strongly in the event of violation;

4) The President is prepared to meet with President Thieu personally within two weeks after the agreement is signed.

3. I assume that the agreement now is basically the November draft with the changes sent to us in your WHS 2295, December 27, 1972, as modified in your subsequent messages this week.⁴ Since the GVN was fully briefed in Paris on the December meetings they should have this text with the exception of the changes agreed to this week. Given his suspicious nature I think we should avoid confronting Thieu with anything he could construe as a surprise and which he could take as a pretext for more fiddling around. Therefore, I think it would be desirable to send him as much as we can of the texts, including the protocols, before Al Haig arrives.

4. Scenario: I assume also that Haig will be authorized to inform Thieu that we would initial the agreement January 23 whether or not the GVN goes with us. As I have mentioned a number of times I think this is essential if we are to get a decision from Thieu. I believe if we establish a deadline, he will agree to go with us in some form, but whether he agrees or not unless there is a deadline he will attempt to string-out the talks as he has done in the past.

5. It seems to me that the President’s proposed statement January 18 indicating agreement in principle with negotiations to be concluded in Paris January 23 is too close to Haig’s visit here. It makes his visit appear pro forma, merely to announce a fait accompli. This will go down hard with Thieu. If the announcement could be postponed to, say, the 20th or 21st with the initialing to take place the 25th, I think it would be preferable. The signing ceremony could still take place on January 26 or 27. If Thieu agrees to go with us would it not be desirable to have a joint announcement by the President and Thieu that there is agreement in principle, with the negotiations to be concluded in Paris January 25? This would enhance GVN status and conform to method we have used previously in making joint proposals for a settlement.

6. Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 28, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris Trip Tohak 67–146, January 7–14, 1973. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via the White House Situation Room and Guay.
2. See footnote 3, Document 265.
3. The two met on November 29 and 30, 1972; see Documents 131 and 134.
4. Reference is to Haig’s backchannel message WHS 2295 to Bunker, December 28, 1972, 0010Z. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 50, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Peace Talks, Chronological File, 16 Dec. 1972–13 Feb. 1973 [2 of 11]) Regarding “subsequent messages,” see footnote 4, Document 256 and footnote 3, Document 265.