Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

227. Conversation Between President Nixon and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, December 27, 1972.

Nixon: And I think we’ve got to give them [North Vietnamese] two or three more days then.

Kennedy: Run it up. Run it up until they agree to the timetable, now, that we have suggested, again.

Nixon: Well, we, as I understand, have offered to go back. We will—we will announce the [December] 31st and stop bombing them until the [January] 8th. That makes sense, doesn’t it?

Kennedy: Right. Yes, sir. I think it does.

Nixon: We should have a one-day off, anyway, there.

Kennedy: Well, when you—once it’s agreed between the two sides that, in fact, they’re gonna go back—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: —it would be—it would be awfully difficult to—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kennedy: —to announce that fact. And if you didn’t, they would.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: And then still continue the bombing. I think it’d be a very difficult thing to do. I—personally, I would like to do it. I’d like to let it run until—

Nixon: Right up to the 8th—

Kennedy: —until they sit down at the table.

Nixon: That’s why I said to Henry, I said, “Why not make them [unclear]? We could always try for the 31st. They know what the hell we’re going to do.”

Kennedy: But, I think it’s—on balance, I think you—

Nixon: It’s not too bad.

Kennedy: —it’s—

Nixon: We’d like to get it better, something announced before the 1st of year, anyway, before the Congress starts back, and we can keep them guessing a while.

Kennedy: We—the plan would be to have the experts—

Nixon: Meet on the 2d?

Kennedy: —go back to work on the 2d—

Nixon: That’s fine.

Kennedy: —which would, again, show that movement. And if they’re—if they’re serious it should be a matter of concluding the thing in pretty short order. If they’re serious.

Nixon: Well, they indicated, according to Henry, they said that there are just two issues left.

Kennedy: Right.

Nixon: For Christ’s sake, they have been up and down the hill on those issues so often. What’s it, the DMZ?

Kennedy: And the signing problem.

Nixon: Well, what the hell is the signing problem? I mean, what—which—which signing problem?

Kennedy: The question of whether all four sign, and whether, in fact, the PRG, in signing then, therefore, is recognized as a government.

Nixon: Oh, yeah. I see what you mean.

Kennedy: Which is the big problem, or one of the big problems for Thieu.

Nixon: Well—

Kennedy: But, that’s always been a problem.

Nixon: We cannot allow that to be a deterrent to us.

Kennedy: No. Thieu can, it seems to me, in his signing, can make a statement that makes it clear that he doesn’t accept their juridical right as a government to be signing, to make the final—

Nixon: It isn’t just that for us there. There are other things that Thieu’s been bitching about. I mean, when you finally come down to it, they’ve gone up and down the hill so much, you know, on those things—those twelve changes, and so forth—that I don’t think any of them mean a goddamn thing. Nothing—nothing, because all that really matters, in terms of this war, at the present time, is whether the enemy has the capacity, one; and, two, the determination to resume. Now, that’s what really matters, and whether they have the capacity is now—has now been given another wallop. That’s one of the purposes of this bombing. It certainly has set them back a few months, wouldn’t you agree?

Kennedy: Yes, sir. I think there’s no doubt of that. They—it’s doesn’t take them long, as—

Nixon: They have some great resiliency—

Kennedy: —as we’ve known.

Nixon: —as we’ve found out. May 8th,² that set them back. I mean, you know, all we’ve stopped to think of is the tempo of the war, and it goes back, and back, and back, every time they—they’re able to mount. Now, they aren’t going to be able to mount a significant spring offensive?

Kennedy: No, sir. I would think—

Nixon: Not this year?

Kennedy: —it’d be couple of years.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kennedy: Uh—

Nixon: Now, there you are. There’s that, then. Then, then—and then you have, of course, their intent, their desire. Even if they have the capacity, and I can’t believe that, that desire will not be affected enormously by what they think we might do. And that’s, again, why this action, perhaps, scares them a bit. Or, at least—and also, their desire might be affected by what the Russians and the Chinese tell them what they want them to do. So, there’s one—there’re just an awful lot factors there, great factors, that are going to control them. The difficulty in Thieu’s case is that he’s dotting “i’s” and crossing “t’s,” and saying, “every man’s gotta be out of here,” and so forth and so on. None of that really matters a hell of a lot. It doesn’t really matter.

Kennedy: No. The thing that matters is that the war gets over in a way in which Thieu and his government can survive, a genuine elections can occur, and if they do, the present structure in Saigon will survive.

Nixon: That’s right. Well, at the present time, first, the likelihood of any elections is very, shall we say—shall we say, at least in doubt.

Kennedy: Exactly.

Nixon: If Thieu feels this won’t work out, he’ll certainly screw it up. But second, if they haven’t, they’ll win it.

Kennedy: Exactly.

Nixon: They’ll win it. They’re not going to vote for any Communists—

Kennedy: It would seem to me in the circumstances that he might want to move quickly—

Nixon: Have it quick.

Kennedy: —for precisely that purpose.

Nixon: Quick, quick, quick, before people begin to think. You know, people can get soured on the thing.

Kennedy: Move—move the election [unclear]—

Nixon: But his—his whole attitude here has been almost [unclear].

Kennedy: Well, he’d had a—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kennedy: —had a good many years. Of course, they recall what has been a—an all unbroken record of perfidy: the 1954 and 1962—

Nixon: On the part of the North?

Kennedy: —Agreements.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kennedy: On the part of the North. They recall all that.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kennedy: And, they know that the efforts at subversion are not going to stop.

Nixon: That’s right—

Kennedy: And have to face all that.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: But, as to winning the war in some—in a traditional sense of an enemy coming to its knees, and—

Nixon: It’s not going to happen.

Kennedy: —begging to surrender, it’s never going to happen.

Nixon: Never!

Kennedy: It just won’t happen.

Nixon: Never, because—particularly after all these years, with American air and sea power, and for a long time American ground power, but with American air and sea power, and they with the most—with the biggest, the most modern army in Southeast Asia, for Christ’s sakes, if they cannot now—

Kennedy: Well—

Nixon: —win, they are never going to win.

Kennedy: They—

Nixon: They’re stronger than the North, are they not?

Kennedy: Exactly. The one thing—the one thing that they’re beginning to build, hopefully, is the kind of will and guts—

Nixon: The will, that’s right—

Kennedy: —that the North has shown. You know, to be—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kennedy: —to give the devil his due, the North has come down there, time after time, under the most incredibly difficult circumstances and done well. Now, that’s all a matter of just plain will—

Nixon: Sure.

Kennedy: —and the South—

Nixon: [coughs] They’ve got a greater will to win.

Kennedy: The South has begun to develop, I think, in the last couple of years. And during the summer, against that big offensive—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kennedy: —they did very well, indeed.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: Now, I wanted—

Nixon: That’s why the May 8th decision—

Kennedy: Yes, sir.

Nixon: —had such an enormous effect. If that hadn’t happened, they’d have lost right then.

Kennedy: I think they would have—

Nixon: They were ready to lose, because their will was gone. Not because they should have lost, but the [unclear] then the May 8th decision, then they began to hold, and they held in III Corps, and they held in Quang Tri, and, then, all of sudden, they had everything [unclear] you know, all the major [unclear]. Then—so why has all this happened? Because they began to think, well, maybe they weren’t going to be abandoned, and so forth. But, we have—we have tended to erode their will by making them too dependent upon us.

Kennedy: Making too many of the decisions—

Nixon: Now, the thing about this was the Russians and Chinese. They have never eroded the will. They have built up the will of the North Vietnamese. They have helped them, but helped them with moral support and just enough material support, but they haven’t sent in the men and the advisers. They’ve made the North do it themselves. That’s why the North Vietnamese—I think, I think that one of great lessons out of this war, looking to the future, is that Americans are basically paternalistic in our attitude toward all countries we’ve helped, and we weaken them. We weaken them, because we want to do it ourselves. And it’s only—and the Communists, strangely enough, when they talk about people’s liberation movement, it isn’t just talk. It’s a way of getting people to stand on their own feet, and fight their own battles.

Kennedy: Exactly.

Nixon: That’s why Communist insurrections, et cetera, are usually better than the others. Not because they’re fighting for a better idea, but because, somewhere, the will to fight only develops. I mean, you have to have it.

Kennedy: And pride in their own contributions—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: —the things they can do for themselves—

Nixon: Ironically, I think it’s a terrible lesson, and hearing it, you know, we did the same in Korea. You remember?

Kennedy: Yes, sir.

Nixon: It—it didn’t last as long, thank God, but in Korea, in the early times, everybody said—what did they call them, the “kooks”?

Kennedy: Yes. The “gooks.”

Nixon: What?

Kennedy: “Gooks.”

Nixon: “The gooks,” they said, “they can’t fight.” I remember talking, and I was a Senator—a Congressman—a Congressman, I guess then, in the early years, it doesn’t matter. “These gooks, they won’t fight. They don’t fight. They’re never going to learn to fight.” And then, old man Van Fleet went out there—that wonderful, lovable, big bear of a man—he said, “By God, they can learn to fight.” And they did, and that’s when [unclear]—

Kennedy: Hell, they’re about the toughest—

Nixon: —let’s tough it out.

Kennedy: Now, they’re about the toughest people in Asia.

Nixon: Tough, mean, on their own. Sure, they still want us to stick around, but they’ll handle it themselves. Now, that’s what we’ve got to do. We’ve got to get out of South Vietnam, and—and now, after this, go home. Unless the North comes back with ridiculously unacceptable demands, we settle. And the South’s going to have to go it alone. They can make it alone, if we don’t—if the Congress doesn’t cut off their aid.

Kennedy: If they go along, I don’t think the Congress will.

Nixon: If they go along with the settlement? Thank God, that’s a hell of an end, isn’t it?

Kennedy: Yes, sir. But I think that’s something he [Thieu] understands.

Nixon: Based on Haig’s last experience of [unclear] my letter to him—

Kennedy: I keep being optimistic—

Nixon: Well, if Thieu—what’s that?

Kennedy: I keep being optimistic, I guess.

Nixon: Yeah. You keep thinking that. I know everybody does, that if—that Thieu just can’t commit suicide. Is that it?

Kennedy: Both for himself and for his country. In the last—

Nixon: He will—

Kennedy: —[unclear]

Nixon: He will if Congress will not go along. But this time, we’ve got to put it to him in a different way. We’re not going to go begging. For Henry to go through those tortuous sessions of all-day long debating for the North Vietnamese, and telling the South Vietnamese, denying it and having them telling him we’ve got to go back and get this and that. That was, I mean, incredibly bad—

Kennedy: The—

Nixon: I’ll never do that again.

Kennedy: —the South Vietnamese simply weren’t helpful.

Nixon: Well, hell, they were just leaking it all, and raising hell and this and that. Now we go in and make the deal with the North and tell the South to either stick it or stuff it.

Kennedy: Thieu has no—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kennedy: —should have no complaint here. We’ve gone down the whole road with him. We know exactly all the things he’s asked for.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kennedy: We’ve done our best to achieve those, at considerable cost in the process. He surely understands that—

Nixon: At considerable cost. God, yes. God, yes. At great cost.

[Omitted here is discussion of damage suffered by B–52s in strikes against North Vietnam, effects of the airstrikes on North Vietnam’s negotiating position at the Paris talks, additional bombing of the North, and media bias in reporting on the airstrikes.]

Kennedy: We’ve also, as I indicated to you a couple of weeks ago, now we’ve turned up the volume up again on the psychological warfare bit—

Nixon: That’s good.

Kennedy: —with the radios, and—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kennedy: [unclear], the regular radios. And we’ve cranked up the leafleting campaign, again. [chuckles] We’ll be charged with damaging the ecology and covering the place with leaflets. [chuckles] There’ll be so much trash to pick up.

Nixon: What do the leaflets say?

Kennedy: Well, they play up a variety—

Nixon: Are they subtle—?

Kennedy: —of themes.

Nixon: Yeah?

Kennedy: Unfortunate that you had to break of the talks, the boys can’t get home. Why don’t you go see your cadre and find out when the talks are going to resume, so the war can end, and your friends, who are down South, can come back—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kennedy: —to be with you.

Nixon: Right.

Kennedy: The government has misled you.

Nixon: Good.

Kennedy: Peace was coming. They don’t want peace.

Nixon: Good.

Kennedy: They look only for victory, which is impossible. This is the sort of theme. Pretty simple—pretty simple, straightforward messages aimed at getting the people to begin to ask questions—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kennedy: —of the cadre—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kennedy: —which begins to unnerve the cadre, and, up the line, it causes problems. This will be—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kennedy: This meshes together, then, with the radio campaign, which is doing the same thing, pointing out that everybody wants peace; all you have to do is move forward to get it; no problem about peace—everybody wants it, except you—why don’t you want it? This is the sort of theme.

[Omitted here is discussion of humanitarian relief for Central America and media bias in reporting on the air war against North Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 828–5. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kennedy met from 9:20 to 10:12 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
2. See footnote 4, Document 221.