221. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
HK: Mr. President.
RN: How are you getting along with your children?
HK: I’m back in Washington now, Mr. President.
RN: I see, you just went there for the day.
HK: That’s right, for the evening.
RN: I see, how were they?
HK: They were fine, they couldn’t be nicer.
[Page 819]RN: Good, okay. Anything new today?
HK: They flew 30 B–52’s this morning and they all got back, so, you know, we’ll still lose here and there but—it’s two days in a row now that we haven’t lost any.
RN: Right. They throw an important mission.
HK: They went a little bit—outside the Hanoi area this time—they went up into the buffer zone with China, where they had found 100 railway cars piled up—and that’s good. I’ve seen some pictures now, some of the damage we’re doing—
RN: You still feel that way, Henry?
HK: Oh yeh, Moorer brought over some of the pictures—
RN: You got his attention huh?
HK: Ohhh, we got his attention Mr. President—we have his attention.
RN: Isn’t a crime we have to do this though—we did it at Cambodia, we did it at, how many times do you have to do it?
HK: Well, I gave him hell and he said during the summer, he sent in at least 50 requests for new authorities which were disapproved—
RN: The point is, did we ever know it?
HK: No, and I think we ought to—
RN: That’s the thing Henry—I just can’t understand whyto send them to me—you remember that I told him that he was to do that—or he was just afraid of Laird was that it?
HK: That’s right. I think we ought to institute a system for Richardson when he comes in that every request of the Chairman automatically comes over here too.
RN: Absolutely—it’s—you bet it will be instituted when he comes in. I think we should institute it now.
HK: Well we’re having trouble with Laird as it is and we don’t want him to blow before he leaves.
RN: Okay.
HK: But we had a report, for example, from the Cuban ambassador in Hanoi who is certainly not friendly to us and he says they are in bad shape, there was a meeting of technical experts this morning again.2
[Page 820]RN: Our technical experts?
HK: No—in Paris—
RN: Oh, I see yeh, yeh, yeh.
HK: And they bled all over us again. But and—but again they didn’t break off, they said we should set the next day, so we proposed the date to them.
RN: Yeh.
HK: And they said—
RN: They may come back and accept your, our message.
HK: I think—you know, they say, these acts of war escalation are seriously undermining—they don’t say destroying, the prospects of a settlement.
RN: Your messagewe worked on yesterday, will have been deliver by now—
HK: Oh it has been delivered—last night.3
RN: That’s good, that’ll give them a problem, also an opportunity.
HK: Exactly. And it also shows them how to turn it off.
RN: That’s right—that’s my point an opportunity to turn it off.
HK: And, here it says if the US had a proposal for another meeting, they would consider it—this is an oral statement—and he said whether negotiations continue to remain in deadlock the US would bear responsibility—it was up to the US side to set a date for the next meeting.
RN: That’s the meeting for the technical experts?
HK: Well, no that’s a little ambiguous in this context—
RN: Yeh, but that of course will have been said before they received our message huh?
HK: They received our message after this—
RN: But not in time to react.
HK: But they hadn’t had time to react, yet. Here is what—the November and December meetings, it was the US side which had blocked an agreement whether negotiations continued or remained in deadlock, US would bear the responsibility—it was up to the US side to suggest date for the next meeting. That seems to be talking about the big meeting.
RN: Yeh, right.
HK: So the response of these guys is very weak. They—their teeth are really rattling right now.
RN: What’s that—I didn’t hear you?
[Page 821]HK: I think their teeth are really rattling right now.
RN: They ought to be from the—
HK: This is something—
RN: When do we break off—it’s the 24th already over there, isn’t it.
HK: We are breaking off at noon tomorrow our time. And then we have to break off for 36 hours because they are 12 hours later.
RN: I know I was saying at least 36 because it’s—
HK: I think we break off at 11:00 tomorrow morning.
RN: Tomorrow is the 24th—Oh I see that’s midnight their time.
HK: That’s midnight their time and then we have to go til about 36 hours—
RN: Moorer is preparing a big strike the day afterwards.
HK: All out.
RN: You see I think that’s the strategy, you can’t let them think we are diddling around with a few messages. But if on the other hand we return we can take another look.
HK: I think Mr. President, we ought to go all out no matter what they reply until December 31.
RN: That’s what I meant. Until the 31st we have to—the problem is we have to do what we can to disrupt their capabilities right now—that’s what May 8th4 did to them.
HK: Right. I think if we can get some of these bridges if the weather clears, we will set them back two or three months again on the transportation and their industrial capabity and their electrical system is being leveled right now—formerly we just went out after one of the buildings—the generator building, but now they are levelling all supporting facilities too.
RN: Good. We’ll just continue on this course and you’ve got Colson working hu [omission in the original].
HK: Absolutely.
RN: Keep it at the present level.
HK: I don’t notice any lead yet Mr. President.
RN: One of theto find things is the way some of these POW wives have handled themselves. They’ve been wonderful.
HK: That’s right, and I get letters from people saying my son is over there but don’t you weaken and I have—lots of people are sending me Christmas cards I’ve never heard of—it must familiar to you. The interesting thing is that not one critical letter and now I am getting lots [Page 822] of letters saying stick to your guns—we heard your account of the television thing—you are right, thank God the President is holding firm.
RN: Now by what we have done we have laid the groundwork for going either way and they say we did our best. It’s terrible that Thieu, Henry, as I reflected on our meeting with Haig, that Thieu—he has made a comprehensive settlement almost impossible, to be ever interpreted as a peace with honor. On the other hand if we can get a comprehensive settlement, we now—(end tape …)
(begin tape) … and perhaps we can bring them around, but we should have had it October 8th.
HK: That’s right.
RN: That deal was good enough. Language doesn’t mean anything—not a damn thing.
HK: We would have had a great success and it isn’t that much different anyway.
RN: You know the language doesn’t mean much—you know it and I know it. Now we are stuck with getting a little better language.
HK: Exactly.
RN: And we’ll—be sure to plan your trip to Palm Springs—I got Ziegler off yesterday—he’s going to be there for five days and you should just plan it, because, Haig ought to get his time too—you be sure he gets away.
HK: Absolutely.
RN: See some of your other people—stagger them, but don’t—we all need a little time off.
HK: The Chinese made a protest about the ship we hit and did about the absolute minimum that they could do—they protested orally in Paris not even in our channel—and then when our man there asked them whether they had a written note, they said oh no, no we said all we are going to say and they said that our air operations threaten China security—this time they are just saying they are closely watching it. We just got a report that they are totally evacuating Hanoi.
RN: They think we are going to come at them with more stuff all over the city?
HK: That’s right.
RN: That can’t [but] be affect[ing] their morale of their people to evacuate that city.
HK: Oh God yeh.
RN: Everyone talks about the ineffectiveness of bombing—it was not ineffective at all, I mean—it was damn effective—what the hell finished Germany?
HK: That’s right.
[Page 823]RN: Let’s face it—the German armies were still fighting damn well but it was just tearing hell out of their cities—the strategic bombing—we just haven’t done it well enough Henry, that’s our problem.
HK: These guys—it’s the tenth year of a war for them and just when they think they have it done—it starts again with increased ferocity—this must be a shocking thing to them.
RN: Right. Well you’ll be there over the weekend. Truman is probably going to die today—I don’t think anything is planned in the way of a public thing in Missouri—so don’t let it bother you.
HK: I’ll be here till Tuesday afternoon.5
RN: If I were you I’d get the hell out of there sooner—nothing is going to happen over the weekend.
HK: I think I better stick here and then on Tuesday I’ll go to Palm Springs.
RN: And stay over New Year’s?
HK: Or come back just before, depending on developments.
RN: In other words, we hope you’re coming back?
HK: That’s right. If you are staying in Key Biscayne, then if it were a Jan 3 meeting I think I ought to fly there on the first over to—
RN: I’ll be here or at Camp David either one—it’ll all work out.
HK: I’ll go wherever you are.
RN: In the meantime be sure to remember—it seems everytime I try to take off a few days—there’s a goddamn crisis and everytime anyone else does, but I probably will come back Wednesday or something like that. I am really the only one who has to be around—the others can be off. There’s not a damn thing any of us can do. Except to keep the heat on—I guess the heat is on Moorer enough though.
HK: Oh the heat is on Moorer enough now Mr. President—I think frankly we ought to leave him alone for the next week or so—
RN: Fine, I’m all for it—he knows what he has to do and I think he’s telling the truth—I think Laird is just—
HK: He’s got a good plan now I’ll send it down to you.
RN: No, I don’t want to see it—if the plan is—you know what I mean—I will not get into tactics—I just want something stiffer—Do you think it is an adequate—
HK: It’s a good plan—I spent an hour with him this morning.
RN: This is for what Henry?
HK: For next week’s operation and their major emphasis now is going to cut off Hanoi from the rest of the country.
[Page 824]RN: I see.
HK: They are going after the transportation system again and so it looks—they understand that the major weight of this can be kept north of the 20th.
RN: Sure. Well—
HK: For the time being it’s best to keep the heat on him than do too many other changes.
RN: Right. Okay We’ll—you can give me a ring here if anything else develops Wait a minute—this is already the 23rd—
HK: Right. There will be one more B52 strike before.
RN: Bye Henry.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was in Key Biscayne; Kissinger was in Washington. All blank underscores are omissions in the original.↩
- In a message to Kissinger, December 23, 1442Z, Isham summarized the experts’meeting held that day in Paris. In the meeting he told the North Vietnamese that it was vitally important to maintain communications and that if they opted for indefinite suspension of the technical meetings, which they said they might, it would be that much more difficult to reach a settlement. Isham proposed another meeting for December 27 at 3:30 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [1 of 3])↩
- See Document 215.↩
- That is, the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong Harbor.↩
- December 26.↩