Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

222. Message From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Gayler) and the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (Meyer)¹

Washington, December 23, 1972, 2247.

3580. Delivery during waking hours. Subj: Linebacker 22 [II]/Post-Christmas Operations (S). Refs: A. JCS 5384/170010Z Dec 72. B. JCS 7807/192322Z Dec 72. C. JCS 3491/231842Z Dec 72.

1. References (A) and (B) were execute/continuation authority for current Linebacker II operations. Reference (C) directed Christmas stand-down.

2. With the first week of Linebacker II nearly complete, the renewed campaign has been markedly successful to date.

3. In order to provide you with maximum leadtime, set forth below is the planning concept for the continuation of the air campaign in NVN. Confirmation will follow ASAP.

Immediately following the stand-down over Christmas, resume the air campaign with maximum effort north of 20 degrees in North Vietnam. Following are major objectives: First, complete an achievable level of damage against present approved targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong complex, as well as the approved targets in the buffer zone. Of particular importance are (A) continuous bombing of authorized targets in the Hanoi area, and (B) the destruction of power plants. Second and closely related to this, but involving some additional targeting, isolate Hanoi from the rest of North Vietnam. Those targets that geographically, electrically and logistically join Hanoi to the remainder of North Vietnam will be attacked. Third, resume destroying the northeast line of communications as a first priority with destruction of northwest line of communications as second priority.LOC attacks include bombing of RR bridges, RR yards, RR shops and highway bridges, and seeding of waterways.

4. Arc Light strikes.

A. Schedule B–52 sorties as follows (all sortie numbers approximate):

Zulu day	NVN North of Twenty North	Elsewhere in NVN, RVN, Laos, Cambodia
26 Dec (After 0459Z)	90–115	as avail
27 Dec	60	30
28 Dec and subsequent	30	60

B. As the results of the strikes north of 20 degrees north become known, retarget either with B–52s or tacair, as required, to achieve desired damage levels. Since much of the B–52 effort has been in the immediate Hanoi area, as the damage levels on these targets are confirmed, expand the effort to include the Haiphong, Bac Giang, and Thai Nguyen sectors. The high priority requirement to maintain heavy pressure on Hanoi/Haiphong continues.

5. Tacair strikes. Tacair will also surge on the day after the Christmas stand-down, and then be used to maintain round-the-clock pressure through the application of both visual and all-weather bombing systems. It is particularly important that tacair all-weather and/or visual strikes be scheduled to maintain pressure during periods when B–52s are not targeted in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi/ Haiphong. The continued suppression of airfields and SAMs, is a necessary adjunct to the total operation and an appropriate fraction of tacair must be used for this task as tactical situation dictates. Meanwhile, some allocation of tacair, including gunships, will be necessary to interdict the flow of supplies down the NVN panhandle through the DMZ and Laos. Portions of remaining tacair will be used to reseed the coastal minefields that have become sterile and additional fields for which authorization is pending. In general, this will be done when weather is unsuitable or marginal for visual ground attacks.

6. The general guidance and priority for sortie allocation in ref B are reaffirmed.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Records of Thomas Moorer, Box 71, Linebacker II Messages, December 1972. Top Secret; Immediate; Specat; Exclusive. Repeated to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Commander, 7th Air Force; Commander, Seventh Fleet; and Commander, Carrier Task Force 77.