Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

220. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, December 23, 1972, 0935Z.

308. Subject: President Thieu’s Meetings with Top Government Leaders, December 19, 20, and 21.

1. We have had reports on three meetings which Thieu held on December 19, 20, and 21 to consider the contents of the letter from the President delivered to him by General Haig.² I am transmitting a summary of these reports thinking it may be useful as background information.

2. Present at the meetings were: Vice President Tran Van Huong, Prime Minister Khiem, Foreign Minister Lam, Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong, Nguyen Phu Duc, Chief Justice Linh, Chief of JGS General Vien, Chairman of the Senate Nguyen Van Huyen, Speaker of the Lower House Nguyen Ba Can, and Hoang Duc Nha. The first meeting convened December 19 at 1600 and lasted until 2100. Nha gave a detailed briefing of the cease-fire agreement and the points of contention which caused a suspension of the talks. Nha reported that of the various counterproposals sent by Thieu to the President in the letter transmitted by Duc,³ only two had resulted in changes, both essentially meaningless:

• —in Article 1 a change in the wording to “… U.S. and other countries …”
• —with respect to the NCRC, North Viet-Nam consented to eliminate the expression “administrative structure”.

3. Nha explained the proposal for the signing of the agreement, i.e., that the U.S. and North Viet-Nam will jointly sign the agreement while South Viet-Nam and the PRG each will sign identical but separate copies of the agreement. This was unacceptable to Thieu on the ground that he will not sign an agreement containing the present provisions.

4. Nha concluded the briefing by saying, with Thieu’s concurrence, that there is no significant change in the terminology of the cease-fire agreement to meet their objections. The two main SVN requests concerning withdrawal of NVA troops from South Viet-Nam and the NCRC were not met.

5. Thieu then reported the President had sent him by General Haig a “secret and personal” message, the contents of which he could not reveal to the meeting, but which he characterized as an ultimatum requiring a “yes or no” regarding his willingness to sign the cease-fire agreement—the Haig trip was not for the purpose of further negotiations, it was only to transmit the President’s message and to obtain a response.

6. After lengthy discussion, the meeting agreed that South Viet-Nam could no longer delay action and must respond to the President. Their position was that:

• —South Viet-Nam cannot sign the text as it stands.
• —South Viet-Nam cannot reject the entire agreement.
• —South Viet-Nam will make one final counter-proposal, accepting the Council but rejecting the continued presence of NVA troops in the South.

7. All agreed that South Viet-Nam must accept the political confrontation with the Communists implicit in acceptance of the NCRC, but that this plus the presence of NVA troops would eventually tip thegame to North Viet-Nam.

8. Thieu adjourned the meeting at 2100 with instructions that all should think about the problems and reconvene the next day.

9. (Source comment: The mood of the meeting was sad, somber, and serious. There was full cognizance of the responsibility and implications of their decisions. There was no element of buoyancy because the Kissinger-Tho talks had been suspended and heavy bombing of the North resumed.)

10. Thieu reconvened the meeting at 1000 hours on December 20. In addition to the participants of the previous day, there were present Minister of Economy Ngoc, Minister of Finance Trung, Director-General of the Budget Luu Van Tinh. The Ministers briefed the meeting on the situation with respect to U.S. aid. In summary the presentation concluded that U.S. aid to South Viet-Nam for 1972 will fall short of requirements foreseen for 1973 by $100 million, and that because current U.S. aid policy tends to cut foreign aid to all countries, U.S. aid to South Viet-Nam in 1973 will probably not exceed the 1972 level of $340 million even if South Viet-Nam were to sign the cease-fire agreement. They thus concluded that if South Viet-Nam does not sign, U.S. aid will be at best greatly reduced and at worst suspended entirely.

11. Thieu opened the discussion by calling for new ideas or new approaches to the problem. All present rested with their conclusions of the previous day. They considered President Nixon’s message to Thieu “his final word”. The “final word” from South Viet-Nam is that they will accept the NCRC, but must continue to insist on the withdrawal of the NVA from the South. (Source comment: All present realized the implications of their decision for South Viet-Nam, the many problems in the areas of economy and finance, but could find no other choice.)

12. At the conclusion of this meeting, Thieu met with Huyen and Can at 1200 to discuss the changed situation brought about by the President’s ultimatum. Thieu said that South Viet-Nam must continue to avoid public confrontation with the U.S. Therefore, no comment about his December 12 address to the National Assembly will be made nor will the National Assembly send a message to the U.S. Congress as previously intended. There will be no further joint National Assembly sessions to report on the new situation. However, the National Assembly may send a message to the new Congress when it convenes on January 3, reminding it of the reasons why the U.S. and South Viet-Nam have fought together for the past ten years, explaining why South Viet-Nam feels impelled to continue its war against aggression, for a just peace, and for the ideals of freedom, concluding with a request for continued support.

13. It was considered inappropriate at this time to send the planned official delegation from the National Assembly to the U.S. However, the National Assembly might send a small number of Senators and Deputies who have personal relations with members of the Congress in a private capacity for individual talks.

14. Thieu said that the President now had the initiative and that he must await the President’s reaction; that if the President will continue his friendly secret talks with South Viet-Nam in trying to find a solution, Thieu will do the same. If, however, President Nixon should create a public rupture with South Viet-Nam, then he (Thieu) would have to react according to the facts of the matter and make a full explanation to the people of South Viet-Nam. Thieu emphasized that he would say nothing until he hears from the President. He said that he wished to sign a cease-fire agreement and “if only we can reach a formula which is acceptable to us, we will sign immediately”. Thieu said that the formula on the NVA troops was the only urgent one—all other problems can wait, but if he were to accept the cease-fire agreement as it now stands he would be betraying the ARVN, the people, and the nation. (Source report said that those attending the meeting concurred fully with him.)

15. Warm regards.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 45, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Cables, Dec. 1972–Apr. 1975. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 189.
3. See Document 131.