Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

135. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, November 30, 1972.

Nixon: We have no choice with these people now.

Haig: No, no. We—

Nixon: Goddamn, I know this little guy² understands it and so forth, but if they want to commit suicide that’s all there is to it. Are they going to?

Haig: No. I don’t think so. It would be inconceivable. This man isn’t suicidal.

Nixon: You don’t think so?

Haig: No.

Nixon: Why did he send that message this morning?³ Henry came in here [unclear]to the effect that Thieu had laid out, and all it meant for us to go at it alone, and he’d go it alone.⁴ Did he really?

Haig: Not really that way. Well—and that’s what he tried to pull away from. What he was saying is, “For God’s sake, if I can’t get these three principles”—

Nixon: Yeah?

Haig: —“then try to work out the May 8th proposition, in which we cut the mining and the bombing in return for your prisoners and a ceasefire, and then we’ll continue try to police the ceasefire with your help. And if they break it, then we would hope you could intervene.”

Nixon: When it’s all done, we can’t intervene—

Haig: It’s got to be done. Well, I told him that it would kill us with the Soviets—

Nixon: [unclear] We’ve got to go ahead. He says he’s got a message coming in from the North Vietnamese. Maybe they’re going to break off negotiations, Al, do you think they are?

Haig: No. I don’t think so.

Nixon: Why not?

Haig: They want to settle. That I’m convinced of. But they have [unclear]—

Nixon: What I said to him about the Congressional thing is totally true. [unclear] aid for them.

Haig: Of, course it’s true.

Nixon: I got it from, also, Goldwater. Goldwater, Jesus Christ. [unclear] He says, “If this ever becomes public and you don’t accept it, you’re down the tubes.”

Haig: That’s right.

Nixon: And they’ve got to understand that. I mean, that aid will be cut off like that. [taps table] Like that. [taps table] And they can’t do that. I think the meeting at Midway is an excellent idea if he’ll do it. If. But understand, a meeting for the purpose only of my—of our agreeing [unclear] is it. I will not go there to talk about the agreement.

Haig: That’s impossible.

Nixon: He’ll just [unclear]—

Haig: They’re going to fight and negotiate—

Nixon: Huh?

Haig: —right to the wire.

Nixon: What’s that?

Haig: They’re going to fight right up to the wire. Now, you pulled the wire tight today and that’s the end of it. And they now know that.

Nixon: When do you leave?

Haig: I plan on the 15th, sir.⁵

Nixon: Well, you deserve a little rest.

Haig: [unclear]—

Nixon: Henry cannot take the—this heat much longer. You know what I mean? He’s—you know what I mean? It’s—it’s been hard for him. But—an emotional pattern here is …

Haig: It’s worse. Well, I, this past—well, he had three weeks where I thought he lost touch with reality.⁶ It started out in Paris, the first round in October. He drove that thing despite all the counsel, all I could give him—

Nixon: Well, and I was trying telling him that, you know, I didn’t want the goddamn thing. But you know why he did that? He wanted to make peace before the damned election. There isn’t anybody to do it after the election.

Haig: That’s right.

Nixon: For Christ sakes don’t do that. Then what happened?

Haig: Then in Saigon he really lost touch because here he was sending two messages to the North Vietnamese, agreeing to the [unclear], knowing that Thieu was not on board, and it was going to take some careful working. That’s what caused our problem. Now, this week he started to regain himself. And I think he did a very fine job last week.

Nixon: Are you going with him?

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: Does he have you in on the meetings?

Haig: Yes, sir. In fact, at the two private meetings I sat there.⁷ And we did the right thing. We had to delay. Well, we could never have done this with Thieu around.

Nixon: This has got to give Thieu something. And that meeting with the Joint Chiefs will.⁸

Haig: That helps. That’s right. And, you know, it’s conceivable. I just don’t think he’ll do that. I think he’s going to come around. I think he’ll come around, and we’ve got to have that communication completed in the next 24 hours.

Nixon: Hmm. In the next 24 hours he’ll come around and meet with us?

Haig: We’ll just have to drive it to that.

Nixon: I think he’s going to wait. Wouldn’t you think he’d just wait?

Haig: See what we get? We’ll he’ll caveat it in a certain way. But he’s got to know—

Nixon: The point is—the point is it’s done. I told him now Henry’s gone over, he’s going to settle the goddamn thing. At the end of the week, they can either come or go. That’s my view as to what he’ll say. If he says go at it alone, that puts us in a position. What—what kind of a deal could we make with the North Vietnamese? Just prisoners for withdrawal, right?

Haig: And the end of—

Nixon: You can’t reason with them—

Haig: —the mining and the bombing—

Nixon: Huh?

Haig: And the end of the mining and the bombing.

Nixon: Why don’t we give up the mining, the bombing, for prisoners? [unclear] It’s just a hell of a way to end the goddamn war.

[Omitted here are closing remarks.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 817–16. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, this conversation took place after the meeting with Nguyen Phu Duc and Tran Kim Phuong in the Oval Office from 12:26 to 1:02 p.m., and continued until 1:11 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) See Document 134 and footnote 2 thereto.
2. Nguyen Phu Duc.
3. See Document 131 and footnote 3 thereto.
4. See Document 133.
5. Haig intended to leave for Saigon on December 15 to meet with Thieu.
6. Haldeman and Haig had discussed this subject on November 29. According to Haldeman’s diary entry: “Got into the K problem a little. I met with Al Haig, at the P’s request, and told him that we’re going to have to do something to deal with the problem. That we’d probably have to bite the bullet soon, but in the meantime we had to get things under control. Al said he understood perfectly, he was very concerned. Henry, in his view, is completely paranoid—is on an up-and-down cycle all the time, and he has bottomed out on his down cycle now and is coming back up, but was in absolutely terrible shape in Paris last week and handled things very badly because of it. And that he was in even worse shape in Vietnam before that. And basically the screw-up was Henry’s fault, in that he committed to final negotiation and settlement before he really should have, which really screwed things up with the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese. Al feels that Henry needs a very good, long vacation, and that we should be sure he gets it. He thinks the trip this week will go all right, and that the deal is locked now, so there’s no problem with Henry going, but as soon as he gets that done and gets back, we should take him out.” ( Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, November 29)
7. Haig was referring to the two private meetings with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy on November 24 and 25. See Documents 122 and footnote 4, Document 126. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1421–1422.
8. See Document 132.