122. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
  • Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
  • Special Advisor Le Duc Tho
  • Minister Xuan Thuy
  • Nguyen Dinh Phuong, Interpreter

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting, which he characterized as an exclusive private session between restricted participants designed to impress upon Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and the North Vietnamese side the fact that the negotiations had reached a most serious point. Both [Page 437] parties had worked together for a long time, in fact for over 100 hours of discussions. Subjectively, it was evident that the U.S. and North Vietnamese negotiators—Dr. Kissinger on the U.S. side, Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on the North Vietnamese side—wished to end the war. But now the talks had reached a serious point.

For this reason, Dr. Kissinger wished to read a Presidential telegram he had received the night before. It should not, however, be interpreted as an official diplomatic communication, but merely an effort by Dr. Kissinger to convey the mood in Washington today. It was in effect a message to Dr. Kissinger from the President and therefore should not become a part of the official record of the proceedings, since it was directed to Dr. Kissinger and not to the North Vietnamese Government.

Dr. Kissinger read verbatim the text at Tab A.2

“The President is very disappointed at the tone as well as the substance of the last meeting with Le Duc Tho. Under the circumstances, unless the other side shows the same willingness to be reasonable that we are showing, I am directing you to discontinue the talks and we shall then have to resume military activity until the other side is ready to negotiate. They must be disabused of the idea they seem to have that we have no other choice but to settle on their terms. You should inform them directly without equivocation that we do have another choice and if they were surprised that the President would take the strong action he did prior to the Moscow Summit and prior to the election, they will find now, with the election behind us, he will take whatever action he considers necessary to protect the United States’ interest.”

Upon reading the telegram, Dr. Kissinger said he recognized the text was not diplomatically phrased, but he could think of no other device to indicate more clearly that the United States did have another choice. If North Vietnam was surprised at the strong U.S. action taken prior to the Summit and prior to the U.S. domestic election, they would now find that President Nixon would take whatever action he considered U.S. national interests dictated.

Dr. Kissinger had been in further contact with the President and had received his authorization to make one more maximum effort, at a meeting which Dr. Kissinger was proposing be held tomorrow, Saturday, November 25. In the U.S. view, the choice was directly up to the North Vietnamese side.

The Special Advisor should now be aware of the difficulty the U.S. side was facing, Dr. Kissinger continued. North Vietnam had its principles, but the United States also had its own. The U.S. side had given great weight to North Vietnamese principles. For example, it had gone [Page 438] along with the charade that North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam were really southerners or the sons of southerners. The U.S. had not publicly challenged North Vietnam on this, although everyone knew the real situation. The U.S. principle was that it must take into account the views of its allies. It was true that in October this point was made clear and the U.S. had not had an opportunity to present the draft agreement to its allies or to discuss it with them. Certainly if the U.S. had wanted to stall for time at that juncture, Dr. Kissinger could have insisted on going to Saigon and then returning to Paris, thus prolonging the sequence of events.

But that was all history. The problem now was to solve the current impasse. The final agreement must provide a document which could demonstrate that some of the South Vietnamese views had been listened to. The current status of the document fell far short of what Saigon had asked for. Nevertheless the U.S. was prepared to make an absolutely maximum effort, including Presidential action and direct intervention publicly, to demonstrate the President’s personal support for the agreement and in fact to seek public pressure on Saigon to accept it. But this could be done only if the United States could in good conscience say it had made every effort and that the North Vietnamese side had made an exceptional effort. If this could be said, then the United States would have a moral basis to implement the agreement within foreseeable limits.

On the other hand, if Hanoi pushed the United States beyond these foreseeable limits and deprived it of its principles, then the effort could not be made, nor could the agreement be accepted. All of the recent efforts that had been made would be in vain, and the war would continue with greater violence. Hanoi must not be misled by the journalists with whom they were in contact. The U.S. had always done what it said it would do.

This, therefore, was the dilemma. Tomorrow, the United States would make a maximum effort. Under no circumstances could it agree to a document which was weaker than what had already been published. The Special Advisor had spoken of the difficulty that he had in changing the terms of the agreement, but the Special Advisor must also consider the United States’ problem as well, especially the changes which Hanoi sought in Article 8(c).3 Nevertheless the United States would review again all that the Special Advisor had said at this week’s meetings and would make an effort, including concessions to the degree that that was possible. But if the United States was pushed beyond [Page 439] this, then a complete deadlock would result. This view was stated with an open heart.

Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger had been enemies; they had also been colleagues in a common effort, Dr. Kissinger continued. He would prefer nothing more than to visit Hanoi as a culmination of these common efforts. But precisely because the task had been so tedious and the effort so prolonged, Dr. Kissinger had requested this personal meeting to convey the seriousness of the situation. The U.S. was at a point where its cupboards were empty.

Dr. Kissinger therefore proposed a meeting for Noon on Saturday, at which time the final U.S. position would be presented.

Special Advisor Le Duc Tho replied that as the meeting today was held as a special private session, he would speak all of his thoughts in an open-hearted way. Yesterday the Special Advisor had presented his views. His views were expressed as a result of a great effort. The U.S. side also made a great effort. But certainly, the North Vietnamese effort confirmed its new strategy of peace. If this were not so, North Vietnam would not have made its earlier efforts. But what did the United States expect of North Vietnam? How could Hanoi sign an agreement in which there was mention of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops? North Vietnam could not do this. Therefore, the Special Advisor had put forward the proposition that it would agree to relocate some of the forces from the northern region of South Vietnam after consultation with the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Thus what greater effort could be made?

President Nixon referred to U.S. honor. North Vietnam had its honor also. In this war the United States sent troops to intervene. Now it was pulling its troops out. North Vietnam was now told it must do so also. How could North Vietnam bear this demand? North Vietnam had tried to put forth a de facto formula on this issue. This demonstrated its good will.

Secondly, how could North Vietnam sign an agreement in which thousands of its people remained in jail? If there were no provisions for these people, how could North Vietnam accept? If peace was really achieved these people must be reunited with their families. So the question was how this sentimental question could be accepted. It had been raised repeatedly. Everyone with a conscience knew that this North Vietnamese demand was both fair and reasonable. It was a most difficult question.

Thirdly, with respect to the political question in South Vietnam, here again Hanoi had made a large effort. They had required now only a Council of the two parties, with a third segment which was not pro-Hanoi. If this were not true Saigon need not agree. Moreover, the third segment would be chosen by agreement of the other two through [Page 440] consultation and unanimous decision. Thus the two parties must agree. As to the lower levels of the Council, they also would be agreed upon by the two parties, and even in this instance the organizations at the lower levels had not yet even been discussed by the two parties. Thus this solution could pose no difficulties.

Hanoi had made great concessions on the political side, Le Duc Tho continued. Now only the foregoing three questions remained: could one imagine an agreement which implied the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, had no provisions for the release of detained civilians, and dropped the provision for a three-segment government and dropped the provision that Thieu must step down? How could Hanoi sign such an agreement?

This did not mean that Hanoi did not pay attention to U.S. problems. Hanoi had agreed to reduce the number of troops in the northern part of South Vietnam. It had met U.S. concerns about the timing of the ceasefire with respect to the Laos question. This was done at the last meeting. Therefore U.S. concerns were met. Obviously the United States was worried that if the conflict in Laos continued then there would be a means for infiltration into South Vietnam. For this reason North Vietnam had agreed to make the ceasefire earlier in Laos. Now the United States must respond to North Vietnam’s difficulty. An agreement that ignored the issues remaining could not be signed by North Vietnam.

It was clear that peace was near. Dr. Kissinger was like the Special Advisor; he recognized that with peace so near we should not now return to war. But what did Dr. Kissinger suggest? If there were an agreement with the implication of the withdrawal of North Vietnam forces, continued civilian incarceration, dropping the three segments, retaining President Thieu, changes in the Council—how could this ever be explained to the North Vietnamese people? Even the world press, in fact even the press in Saigon, confirmed that North Vietnam had made a large effort. The United States had seen Hanoi’s strategy of peace. Dr. Kissinger could not overlook the fact that North Vietnam had been in a state of war but the fact that it would receive him in Hanoi was evidence of its peace strategy. However, Dr. Kissinger must understand that North Vietnam had made its last proposal, its greatest effort.

The Special Advisor said he understood that the situation was in fact at a decisive point. He had considered the matter overnight and had concluded that there were only two possibilities—either the restoration of peace or continued war. War would not be by desire or by an unwillingness to reach an agreement. But North Vietnamese good will had its limits. If now these limits were surpassed the war would continue despite Hanoi’s wishes. If it was now necessary for Hanoi to make concessions, this would be a camouflaged surrender. The United [Page 441] States had fought North Vietnam for ten years. Dr. Kissinger had negotiated for over four, and he knew that the North Vietnamese people could not surrender. He knew the history of the people of North Vietnam. He should make an effort, and North Vietnam would do the same, in an effort to reach a settlement.

Hanoi desired peace, but if peace was impossible the war would continue. Dr. Kissinger stated that Hanoi was responsible; the fact was the United States would be responsible. North Vietnam never threatened since they were an oppressed people. This was an historic reality. But Hanoi opposed threats and oppression. Dr. Kissinger studied North Vietnamese history and was aware. This discussion was private, so the Special Advisor could speak frankly. While we were at a decisive point, the Special Advisor must be responsible to his country and his people. He understood well that the losses would be great, but the North Vietnamese people would never accept an agreement which was tantamount to camouflaged surrender. If the negotiations failed, North Vietnam would fight again even though this would be against its will. Dr. Kissinger should consider this view. If Dr. Kissinger made an effort the Special Advisor would do the same. If there was no settlement this was contrary to the North Vietnamese desire.

Thus far, the Special Advisor had expressed all of his views. He had carefully thought over what he had said because of the decisiveness of this juncture. The Special Advisor and Dr. Kissinger had long been acquaintances; they had understood each other. If the war continued the problems would be very difficult. Sometimes the negotiations had been heated. Nevertheless Dr. Kissinger was a close acquaintance. After peace this relationship would become good. This was a practical reality. Dr. Kissinger asked about the remark made by the Special Advisor the day before on what he would do in the future. Certainly after the war they would become friends, the Special Advisor replied. That he was confident of.

Dr. Kissinger then urged the Special Advisor to consider the following points overnight. North Vietnam asked how there could be peace with North Vietnamese people in jail in the south? Dr. Kissinger had always sympathized with that question, but the Special Advisor should imagine the United States problem of telling its allies that Saigon should make peace, leaving 200 thousand hostile troops in its territory. This was the reason why redeployment was useful and helpful. On Article 8(c) it was clear that Hanoi had been prepared to accept this once, despite the difficulties. Now it was impossible for the United States to emerge from this round with the paragraph on this issue which was less of a concession. This showed a change in Hanoi’s good will. If Dr. Kissinger were to agree to this, the President would reject it, and if the President agreed, then Saigon would reject it, and there [Page 442] would be no basis for an agreement. The U.S. side would consider the political question carefully. If, however, the largest part of the North Vietnamese troops were withdrawn, the question of the political prisoners would be solved. Then there would be no moral basis for holding them.

Special Advisor Le Duc Tho confirmed that Hanoi had agreed to their continued retention on the basis of an October 31 signing of the agreement. Hanoi recognized that the United States would have difficulty in accepting a change in this position. That is why it had agreed to the relocation of forces in the northern part of South Vietnam. This issue had been taken into account. Dr. Kissinger replied that unless this figure were very large it could not help. Le Duc Tho asked how large it should be—total withdrawal? Dr. Kissinger said that if it were in the neighborhood of one hundred thousand, then he thought one could solve the political prisoner issue.

Le Duc Tho said this amounted to wishful thinking and was hardly different from demanding total withdrawal. Dr. Kissinger denied this. He emphasized that the point he was making involved the fact that the North Vietnamese position on Article 8(c) now posed an unmanageable problem in the United States. The Special Advisor should understand that if the war continued, this was the reason. Nevertheless the U.S. would carefully review the Special Advisor’s statements. The Special Advisor had told us what he could not change. He stated what he could not do. Each of the Articles would be reviewed and North Vietnamese views and principles will be kept in mind. Then an assessment would be made. The North Vietnamese views were clear.

Le Duc Tho said that all the North Vietnamese views had been expressed, but it was now clear that President Nixon’s message, although addressed to Dr. Kissinger, must be considered as a threat. As had been made clear, threats could have no effect. North Vietnam had fought for ten years and negotiated for many years. Therefore, both sides should have a correct attitude. There could be no threats. North Vietnam would not allow others to threaten it. If threats were received North Vietnam would oppose. So in the negotiations, threats should cease. If the negotiations were prompted by good will there was no need for threats. North Vietnamese views had been expressed completely. All available positions had been put forward. The meeting would occur tomorrow and another effort would be made. The United States should do the same. If this was so, a good settlement would be found.

Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed that the United States would make the utmost effort, keeping in mind the principles involved.

The meeting adjourned at 12:20.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI, Minutes of Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at 11 rue Darthé, Choisy-le-roi.
  2. Tab A is attached but printed as Document 118.
  3. This article concerned the release of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam.