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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972
  4. Document 84

84. Diary Entry by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1

Washington, December 9, 1970.

1630

Met with Kissinger in his White House Office. I pointed out to Kissinger that we are asking Abrams to do the impossible. We have just a handful of advisers operating out of the Embassy at Phnom Penh and all our reports are at least 24–36 hours late. There is virtually no way of evaluating the situation in Cambodia or of evaluating Cambodian plans for coping with the situation. There are some 25,000 FANK troops around Kompong Cham stymied by only 2800 VC/NVA. Yet, we are asking Abrams to operate at long distances, by remote control, with no representatives in-country and no legal authority over the troops involved. Told Kissinger that we have somehow gotten President Thieu all wound up and ready to go. But if we keep pricking his balloon he is going to give up.

However, Kissinger is concerned over losing the Cambodian MAP Supplemental. He doesn’t want to do anything until the vote has been taken on the Floor. He wants to investigate other ways and means of shoring up the situation in Cambodia without using US personnel on the ground. He asked that we go out to Abrams and query him as to what we can do using Vietnamese airlift only.

Then Kissinger asked why he wasn’t informed of the situation in Kompong Cham. I told him that we have been getting daily reports on the situation since the Chen La operation started on 8 September.2

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret.↩
  2. The next diary entry summarizes a meeting between Moorer and Laird at 6:25 p.m. on December 9 in Laird’s office at the Pentagon. Laird questioned why the contingency planning was for U.S. airlift of ARVN troops in Cambodia instead of U.S. tactical air support. Laird had reservations, which he had expressed to the President, about U.S. airlift and wanted to use ARVN airlift. Moorer responded that if that was the case, the United States should rethink its MAP to South Vietnam and provide ARVN with “lots of airlift aircraft.” (Ibid.)↩