64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia1

181759. Subj: Cheng Heng’s Conversation with the President, Oct. 25.2

1.
President Nixon expressed admiration of American people for courage shown by Cambodian people in these difficult times. They have surprised many observers by their capacity to defend selves. The President believed people like Cambodians, who cherish independence and are willing fight and sacrifice for it, will win out. We want to help, to the extent possible, so that Cambodians may be independent and choose own way without foreign invaders imposing their will.
2.
Cheng Heng thanked the President on behalf of Cambodian people for his friendship, support, and assistance. Thanks to destruction of sanctuaries and provision of training, supplies and material, GKR has so far been able to resist VC/NVA advance. President Nixon remarked that we know no nation can survive unless its people are willing and able to defend selves. U.S. can help, but in final analysis it is character of Cambodians that will determine their future. We have been encouraged to see Cambodian bravery and loyalty to GKR.
3.
Cheng Heng confirmed that all the people of Cambodia including youth, Buddhist monks, officials, and peasants—are determined to fight against enemy. GKR naturally wants to take offensive now, but lacks heavy weapons and communications equipment to do so. GKR wishes to free the people in enemy-controlled areas as soon as possible. These people do not support enemy and have sent emissaries to ask that they be liberated to supply GKR with information. GKR would like to equip 210,000 men by end of 1970. They have manpower but not enough weapons. The President replied that we are trying to cooperate. We have certain limitations placed on us by Congress, but the President has issued instructions that, to the extent possible, we want to cooperate with and assist FANK to defend themselves. [Page 159] Nixon Doctrine involves just that: we prefer not to go into a country and defend it ourselves, but to help it defend itself by providing U.S. assistance such as arms. He then asked whether Cheng Heng expecting a VC/NVA offensive during coming dry season.
4.
Cheng Heng said there were rumors to that effect, but he felt there was no need to be especially concerned because VC/NVA have already exhausted every means they have to eliminate Cambodians and have failed. Moreover, FANK and VC/NVA are pretty much on equal footing and face same conditions—“nous marchons comme eux.” Wet season did not present special advantage for GKR, and dry season would not present special advantage for enemy. Moreover, destruction of sanctuaries has made it hard for enemy to obtain supplies. They can no longer come by sea, and Ho Chi Minh Trail is very hard to traverse.
5.
The President commented we must be sure they can never again obtain supplies by sea. He went on to ask what support Sihanouk had among population. Was there a small clique of supporters? Cheng Heng said that at time of Sihanouk’s ouster GKR had support of right and some neutralists, but there had been a pro-Sihanouk group composed of wealthy people who had received favors from Sihanouk. Now, however, they too are coming over to GKR side, because much as they may think of Sihanouk they cannot be pro-Communist. Sihanouk’s entourage in Peking, except for Communists who had come from Paris, are anxious to leave for France or Cambodia, and cannot stand life in Peking. He estimated about 10 to 12 would do so, e.g., Duong Sam 01. Sihanouk followers have apartments in Paris and money in Switzerland and France and are anxious to leave, but they are under house arrest. GKR representatives tried to make contact with some of them at Lusaka conference, but found they were always followed by three or four armed bodyguards. Latest word about Sihanouk is that he is in bad state and had reportedly attempted suicide. He is under ChiCom orders, required to recite prefabricated speeches—which he would never had done before. Moreover, the “reds” who came from Paris will not let him do as he pleases and require that all decisions be taken by vote, to Sihanouk’s distaste. He broadcasts almost daily on Radio Peking and regularly contradicts himself. This is beneficial to GKR because Cambodians no longer want to listen to Radio Peking. They do not want to listen to Radio Phnom Penh, he added, because it exchanges insults with Sihanouk, but prefer VOA as more neutral and more credible. Old peasants particularly touched by VOA’s continuing to refer to “Samdech” Sihanouk.
6.
President Nixon asked how people had reacted to proclamation of republic. He mentioned that certain of his Southeast Asian friends had expressed concern, saying that peasants and old people favored retention of monarchy. Cheng Heng said that was not quite true. There [Page 160] had been some concern about that, but people have come to understand and, except for a minority of old people, everyone favors republic after years of monarchic dictatorship. Even old people are being led to change their minds by their children, including officials, monks, youth leaders, etc. GKR had explained that Sihanouk himself destroyed monarchy by taking over position of King, then Chief of State, and acting like a president. He destroyed monarchy without regularizing situation. GKR had now done so and everyone understands that.
7.
The President assured Cheng Heng we are proud to stand side by side with Cambodian people who have our admiration and support. He reiterated that it is not so much what we do but Cambodia’s own determination that will keep it independent. He asked Cheng Heng to convey his best wishes to Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and other colleagues, some of whom President met during his 1953 visit.
8.
Cheng Heng reiterated Cambodian gratitude for the President’s help. Since Cambodia has been going through difficult time economically, he would appreciate anything the President could do to “activate” economic aid. Also, GKR would welcome cultural assistance. They want to send young people to U.S. to study, not elsewhere where they may be led astray into the other camp.
9.
The President said cultural assistance should have high priority. He believed in cultural exchange and liked idea of young Cambodians coming here to study. As for economic aid, he said we would take a sympathetic attitude toward GKR request. We recognize we cannot give military aid without economic aid. Dr. Kissinger pointed out we are now working on economic aid program.
10.
Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Green were present during conversation.
Irwin
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 511, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XI, 11/70–1/71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by P. J. Bennett in EA/LC, cleared by Thomas Corcoran in EA/LC and Holdridge, and approved by Green. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
  2. An October 25 memorandum of conversation is ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 82, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 25, 1970. Cheng Heng also met with Vice President Agnew. A memorandum of conversation, October 22, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 CAMB. Kissinger met with Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick on October 22. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., NSC Files, Box 511, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XI, 11/70–1/71.