Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

58. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
  • Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State
• USSR
  • A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
  • A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
  • Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The President welcomed Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington and said that he appreciated the opportunity to have a talk with him. He had been informed that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Gromyko had held useful conversations in New York.² It would be helpful if today they could discuss the questions of the general relationship between their two countries. The President said he was prepared to take up any items that the Minister wanted to bring up. Specific problem areas, in his view, which could be usefully discussed concern the Middle East, the Berlin negotiations between the Four Powers, SALT, a most important issue, Western Hemisphere problems, specifically Cuba, and problems in Asia, specifically Vietnam.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

The President said that there were possibilities in this field. He thought one would have to be realistic and say that some of the other problems come into play when it comes to considering the possibility of increasing trade between the two countries. For example, the Vietnam war, which involved our primary and basic interests, was bound to have an inhibiting influence upon trade. It was a fact that under our legislative arrangements some items which could be used to aid North Vietnam could not be exported to the Soviet Union. We were indeed prepared to explore ways in which trade between our two countries could be increased. He did not like to use the word “linkage”, but it was true nevertheless that a settlement of these other matters would lead to increasing economic exchanges between us. He therefore felt that if our political relations improved, increased trade would follow naturally. This was in our interest as well as in the interest of the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

Vietnam

The President said that he would raise the subject of Vietnam only in passing, in view of the fact that Mr. Gromyko and Secretary Rogers had already discussed it in New York, and that it had been reported to him that Mr. Gromyko saw no prospects of North Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government engaging in a discussion of our proposal. Our position in this matter was as follows: we have made a proposal⁴ and this is as far as we would go. It had been suggested, for example, that unilateral withdrawals be made without discussion with the other side. This was completely out of the question. The President said he had carefully considered the recent proposal advanced by the United States and if North Vietnam and the PRG declined to discuss our proposal in Paris, we would simply have to proceed down the other road, our program of Vietnamization. That program also would end the war, although the road would be longer. We would much prefer to shorten the war by meaningful discussions with the other side. The problem of Vietnam, of course, involved the United States to a far greater degree than the Soviet Union, for the simple reason that so many U.S. soldiers had been killed there. If, in the future, we should have to undertake forceful moves to protect the interests of our men, we would do so resolutely, but would also inform the Soviet side as we had done at the time of Cambodia. The President hoped that Mr. Gromyko would understand our position, by putting himself in our place. Since we were in this area we must protect our interests. We had made our proposal and hoped that it would be a basis for negotiation. If this failed to stimulate an interested reaction on the other side, we would proceed down the other track as forcefully as we considered necessary.

Mr. Gromyko said that in his view there was no prospect of the other side engaging in discussions unless the United States was willing to work out the timing for withdrawal of its troops, and agreed to the establishment of a coalition government for South Vietnam. His statement was based upon his knowledge of the position of North Vietnam. The President had spoken of the possibilities open to the United States and had said that the recent proposals were as far as we could go. Of course, we would be able to judge the situation better than he, but it was his impression that if we were serious about wanting to put an end to the war, we would have to go along with the two conditions he had mentioned. He would be less than frank if he did not tell the President the same thing he had said to Secretary Rogers.

The President appreciated Mr. Gromyko’s candor and said he knew that we disagreed on this subject. Regarding a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops, we were willing to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of forces. We were not going to indicate any date in advance on unilateral withdrawal, however, since to do so would mean to destroy our negotiating position. In regard to the coalition government, the opposition spoke of a coalition government as one that would be set up after removing all elected people in the present government.

This was totally unacceptable to us. As he had said earlier, and as Secretary Rogers had told Mr. Gromyko in New York, whatever the leaders of North Vietnam and the PRG could arrange with South Vietnam would be acceptable to us.

If North Vietnam tried to step up military operations we would take strong actions. In that case, we would inform the Soviet leaders in advance. We had our interests in the area and we had our plan which was succeeding. We were confident that our plan would succeed. Time was now on our side, even though we regretted that it would take longer than the negotiating route. The President emphasized that we would do our best not to permit the Vietnam situation to interfere with our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Soviet Union, volume XIII, October 1970–October 1971, Document 23.
2. See Document 57.
3. In an October 19 memorandum to Nixon briefing him for the meeting, Kissinger noted that while the Soviets had been accurately reporting the administration’s views to Hanoi, they had been unwilling to do more. So that the Soviets did not become merely intermediaries, he advised Nixon to be tough and say the following: A stable settlement was possible based on his October 7 proposals, but if Hanoi was not forthcoming then the United States would continue with Vietnamization, which was working; Hanoi’s political proposals were unrealistic; and it would be a mistake for Hanoi to increase its military activity because it would not prompt a precipitate U.S. withdrawal or disguised defeat. The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Soviet Union, volume XIII, October 1970–October 1971, Document 18.
4. The President is referring to his October 7 speech; see Document 46.