47. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Peace Talks on Vietnam (Bruce)1
Dear David:
The meeting in Ireland with you and Phil went very well and was extremely valuable in preparing for the President’s speech.2
There was one item in the President’s talking points for that meeting that did not come up but that he has asked me to pass on to you. The President is very emphatic that his new initiative is not designed to be a cover for unilateral American withdrawal. Although our position on withdrawal is phrased somewhat differently in the speech, this is essentially for packaging reasons and is not meant to get us away from the basic principles of his May 14, 1969 speech.3 He hopes you will make this point clear to Phil and the delegation, for it will be most important that we all speak with one voice while following up the President’s proposals during the coming weeks.
I had already drafted the above when my concern on this point was heightened by seeing the report of today’s press briefing by our spokesman in Paris in which he did not make clear what the President really meant. I can understand his reticence and his view that any interpretation of the speech come primarily from here. Nevertheless, it is important that we should all be on the record in affirming that the President does not mean unilateral withdrawal.
[Page 125]There has been some real pressure within the bureaucracy for us to trade unilateral withdrawal for a ceasefire. The President’s careful phrasing on withdrawals in his speech is being used to fuel and to justify that pressure. However, in his personal briefings to the Cabinet and the Congressional leadership, the President made very clear that he is not suggesting or accepting a unilateral withdrawal, and he wanted you to know his strong views on this.
I notice that our spokesman also left some ambiguity about our policy on the removal of Thieu-Ky-Khiem. On this point also the President’s position is very firm. He believes that removal of these men would be tantamount to the dismantling of the organized non-communist forces. He also believes the other side’s demands reflects their awareness of this fact. Therefore, we should not suggest in any statement that the three men themselves might be negotiable, since—as you know—far more is at stake.
The President will, of course, consider seriously any proposals you have on these or any other issues in the negotiations, but did want you to know his position.
I trust that your dignified patience of these past weeks will be rewarded with some real negotiating movement now that the initiative has been launched. I wish you every success in the coming months, and we all share the view here that we have the best man possible in Paris for this crucial task.4
Warm regards,
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 190, Paris Talks/Meetings, 1 Oct–Dec 70. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Lord sent a draft of this letter to Kissinger under cover of an October 7 memorandum, noting it was “redone & amplified per your instructions.” (Ibid.)↩
- On October 4, the President, Rogers, and Kissinger met with Bruce and Philip Habib from 9:30 to 11:45 a.m. in Limerick, Ireland during the penultimate day of Nixon’s European tour, September 27 to October 5. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For the President’s speech of October 7, see Document 46.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 37.↩
- Bunker responded to Kissinger in backchannel message 116 from Paris, October 19, stating that he had no suggestions for a change in the negotiating posture in Paris, no sympathy for trading unilateral withdrawal for a cease-fire, and no patience for those calling for the removal of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Messages, Europe, Mid East, Latin America, 1970)↩
- Kissinger signed “Henry” above his typed signature.↩