Office of the Historian

40. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group1

Washington, September 15, 1970, 4:12–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Short-Term Cambodia Strategy (NSSM 99)

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
    • Mr. Marshall Green
    • Mr. Arthur Hartman
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Vice Adm. William Flanagan
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. George Carver
  • JCS
    • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
    • B/Gen. Robert Lukeman
  • NSC Staff
    • Dr. K. Wayne Smith
    • Mr. John H. Holdridge
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
    • Capt. Robert Sansom
    • Mr. D. Keith Guthrie
  • OMB
    • Mr. James R. Schlesinger

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
The SRG agreed that from a military standpoint, Strategy 3, Variant 3, as outlined in the VSSG Working Paper,2 states the preferred objective, which is to maintain the Cambodian Government in control of the half of the country that includes the capital, populated areas, and port. The SRG also agreed that in seeking to achieve this objective, the US should aim at building up the capabilities of the Cambodian forces so as to minimize the need for significant long-term intervention by the ARVN. The SRG noted that the requirement for involvement of South Vietnamese forces in the defense of Cambodia should decline as the capabilities of the Cambodian forces improve.
2.
To provide a fuller analysis of the implications of the strategic objectives outlined in Paragraph 1, the NSC Staff will prepare in chart form an analysis covering the next six months which relates the expected increase in Cambodian military capabilities, the likely levels of NVA/VC reinforcements in Cambodia, and the requirements for employment of South Vietnamese forces in the defense of Cambodia. CIA will assist in assessing prospective NVA/VC reinforcement levels, and [Page 110] JCS will provide data on prospects for the improvement of Cambodian military capabilities.3
3.
State and OMB will prepare a study on means to fund a Cambodian assistance program at the current level pending passage of a supplemental appropriation or in default of passage of such an appropriation. The study should also define the amount which should be requested to support the objectives referred to in Paragraph 1 if it is decided to seek a supplemental appropriation early in CY71.
4.
The SRG endorsed the suggestion that the Secretary of Defense provide the President his views on why he believes it would be possible to obtain a supplemental appropriation for military assistance to Cambodia prior to the adjournment of Congress on October 23.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.↩
  2. See Document 39 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
  3. In a September 19 memorandum to Packard, Johnson, and Helms, Kissinger requested that they expand the NSSM 99 response to include an option that would allow Cambodian forces to defend the area outlined in variant 3 of Strategy 3 without “significant long term intervention by South Vietnamese.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–173, NSSM Files, NSSM 99)↩