Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

• My September 7 Meeting with the North Vietnamese

As you know, the North Vietnamese have agreed to meet with me in Paris on September 7 at 9:30 a.m. Both sides will be feeling out one another’s positions after the long interval since our last, pre-Cambodia meeting on April 4.² With Le Duc Tho absent, I do not expect Xuan Thuy to show a great deal of flexibility; we can count on his sticking closely to his instructions with characteristic discipline.

I plan to speak first at this meeting since they spoke first at the last one. Attached for your approval is a draft opening statement (Tab A).³ I would reiterate our preference for a negotiated settlement, but would underline that the time for this is beginning to run out and at some point we will be committed to our alternative course of Vietnamization.

The major points in my opening statement are as follows:

• —Ambassador Bruce, whose appointment we consider a significant step, has your full confidence and is fully empowered to negotiate on all issues. He alone on our delegation will be kept fully informed of my meetings and may join future sessions.⁴
• —You continue to seek a peace fair to both sides and your seriousness is underlined by your sending me on these missions.
• —The other side must soon choose the way they wish to resolve the conflict. We are nearing the time when the chances for a negotiated settlement will pass, and they will have committed themselves to a test of arms against a strengthened South Vietnam, supported by us in whatever way seems appropriate and necessary.
• —We envisage that these restricted meetings should deal with the general principles of a settlement which should then be translated into detailed agreements in private and plenary sessions between Bruce and Xuan Thuy.
• —We find unacceptable two elements of their negotiating approach, i.e., setting forth preconditions and coupling military pressure with negotiations. On the latter point, I would repeat our warning about the possible unfortunate consequences of military pressures and would caution them particularly against military actions such as the shelling in South Vietnam which is inconsistent with our understanding of the bombing halt.
• —I would present a schedule for withdrawal of U.S. forces over a 12-month period to replace the 16-month timetable I gave them in March. (This schedule has been cleared through the bureaucracy; we have made a couple of minor changes to bring it into accord with our public statements and previous positions.) I would ask them for their response and for them to tell us with whom they would discuss the question of their forces in the south.
• —On political issues, I would seek their reaction to our proposals at the last meeting which they said needed further study. I would repeat the principles in your April 20 speech⁵ and reiterate that we cannot agree to the replacement in advance of the leaders of the present South Vietnamese Government.
• —I would close with an exhortation to speak candidly and go directly to the heart of these problems.

Recommendations:

That you approve this approach by initialing the statement attached at Tab A.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol V. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for action. The President wrote, “OK,” at the top of the memorandum.
2. For a record of this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 222.
3. Tab A was not attached, but drafts of Kissinger’s opening statement are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol V.
4. In an August 19 memorandum to Kissinger, Smyser recommended keeping Bruce informed about the secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese. While Smyser cautioned that doing this would increase the risk of leaks and create more logistical problems for Kissinger’s staff, he believed that “on balance, I think we should cut him in. Curiously, I think that the whole arrangement will appeal to Hanoi’s passion for complex and devious maneuvering.” (Ibid., Box 861, Camp David, Memos, 1969–1970)
5. In an address to the Nation on April 20, Nixon announced that, despite the lack of progress toward a negotiated settlement, he was withdrawing 150,000 troops by the spring of 1971. He set out three principles for a political settlement: the Vietnamese people must be free to determine their own future, the settlement must reflect the “existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam,” and all sides must agree to abide by the results of the political process. He again refused to agree to the North Vietnamese demand that the current South Vietnamese Government be overthrown. The text of the statement is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 373–377.
6. Nixon did not initial Kissinger’s draft statement. However, he did deliver his opening statement, with some modification, as drafted. See footnote 3 above.