287. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rogers 1
WSAG Meeting on Laos
The WSAG meeting which was held at 12:00 noon on January 3 dealt exclusively with the subject of Laos.2 It addressed the immediate problem of defending Long Tieng as well as the longer range problems of sustaining the friendly positions in Laos. In discussing these problems it was universally recognized that the current North Vietnamese tactic is to try to involve us more deeply and more extensively in Laos in the hope of exacerbating our problems with the Congress and the public.
On the immediate problem of defending Long Tieng, the following decisions were taken:
- (a)
- The only feasible source for additional troops for this purpose would be Thai SGU forces.
- (b)
- CIA was therefore directed to examine the possibility of increasing the available Thai SGU force in the Long Tieng area. Two avenues are to be explored. The first would be to expedite the return to Laos of those ten battalions which were withdrawn for rest and recuperation after the collapse of the Plaine des Jarres, as well as expediting the introduction into Laos of those Thai SGU forces currently in [Page 1027] training. The second avenue would be through persuading the RTG to permit members of trained regular Thai units to volunteer for the SGU forces, presumably as replacements or fillers in the depleted ranks of the ten evacuated battalions.
- (c)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to send instructions to General Lavelle, Commander of the Seventh Air Force, to visit Bangkok and through Ambassador Unger to give appropriate Thai officials assurances about the use of United States air power in Laos. We are sending a separate cable to Unger alerting him to this visit.
- (d)
- Kissinger will call Laird to convey the President’s desire that Laird take appropriate action with Senator Stennis either to have a more flexible interpretation of the accounting process under the Symington Amendment or else to arrange for Senate action in the new session to increase the authorization of $350 million currently provided by the Symington Amendment.
In addition to these decisions on short range matters, the following decisions were made with respect to the longer range problems:
- (a)
- It was decided that, for the time being, no action should be taken to seek a way out of the inhibitions against United States support for Thai regular forces operating in Laos as provided by the Fulbright Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act. It was pointed out, however, that the President could make an official finding that the support of such forces was “required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia”. It was considered that, by logical extenuation, an agreement could be made for such a finding, but at a considerable political price with the Congress and the public. It was decided that current circumstances were not so bleak as to require such action at this time.
- (b)
- It was further universally agreed that it was important to try to keep the remnants of the Meo forces intact as a fighting unit and not let them become dispersed. To this end the CIA was instructed to put more emphasis upon the use of the Meo as guerrilla units rather than as forces utilized to defend fixed locations.