Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

275. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Trip to Vietnam, November 2–8, 1971

As you requested, Admiral Moorer and I have reviewed again in the theater the situation in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The visit afforded me the opportunity to visit with Ambassador Bunker and his staff, General Abrams and his staff, and President Thieu² and the top Republic of Vietnam (RVN) leadership. In addition, members of my personal staff spent time in the field throughout South Vietnam. They visited the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in each Military Region; consulted U.S. military and civilian leaders in the various regions; met with those who are planning and administering the economic programs; and went into detail with those who are charged with the diverse and complicated prisoner of war matters. As you know, Admiral Moorer spent additional time in Cambodia and Laos. He will be providing supplementary observations later.

In this report, I shall, as I have after my three previous Southeast Asia trips, provide some general impressions. Thereafter, I shall provide in somewhat more detail:

• —A delineation of the impressions we took to Southeast Asia.
• —What we found in Vietnam.
• —The outlook for the future, based on our earlier analyses and our findings in Vietnam.
• —The current issues which deserve special attention.

Finally, I will draw the conclusions which seem, in my judgment, most pertinent and will make recommendations based on those conclusions.

General Impressions

The most compelling impression I have is one of success. The risks you have taken for peace are paying off. The successes, and the potential for future success, are of such magnitude that we must, if anything, guard against overoptimism.

In the various functional areas—military, pacification, economic, and political—progress is significant, if not completely uniform. In the political field, there is cause for concern. That concern stems principally from indications that President Thieu may move too slowly and unimaginatively to avail himself of steps that are needed to maintain stability and cohesion in the RVN society. Opportunities lost today may not be retrievable in the months and years ahead. The cost of losing these opportunities could seriously degrade the impressive progress made—and potentially available—in the other functional areas.

The fact that President Thieu is not showing immediate signs of using the referendum mandate to move ahead vigorously in the political arena does not diminish the fact that currently effective military, province, district, and local leadership is at work. I was particularly pleased with that progress. RVN’s will and desire are more in evidence today than at any time in the past. That continues to be an essential—if not the essential—ingredient to the future. President Thieu agreed with me on that point.

I believe one major reason for this change is that from the outset of your Administration the focus has been on turning over responsibilities to the RVN and not taking them over as had been the case prior to that time.

The view of U.S. civilian and military leaders in Vietnam and of the GVN leadership is that we now have and can maintain sufficient military strength to preclude the enemy from achieving any kind of military verdict in South Vietnam. A dynamism is at work leading to increased RVN self-reliance. The United States can continue its force redeployments. In fact, the redeployments can safely be accelerated.

There are, of course, continuing problem areas. In addition to the political item mentioned previously, I see little progress in (a) the formulation of new diplomatic initiatives for peace; (b) the planning for or resolution of the complex and important prisoner of war issues; and (c) the various forms of regional cooperation, fostered by the Southeast Asian nations, which will allow them to consolidate their hard-won gains.

The U.S. military leadership in Vietnam again deserves special mention. General Abrams, General Weyand, General Lavelle, and their staffs are pursuing U.S. interests with a vigor and resolution worthy of the highest acclaim. We can be justly proud of the U.S. military elements in Vietnam.

Those, in brief, are my general reactions. I should like to outline in more detail the impressions I carried to Vietnam and how they compared with what I found there.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 158, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Nov–Dec 71. Secret; Sensitive.
2. A memorandum of conversation between Laird and Thieu on November 5 is ibid.