Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

273. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 2, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. foreign aid program and South Asia.]

Nixon: We just got word that Le Duc Tho is coming back to Paris on the 20th to meet with him on Sunday.²

Kissinger: That’s [unclear].

Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Now, in my view, this is either fish or cut bait. There isn’t any more reason to meet again. On the other hand, the—you know, you know the pattern of the previous meetings, and how much we have offered. We’ve answered the seven points, and they’ve agreed to some things, and so forth and so on.

Kissinger: Bill has seen every memo—³

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —that I’ve given you.

Nixon: Yeah. What is the situation at the present time? Le Duc Tho—

Kissinger: Well, [unclear]—

Nixon: —wants this meeting, though. What I’m getting at is this meeting assumes more importance due to the fact. Remember, I said, “No more meetings unless they have a direct expectation to discuss something new.”

Kissinger: Well, they—they sent us a message,⁴ which said that. We left it the last time, as you’ll remember, Bill, that if I decide there’s nothing to say, we’ll meet again—

Rogers: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —but—that if you’ll schedule a meeting. Well, we got a message—actually, we got it while I was in China—while in Paris; we didn’t hear it in China—which said that Le Duc Tho is coming back to Paris, and Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho would like to meet me on November 20th. We got it four weeks ahead of time. In other words, we got it the last week of October. They added to it that the reason they’re suggesting November 20th is because Xuan Thuy is ill and recuperating. And you remember, they’ve given us that message also in the official—

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: Normally, they don’t give any explanation for their movement. And—

Nixon: Yeah, that’s public knowledge.

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: The Xuan Thuy part is [unclear]—

Kissinger: Yeah, but normally when Xuan Thuy doesn’t come to a meeting—

Nixon: Le Duc Tho is not public knowledge?

Kissinger: That’s right. Well, but—

Nixon: Yeah. Then he’s coming back.

Kissinger: That he’s coming—

Nixon: He will be—

Kissinger: He will be coming back. So, now, 15, 16, 17th—if he’s coming—through the 20th, he’ll be in Paris, and that’s [unclear]—

Nixon: The most important point is that this is—

Kissinger: That he’s asked for a meeting in a public venue.

Nixon: Yeah. Now, the most important point is that, then, the—we know, we’ve always said that there will come a time when the negotiating track is either closed, or it could really mean something. It could mean something this time. It could. I—I don’t know. But, it—the point is, it’s at their initiative this time; they want to meet. Now, this occurred, of course, before this damn vote.⁵ I don’t know how much effect this will have [unclear]. But, if we can get a continuing resolution through before that meeting, it would be very helpful. You see? Well, as a matter of fact, continuing resolutions have to go through—

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: —the 15th.

Kissinger: It’s got to go through with—⁶

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: I think we really need the heat on that [unclear]. Now, this comes back to the point about the, about the troop withdrawal that—which—we got Laird on it; Laird’s set up for it, but no idea that I’ve—here’s what I had in mind, and, see if [unclear]. I think that we cannot make a—what I would call, and you know—I felt that there has to come a time when we make a—[unclear] you—we talk about a proposal, we may make an announcement:⁷ “Well, this is it. We have finished, and now—And the war is—it’s completed, now.” I was hoping we could do it now. We can, in the light of this meeting. We can. Before the meeting,⁸ you say, “Regardless of what happens, on the negotiating front, we’re going to do this, or that, and the other thing.” Well then, on the other hand, we have to say something. Here’s what I have in mind.

[Omitted here is discussion of Nixon’s public announcement of troop withdrawals.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 611–03. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared by the editors specifically for this volume. This exchange is part of a larger conversation from 9:32 to 10:45 a.m.
2. November 21.
3. For example, Kissinger sent Rogers a slightly revised version of the record of his secret talks in Paris on September 13 with Le Duc Tho in a memorandum of September 14. See footnote 8, Document 254.
4. On October 25; see Document 272.
5. On October 29, the Senate rejected a House bill, HR 9910, authorizing both economic and military foreign aid in fiscal years 1973 and 1973 at $3.4 billion. This was the first outright rejection of foreign aid assistance since the inception of the program 24 years before. Complicating the issue was an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops in Indochina within six months after passage of the legislation. (Congress and the Nation, 1969–1972, Vol. II, pp. 876–877)
6. On December 16, the House rejected the Mansfield amendment, and Mansfield accepted this vote as an expression of the House. A House–Senate conference agreed upon a continuing resolution that would fund foreign aid at $2.75 billion. (Ibid., pp, 877–878)
7. The announcement of the withdrawal of 45,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam was made on November 12; see footnote 2, Document 276.
8. Apparent reference to a meeting of the President with the Republican House Congressional leadership to discuss the legislative program for the remainder of 1971, 5:25 to 6:22 p. m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)