261. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Southeast Asia Trip, September 20–26, 1971
On September 20, a team composed of three representatives of the National Security Council and one representative of the Department of State departed Washington to conduct a survey of the situation in Southeast Asia, with emphasis on the security situation in South Vietnam. The team returned to Washington via CINCPAC, arriving the evening of September 26. At Tab A2 is the team composition and a detailed itinerary.
The following is a summary of the findings concerning the political, economic, and security situations in the Republic of Vietnam.
Political Situation
Despite a deep sense of disappointment within our mission in Saigon with respect to the current political situation, President Thieu’s decision to proceed with the October 3 referendum has caused:
- —little controversy in the countryside where most voters live;
- —vocal opposition among urban political groupings;
- —a policy of violent confrontation in a very small minority of city dwellers with some leadership from the Vice President. Despite exaggerated press reporting, the violence thus far has stirred hardly a ripple in Saigon or elsewhere;
- —no known serious coup planning;
- —no serious threat to Thieu’s prospects for a “victory” in the referendum.
However, it is apparent that during the post referendum period, there is serious risk of an erosion of Thieu’s control and support if he does not institute positive reforms designed to broaden the base of his new government and move, at least ostensibly, against the more flagrant kinds of corruption.3 A detailed report is at Tab B.
[Page 949]Economic Situation
This economic stabilization program continues to be very successful. Price increases in 1971 should be in the 10% to 15% range, well below the past levels of 30% to 40%.
President Thieu is planning another set of far-reaching reforms for October. They include a major devaluation. This devaluation will be the key step toward limiting inflation in 1972 to 10% to 15%.
There is a slight political risk within South Vietnam if import prices rise sharply as they will when the reforms are executed. One-third of South Vietnam’s goods are imported. But President Thieu appears confident he can bear these risks; and the GVN appears determined to lessen its dependence on U.S. assistance.
The best way to insure that U.S. assistance is not cut by our critics in the Congress is to launch an economic development program. One has now been designed by our Mission and the GVN wants to implement it. Plans now are to launch this program on January 1, 1972, but it could be implemented earlier by President Thieu.
You will be informed later of the decisions required, and it may be appropriate for you to take a personal role in launching the program.
A detailed report is at Tab C.
Security Assessment
The latest reports on the pacification situation show that GVN control of the rural population is 69% countrywide. Of more importance, GVN control in southern South Vietnam (MR’s III and IV) is about 75%; in areas in the northern part of the country (MR’s I and II), it is around 50%.
The resources and plans for pacification in the Delta and Saigon areas practically guarantee continued pacification progress against likely enemy threats through 1972. In the northern part of the country, there is a serious question whether pacification progress can be sustained in the face of the likely enemy threats.
The potential problem results from U.S. redeployments and the incentives they could create for a North Vietnamese offensive. While there is practically no solid evidence on enemy intentions and capabilities for the upcoming 1971–72 dry season, analysis shows that if the enemy mounts an effort similar to last year’s, he could set back the GVN’s pacification effort at least temporarily in northern South Vietnam and perhaps temporarily occupy a highland city like Pleiku or Kontum. Of course, if one optimistically assumes the enemy will not infiltrate resources at a level approaching last year’s level, the GVN’s prospects are very good.
Vietnamese forces have the capability to pre-empt to some degree even the enemy’s best efforts. They can do this if they take actions to strengthen their forces and execute cross-border operations to pre-empt enemy attacks.
[Page 950]The GVN must mobilize additional forces in the northern part of the country, increase the pay of combat soldiers countrywide, modify its draft and personnel allocation policies to raise the manning levels of its combat units to 90%, and remove selected division and regimental commanders who by all accounts border on the incompetent.
At your direction, Secretary Laird and General Abrams have sought these changes. But President Thieu’s response has been slow. This trip provided me with an opportunity to impress again on President Thieu the need for decisive action in these areas. He seemed to understand what was called for and intends to act.
President Thieu is planning to execute cross-border operations toward Kratie in Cambodia and on a limited quick-stroke basis into southern Laos. These will play a key role in limiting Hanoi’s options.
With regard to U.S. forces, the political and security situations in South Vietnam justify some acceleration in U.S. redeployments, beginning on December 1st.
Assuming no negotiated settlement, residual U.S. functions of helicopter, tactical air, and limited advisory, logistics, and intelligence efforts can be adequately maintained at a U.S. force level of approximately 50,000, provided it is correctly designed.
A detailed report is at Tab D.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 157, Vietnam Country Files, Viet Sept 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.↩
- Tabs A–D, attached but not printed.↩
- Haig met with Thieu on September 23. See Document 268.↩