243. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

12885. Deliver opening business to Ambassador Bunker and Dep Asst Sec Sullivan from Berger. Subj: Meeting With Minh. Ref: A. Saigon 12801. B. State 146980.2

1.
I met with General Minh this morning for two hours and twenty minutes. He had Ton That Thien with him and I was accompanied by political officer Richard Thompson.
2.
Minh opened by saying he had long felt the elections would be dishonest, and when he last spoke to Ambassador Bunker he already had proof in the form of a secret document circulated to province chiefs setting out in detail what they should do to insure Thieu’s election. Picking a document out of a folder Minh said, “Here is the evidence that the government has no intention of permitting an honest election. I have had it for three months. I will give you a copy but you must not let President Thieu know you have this or show it to President Thieu.”
3.
I asked Minh if he had given any thought to the possibility the document might be a forgery. I said forged documents are common in elections, and, turning to Thien, I said he would recall the famous Zinoviev letter which figured so prominently in a British election in the 1920s. I said could this possibly be a Communist-created document which was designed not just to discredit Thieu, but the elections and the whole constitutional system.
4.
Minh brushed this aside saying he had personally received the document from a province chief. I asked if the copy he was supplying me was a Xerox of the original. He said my copy was a retype. (Later in the conversation when I returned to the validity of the document, he said seven or eight province chiefs have given him the same document, which he had returned to them, and he had also received a copy “from a member of President Thieu’s staff.” I said I was under the impression he had said that the document called for its return after the Presidential election. Was the copy in his possession the actual one received by the province chief? He said no it was a copy of the original, which was back in the hands of the province chief.)
5.
We are having the document translated and will cable it soonest.
6.
Speaking from a shorter paper, Minh then listed some of the main items in the document: Directions on how to organize the electorate, locating voting stations in remote and inaccessible places; stuffing the ballot box in advance; how to carry out multiple voting; arresting and intimidating opposition cadres and supporters; etc. (I am having Thompson spell out this in detail from his notes and will forward a supplement to this para, also some of the events which Minh said are already taking place.)
7.
Minh said for the last six months Thieu has used the government’s administrative apparatus to prepare for a guaranteed result. He said he also had other documents in his possession to prove this: Documents circulated by the Ministries of Interior, Information, the secret police, the military special services, and others. The original election law was unconstitutional, but Thieu dominates every branch of the government including the Supreme Court which found the law valid. What chance, Minh said again, was there for an honest election in these circumstances, and what does constitutional government mean when all organs of government are under Thieu’s control?
8.
Minh said our advisers in the field surely must know of the existence of these documents, and of the orders being carried out by province chiefs, district chiefs, Phung Hoang chiefs, RD cadres, and other government officials to deliver the vote in both the lower house and Presidential elections. I said we have not heard anything of any documents, nor had we much evidence of the actions which he had described.
9.
Minh said the elimination of Ky was done by underhanded and illegal means and is further evidence that the elections will be rigged. Mr. Nha has already told the press that the outcome of the Presidential election will be 55 percent to 45 percent, and that it does not matter whether Minh runs or not. (He repeated this several times during the talk.)
10.
Minh said in view of the way the situation has developed there is no purpose in his continuing the campaign. Most of his supporters are now urging him to announce his withdrawal, and the question he must answer is whether to run or not. Before deciding he wants me to send this document to Ambassador Bunker and to Washington and to ascertain their views of “its importance”. He also wishes to know, if he does not run, will this have “bad effects” in the United States. If the U.S. does not think it is bad for him to withdraw, he will withdraw. He does not want to do anything that would damage the friendship of the U.S. toward Viet-Nam.
11.
I said I wish to speak to him very frankly. The elections which were coming up were of the greatest importance to Viet-Nam and to the United States. All the reports we had indicated that General Minh was a very strong candidate, with wide support in the country, and that he would get a great many votes. Minh interrupted me to say yes, he knows that, but will he win. I said I did not know who would win, but it was evident that he was going to give President Thieu a real race.
12.
I said we were getting reports that Minh’s uncertainty about running was having a demoralizing effect on his supporters and cadres and that people were stopping contributions to his campaign because of the fear that he would withdraw. It was essential to Viet-Nam’s political evolution and development and to future stability that there be a contested election in which people would be given an opportunity to register their views. I said, if he withdraws and there is no contest, what is the consequence for Viet-Nam? Minh replied the consequences would be very serious and he could not predict what would happen. I said Viet-Nam and the U.S. had already had one experience of government anarchy and turmoil after the overthrow of Diem in 1963. Neither Viet-Nam nor the U.S. could afford another such experience. There is much talk now of coups, and I wanted him to know that if there was another coup it would be impossible for the U.S. to continue to support Viet-Nam. He said he was aware of that. On the other hand, he said, if he takes part in an election whose outcome is fixed in advance, he will be condemned by the people for letting himself be put in that position. It would be better for him to stand aside and maintain his prestige in order to give the people hope for the future.
13.
I said in 1967 after four years of turmoil, Viet-Nam had an election under a new constitution, and during the last four years there has [Page 870] been a substantial measure of political stability, evolution and progress. There have been local, provincial and senate elections. Many had predicted that these would not be fair, yet after the event there were very few complaints. There were many charges that in the selection of candidates for the lower house in the coming election, many would be disqualified, but in the end very few were barred. In the lower house elections, An Quang hopes to win 40 to 50 seats which will make it the largest bloc in the lower house. There is an imperative need for organized political parties both supporting and opposing the government and there is a real possibility that this can be done in the next few years. I said to Minh that he was the only and obvious opposition leader who could help strengthen and develop the political process, but if he withdrew, the country would again drift aimlessly without organized parties. If he won in the coming election he would be the head of a great political force, if he should lose, he would still be the leader of a very great political force. He had a heavy responsibility to the country and to himself to run in order to take Vietnam into the next stage of political development. Only the Communists would benefit if he withdrew.
14.
Minh said he recognized his responsibility, he recognized the needs of the country, and he recognized the dangers. But in the Vietnamese context he must tell me the Vietnamese would never understand his running in an election where the outcome was fixed in advance. He was already out of money to continue the campaign, and how could he appeal for funds in these circumstances.
15.
I asked him why he does not seek a private meeting with Thieu to discuss the situation. He said he knows Thieu better than anyone and it would do no good.
16.
The anti-climax of all this came at the end when Minh said he hoped I could get a reply to his questions as soon as possible. Time was running out. He had to make a decision by August 24, since he would forfeit his deposit of 2 million piasters unless he withdrew before that date. He asked when Ambassador Bunker would return. I said I had no firm date, but it would be in a few days or early next week.
17.
Since writing the foregoing I heard that Minh gave the British Ambassador a copy of the document, and presumably others in the diplomatic corps will have it soon. The Vietnamese press this morning mentioned that General Minh had documents to prove the government’s intention to rig the election. This came from Ton That Thien who told the press yesterday Minh has documents ordering province chiefs to paralyze Minh’s election apparatus and is gathering more such documents to use when necessary. It is only a matter of time before the U.S. press will be playing the story.
Berger
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David, Cables, October 1969–December 31, 1971. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
  2. Neither telegram was found.