Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

241. Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, August 10, 1971, 2:10–3:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger
• State:
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. William H. Sullivan
  • Mr. G. McMurtie Godley
  • Mr. Mark Pratt
• Defense:
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Rear Adm. W.R. Flanagan
• JCS:
  • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• CIA:
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. Charles Whitehurst
  • [name not declassified]
• NSC Staff:
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge
  • Mr. John Negroponte
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

• —the Laos Ad Hoc Group would draft a negotiating cable to the field, separating the two issues of talks and a neutralization of the Plain of Jars. Our objective should be a neutralization of the Plain of Jars, as an outcome of talks, and Vang Pao’s forces should not be pulled off the Plain until an agreement on neutralization is reached.
• —Col. Kennedy would summarize the decisions taken on military readiness measures—Thai SGUs, Lao SGUs, A–1s, M–60s and gunship helicopters—and circulate them to the WSAG members.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we going to start off with a briefing?

Gen. Cushman: If you desire.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think it would be a good idea to get a rundown of the present situation, if it can be done with reasonable speed.

Gen. Cushman: (Uses large map, showing the disposition of the Laotian, North Vietnamese and Thai forces in the Plain of Jars area). The situation in the Plain of Jars is rather static, from the point of view of movement of forces. Vang Pao has three battalions in operation in the northeastern sector of the Plain, and he has met some resistance.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we stopped him, or was it the enemy?

Gen. Cushman: The enemy. Vang Pao is getting artillery support from the Thai battalions behind him on the Plain. I should point out, however, that nobody is going anywhere. I doubt that he can seize the territory to the north and east of the Plain. I don’t think he can achieve his objectives.

The issue is whether we want Vang Pao to withdraw from his extended positions as an inducement to talks, or whether we want him to use the good military position as a possible chip in bargaining with the North Vietnamese. Militarily, he is in fairly good shape. He is being hit by some mortar fire, and he is taking casualties from enemy patrols. In essence, though, the situation is static. The question is what does he do if the enemy brings in additional units. If he is attacked, he is well-set to conduct defensive operations and an orderly retreat, unlike two years ago, when he was routed. The situation was saved two years ago by bringing in additional SGUs.

Mr. Johnson: Is Vang Pao operating only against the NVA, or is he also facing the PL?

Gen. Cushman: He is facing some local PL forces.

Dr. Kissinger: We called this meeting in order to discuss the negotiating scenario and the relationship of Vang Pao’s operations to the scenario. We also have to discuss the military steps we must take now and before the next dry season to retain the necessary flexibility if the negotiations fail. In addition, we should see whether we can settle the issue of logistical support while there still is something to support. Finally, we should consider the legislative restrictions. Alex [Johnson] or Bill [Sullivan], do you want to brief us on the negotiating scenario?

Mr. Sullivan: You recall that at the last meeting² we agreed that the prospects for real negotiations were nil, except in the context of the Vietnamese situation. We look upon the scenario as a sophistry which enables us to arrange a conditional ceasefire under the guise of creating proper security for the internal Lao talks at a site on the PDJ. We don’t expect the talks to really get anywhere.

Dr. Kissinger: Why would the other side want to accept our proposals?

Mr. Sullivan: They might want to accept them because there has been continued fighting, yet they have not gained territory, and they have suffered considerable casualties. If they accepted the sophistry, we could have talks which could precipitate a military standdown. Souvanna has also talked of neutralizing the Plain of Jars.

With regard to the forward movement of Vang Pao, there are also indications that part of the North Vietnamese 312th division is moving back into position to clip off some of Vang Pao’s forces. The Pathet Lao plenipotentiary went home last Saturday and made a statement to the effect that nibbling attacks by U.S. puppets make it impossible to go ahead with the talks. On top of all this, Souvanna is planning to leave soon for his annual cure in France.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn’t he give up his cure in order to proceed with negotiations?

Mr. Sullivan: He would. But he also thinks a lot of the details can be handled by his subordinates.

Vang Pao talked to our Chargé and the CIA station chief in terms of holding on to the territory in the Plain as a permanent home for the Meo. This is counter to our scenario and to Souvanna’s thoughts. Souvanna will agree to pull Vang Pao off the PDJ, in return for a general understanding of a military standdown. We must get instructions to our people to have a heart-to-heart talk with Souvanna on the proposals. We also have to state the facts of life to Vang Pao. I think he has just been trying to see what the traffic will bear, and I don’t expect him to be an intractable problem. If the scenario is approved, we can at least tell that much to Souvanna. We must also tell him what we are prepared to do to back him.

Some of the language in the part of the paper dealing with military measures is a bit fuzzy because it is compromise language. I see five fuzzy elements.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we clear on any element?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes, on everything but these five elements.

Dr. Kissinger: How many elements are there? Six?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes. Somebody must have briefed you. The first element is the Thai SGU. Do we approve a total of 36 Thai SGU battalions, or do we hold at 24? We can hold a portion of these SGUs for potential use in the North, and others could be used against the Trail.

The second element is the recruitment of Lao forces. Do we recruit additional Lao SGU battalions, or do we recruit available manpower into the special reserve divisions of the Lao Army? The third element is the improvement of equipment. Do we equip the irregular forces with improved equipment, principally the M–60 machine gun? We also have to consider giving these items to the Lao regular forces. If so, the cost would be high, and the Lao regular forces would probably not be able to use and maintain the equipment. The fourth element is U.S. air support. How long will the A–1s be available? The final element involves medevac helicopters and air cover for them. The slicks are there on loan now, from CINCPAC, I believe. Can we have them for an extended period of time? What about the cover for them? The Field prefers helo gunships. What about pilots? I think that if we have Americans in the slicks, we need Americans in the gunships. If we can get Laotians or Thais for the whole kit and caboodle, this will ease our problem—provided there is no Congressional problem.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you handle the instructions to the Field?

Mr. Sullivan: We want to have a firm package.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We can’t say that we are undecided on five issues.

Mr. Packard: What is the sixth element?

Dr. Kissinger: That we should send instructions to the Field.

Mr. Sullivan: The sixth element is that it would be useful to have a military standdown. Everyone concurred in it.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Godley) Mac, do you agree with that?

Mr. Godley: Yes. I do think it would be useful to have a standdown—provided we didn’t give away all of our marbles. Souvanna would like a standdown, even Vang Pao would like one.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by “giving our marbles away?”

Mr. Godley: An example would be if we threatened to reduce our air sorties and said, “Ergo, we must have a standdown.” There should be no question of our taking such action. We should reiterate our desire for a standdown and a ceasefire—for de-escalation. We have always said we were for de-escalation. The nuance now is that we are talking about a ceasefire—perhaps even a ceasefire that could be extended in a radius of thirty kilometers around the talk site. I don’t think this idea would shock Souvanna.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are we interested in it?

Mr. Godley: We would like to bring about a localized ceasefire because we have always had the hope—a remote hope, to be sure—that we could get substantive discussions going between Souvanna and Souphanouvong. Of course, the success of these discussions would be intimately related to the enemy’s intent.

Mr. Johnson: A ceasefire would also help maintain the status quo in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: I am always playing the part of the devil’s advocate. So many of our discussions about negotiating with the North Vietnamese are like detective stories. We are always looking for a clue. We are always looking for something that might happen. If the North Vietnamese want something, they should ask for it.

Mr. Godley: Ever since March, 1970, they have been playing a cat-and-mouse game. I do not see any disadvantage in our side making clear that it wants talks and a ceasefire.

Dr. Kissinger: If Souvanna genuinely wants talks, how much muscle does he have to bring them about?

Mr. Godley: He has some.

Mr. Sullivan: He will need some muscle to deal with Vang Pao.

Mr. Packard: What about the idea of a standdown in place?

Dr. Kissinger: If a standdown is so desirable, why does Vang Pao have to pull back to the western rim of the PDJ?

Mr. Sullivan: We would start out by proposing that Vang Pao stay in place. We would propose the establishment of a stable line between Vang Pao and the NVA. However, since it is unlikely the other side would accept this line, Vang Pao would probably have to withdraw to the western edge of the PDJ in order to trigger the talks.

Dr. Kissinger: We could move the site of the talks. What would happen if we proposed that the site of the talks be Long Tieng and if they took Long Tieng? Then if I came into this room and said we should go east of Long Tieng before the negotiations start, the newspapers would say the White House was screwing up the negotiations. It’s easier to move the site of the talks than Vang Pao.

Mr. Johnson: Neither side has held the Plain over the years.

Dr. Kissinger: We should offer the neutralization of the Plain as an outcome of the talks. Why not say that one result of the talks could be the neutralization of the Plain? (to Mr. Sullivan) You are proposing that Vang Pao move out before the talks really get started.

Mr. Sullivan: Both sides would pull out from the Plain. We would propose that the ceasefire be adequately monitored by “neutralist” and Lao elements, and Souvanna would seek a mixed ICC presence on the talk site.

Dr. Kissinger: What would happen if the North Vietnamese moved on to the PDJ again?

Mr. Sullivan: There would be a resumption of fighting.

Dr. Kissinger: And Vang Pao would already have given up his defensive positions.

Mr. Godley: There are no defensive positions on the PDJ.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sullivan) I remember that you said after the rout of 1970 that it took about six weeks to develop.

Mr. Sullivan: This would be a different situation. Vang Pao would come out, but there would be no North Vietnamese on the PDJ, either.

Dr. Kissinger: If we assume the NVA break the agreement—and it would not be unusual for them to do so—what would happen? We would start bombing again, but we would probably spend two weeks debating whether they had indeed violated the agreement before we began the bombing. I am just trying to understand if we are better off making them fight through the Plain and suggesting another site for the talks, or if we are better off vacating the Plain. Why don’t we propose a ceasefire in place?

Mr. Sullivan: If we propose a ceasefire in place, we won’t get the talks or a ceasefire.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you know?

Mr. Godley: It might be worthwhile to propose a ceasefire in place.

Dr. Kissinger: We could stop the bombing if it’s worth something to the other side.

Mr. Johnson: Why should they accept a ceasefire in place when they can gain control of the PDJ again?

Dr. Kissinger: But they can only get it back again by fighting.

Mr. Sullivan: And then we would have them on the western side of the PDJ.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s your assessment.

Mr. Packard: A ceasefire in place would be better if we could get it. Perhaps we should start out by trying to establish one.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. What’s wrong with that?

Mr. Sullivan: Souvanna has already proposed neutralizing the Plain. What you suggest now would mean that he would be upping his price.

Dr. Kissinger: The outcome of the talks should be the neutralization of the PDJ.

Mr. Sullivan: The current phase of the talks is taking place in Vientiane, not Khang Khay. The next phase of the talks would be held at Khang Khay, and only if this phase takes place would Vang Pao pull back from his advanced positions.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we make the pull back and the neutralization of the PDJ the outcome of the negotiations? You want Vang Pao to pull back before the negotiations start.

Mr. Sullivan: Perhaps the word “negotiation” is causing the problem here. Talks are going on now. Before Souk Vongsak went back to Hanoi last weekend, he set certain conditions for the PDJ, which Vang Pao is still holding. If Souvanna can get an agreement for a military standdown in the guise of creating security for the next phase of the talks, presumably at Khang Khay, he would agree to pull Vang Pao back from his advanced positions.

Dr. Kissinger: This wouldn’t be a permanent neutralization of the Plain. The NVA could take it any time they wished.

Mr. Sullivan: If they did, the bombing would resume.

Dr. Kissinger: That wouldn’t bother them, especially during the rainy season. If you were the North Vietnamese, wouldn’t you prefer to have Vang Pao pulled back to the western edge of the PDJ? Then you could go through it without opposition. The only consequence of that action would be the breakdown of the talks. I do not understand why we want Vang Pao to withdraw just to find a site for the talks.

Mr. Sullivan: He cannot regard the PDJ as a permanent home for his people.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a theological point. The NVA will teach him that, anyway, during the next dry season. Why can’t we use a ceasefire in place as a means of bringing about a de-escalation?

Mr. Sullivan: I think they will accept a military standdown.

Dr. Kissinger: How many miles are involved in the pull-back of Vang Pao’s forces?

Mr. Sullivan: About eight.

Mr. Packard: That’s not a very big distance.

Dr. Kissinger: I just don’t understand the psychology of this.

Mr. Packard: Nothing has worked during the past three years, so we want to try something else now.

Dr. Kissinger: If I said that I wanted the NVA to pull back two miles in order to get the talks started, all hell would break loose about the intransigence of the White House on this issue.

Mr. Sullivan: The NVA have pulled back. They can, however, move again during the dry season.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course they can. They could go all the way to Vientiane if they wanted to.

Mr. Sullivan: Our proposal provides a means for keeping them east of the PDJ.

Mr. Johnson: The talks are a sophistry, as Bill [Sullivan] said, for a ceasefire and for an agreement that would keep them east of the PDJ.

Dr. Kissinger: When the North Vietnamese want something, they hit you over the head with a baseball bat six times so that you are aware of what they want. When have we ever tricked them? Have we ever come up with a cute ploy that tricked them into something we wanted? Can anyone cite such an instance?

Mr. Johnson: You are right? They only do something if they want to do it.

Mr. Sullivan: We haven’t had a rocket in the center of Saigon in a long time.

Dr. Kissinger: If we stop the bombing, they stay in place. This seems to me to be the best deal to get talks started. It also makes sense to me to try to establish a neutral area as a result of the talks. But to say that we want a neutral area just to get talks started, doesn’t make sense because they could end the talks any time they want. When the dry season starts, they can advance if they want to.

Gen. Vogt: We can try to start the negotiations with a ceasefire.

Dr. Kissinger: I see two things we should try to achieve: (1) a ceasefire; and (2) a neutralization of the PDJ in its own right. If we follow your proposals just to get a site for the talks, the other side could end the talks and advance. Why can’t we propose a neutralization of the PDJ and forget about the site for the talks? We could propose that Vang Pao pull back ten miles, provided the other side stays in place. Would that be a generous offer?

Mr. Sullivan: No. The other side would be able to come back.

Mr. Packard: Yes, but at a cost.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sullivan) Why should the other side make any kind of deal if you say they could come back at no cost? If you say neutralization of the PDJ might become permanent, why don’t we offer it? They always complain about us taking the PDJ, and we complain about them taking it.

Mr. Sullivan: This gets into a theological point. They say that in 1962 the PDJ was on their side of the line.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think that talks between Souvanna and Souphanouvong will change the theology of the situation? If a neutralization of the PDJ suits our mutual purposes, why don’t we offer it?

Mr. Sullivan: We tried to in the past, but nothing worked.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know if this proposal will work now.

Mr. Sullivan: They have already complained about the area of the talk site being nibbled at by U.S. puppets.

Dr. Kissinger: If your scenario is enacted, the other side would get an end to the bombing, a pull-back of Vang Pao’s forces and a psychological advantage. What would we get? We would have no assurance that their advance during the dry season would be delayed.

Mr. Sullivan: We would at least keep the NVA on the eastern side of the PDJ until they decide to break the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but this is the situation as it exists today.

Mr. Sullivan: They are already bringing in the 312th Division.

Gen. Cushman: I think it’s too early to worry about the 312th Division. We have only had some indications of movement.

Dr. Kissinger: Until they decide to move, then, the situation would be the way it is today. (to Mr. Sullivan) You are saying that they will not move until they decide to do so.

Mr. Sullivan: Right now we are flying air missions and taking casualties. With a ceasefire, there would be no more sorties. We would also save U.S. lives.

Dr. Kissinger: How many Americans have died there recently?

Mr. Sullivan: Six in the last couple of months.

Mr. Godley: There was one crash of an Air America plane.

Mr. Sullivan: We would also be saving U.S. dollars and wear-and-tear with the Congress and the public.

Dr. Kissinger: Until it starts all over again.

Mr. Packard: We could try to build up our capability of stopping the NVA at the Long Tieng complex. We can ask Vang Pao to pull back to Long Tieng and to concentrate on building up his defenses there.

Dr. Kissinger: Nobody is suggesting that Vang Pao advance.

Mr. Johnson: We could try to do what Dave just suggested, pursuant to an agreement.

Mr. Packard: What do the NVA want to do? I don’t agree that they can go to Vientiane any time they want. So far they haven’t been able to take Long Tieng. It might be a good idea to pull Vang Pao back to Long Tieng and to have him concentrate on his defenses.

Dr. Kissinger: What price would we pay in order to pull Vang Pao back? (to Mr. Godley) Mac, what do you think?

Mr. Godley: It would be tough to pull him back to the western fringe of the PDJ. Nevertheless, I think we can sell him the idea of a neutral area—either a permanent neutral area or a temporary one which could eventually become permanent. This could be sold to him without too much trouble, especially if we build up his defensive capabilities and augment the Thai SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: That [augmentation of Thai SGUs] is in dispute.

Mr. Sullivan: What is the value of the PDJ?

Dr. Kissinger: It is of no particular value. I wonder what Hanoi thinks. When we talk about a ceasefire and a neutralization of the PDJ, both of these things make sense. But when we say we will stop the bombing and pull Vang Pao back just for the advantage of having talks, that makes no sense. We have repeated the pattern before: we pay and the other side talks. I wonder how this affects the other side’s image of us. I’m not saying, though, that we shouldn’t do anything.

Mr. Sullivan: If Vang Pao stays where he is, the NVA will attack him during the dry season. Would we want him to hold?

Dr. Kissinger: No. He will fall back, using the PDJ for space.

Mr. Sullivan: Then we will be in a worse situation.

Dr. Kissinger: You assume the NVA will not take the PDJ while talks are going on. If they don’t want the PDJ, we should make an offer for neutralization now. We can have talks, but we should separate the two issues of talks and the neutralization of the PDJ.

Mr. Sullivan: Souvanna has already tied neutralization of the Plain to the talks.

Dr. Kissinger: If he changes his position, it won’t be the first time a proposal has been modified.

Mr. Sullivan: I agree that the talks themselves are irrelevant. We should separate the issues.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it inconceivable to you that they may want a period of quiet? If there are talks, perhaps they can have six months of quiet. Then they could start an attack with a better build-up. They would also be ten miles further forward. Is that inconceivable?

Mr. Sullivan: I’m not sure they would be ten miles further forward.

Mr. Johnson: We are not really far apart on this issue. We can come up with a proposal for the neutralization of the PDJ and not make it dependent on the talks taking place.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not interested in supporting Vang Pao. In fact, I tried to stop him before others did. The issue now is what do we have to pay in order to get talks started.

Adm. Flanagan: The talks, as I understand it, will be held in Khang Khay. Who controls it?

Gen. Cushman: Khang Khay is in NVA hands.

Mr. Sullivan: There have been clashes, though, within one kilometer of it.

Mr. Johnson: We seem to be confused on what we should do to get talks started. But we are not confused about the objective, which is neutralization of the PDJ.

Mr. Packard: Let’s call a spade a spade and get on with it.

Mr. Sullivan: We can try to bring about the neutralization of the PDJ. The only instrument we have for this, however, is the sophistry of the talks. I don’t think the talks themselves will amount to anything.

Dr. Kissinger: We can say we want two things: (1) talks, presumably at Khang Khay; and (2) neutralization of the PDJ. Even if the talks break down, it will still be possible to have the PDJ neutralized.

Mr. Sullivan: We must first make it clear that if the talks break down, we would still want the PDJ to be neutralized. We will have to watch the NVA very carefully.

Dr. Kissinger: Vang Pao should not withdraw before the talks start because I don’t want to break his back for the NVA.

Mr. Sullivan: Vang Pao’s primary concern is the security of the area. If we give him ten miles of neutral land, it will provide better security.

Dr. Kissinger: I made my point before.

Mr. Godley: Souvanna has proposed a neutral area of thirty kilometers around Khang Khay. This takes in most of the access roads.

Dr. Kissinger: Has the other side pulled out of there?

Mr. Godley: No. They have proposed a nationwide ceasefire.

Dr. Kissinger: How will we advance this [modified] proposal?

Mr. Sullivan: We can draft a new paper, with emphasis on the neutralization of the PDJ.

Dr. Kissinger: And we will ask Vang Pao to retreat only after agreement has been reached on neutralization. Is that all right with everybody? Now, can we move on to the military steps we must take? Can we settle the five issues before us?

Mr. Sullivan: As you know, there is a divergence of views on these steps. Perhaps I can start by giving you our views. With regard to the Thai SGUs, I think it would probably be useful to undertake all 36 battalions.

Mr. Johnson: The timing, however, should be related to the progress of the defense bill on the Hill.³ The progress has been good so far, and we don’t want to precipitate any problems until the bill is passed.

Mr. Sullivan: Twenty-four SGUs are being recruited and trained right now.

Dr. Kissinger: We can’t handle any new ones until October, anyway. And by then the bill should be passed.

Mr. Sullivan: Perhaps. The vote on the bill may be on this very issue. I believe the question of keeping the program going was put to you by Thanat Khoman [Thai Foreign Minister] when you were in Bangkok.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: If we agree, we can give him assurance of implementing the full program, subject to our Congressional schedule.

Adm. Flanagan: We have to pay a high price for the Thai SGU battalions, and they slow down the improvement of the Lao forces. We think that we have to address the long-term solution, which is the improvement of the FAR.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do I suffer from the belief that the FAR are not fighters?

Adm. Flanagan: In the long term, we have to depend on the FAR. This means improving the leadership, equipment and pay. It is a short-term measure to go with the SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: They will provide help next year, when we need it.

Adm. Flanagan: They will provide some help.

Mr. Sullivan: The main problem with the FAR is the leadership. When we provide money, it goes to the generals and never gets down to the fighting men. You have to consider the organic nature of the Lao hierarchy when you talk about their forces in the field. We need the SGUs.

Mr. Godley: I propose that we continue our work at the FAR training center. We shouldn’t have any illusion, though, that in the next five years the FAR capabilities will be equal to those of the SGUs. Over the long term, I think the Lao SGUs can be brought back into the FAR and be incorporated into the FAR as units. However, I don’t think it’s correct to say that only the FAR will be able to provide long-term security.

Adm. Flanagan: In the short term, we have to go with the SGUs. But over the long term, we have to depend on the FAR, just the way we depend on the ARVN and FANK.

Mr. Packard: That may be true, but we are talking about next year.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we agree that subject to the Congressional schedule, we will go ahead with the 12 additional Thai SGUs in the last quarter of this year?

All agreed.

Mr. Sullivan: The next item is U.S. air support.

Mr. Packard: I’m giving up on everything, but not on this.

Mr. Sullivan: How long will we have the A–1s?

Dr. Kissinger: We finally got a plane that can hit something, and now he [Packard] wants to pull them out.

Gen. Vogt: They will remain until the first quarter of FY73. Some of them will start leaving at that time.

Mr. Packard: They will remain through the next dry season. That ought to keep everybody happy.

Mr. Sullivan: What about after that?

Mr. Packard: They are committed through the dry season, but they are not committed forever.

Mr. Godley: I can accept this.

Mr. Packard: You should all quit while you are ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: We can tell Souvanna, then, the A–1s will be there through the next dry season.

Mr. Sullivan: The next thing to consider is the M–60 machine gun.

Dr. Kissinger: Before we get to that, let me ask if the A–1 sortie rate will stay the same?

Mr. Packard: The A–1s will keep their full capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: This means there will be no greater limitation on them than there has been this year, right?

Gen. Vogt: We are down to 24 operational planes at the present time. This figure will probably remain constant through the dry season, and they will remain at full capability.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Godley) Is that OK with you, Mac? There will be no additional sortie limitation on the A–1s.

Mr. Godley: That’s all I can ask for.

Col. Kennedy: Will there be enough money to maintain the current capabilities?

Adm. Flanagan: Yes. We can continue to give the A–1s the same priority.

Dr. Kissinger: Now let’s turn to the M–60.

Mr. Sullivan: Bob [Cushman] is our expert on this subject.

Gen. Cushman: We would like to have the machine guns. The trouble is that DOD won’t give them to us.

Adm. Flanagan: We would have to know how many M–60s you need, and we would also have to know the price. In any case, whatever you get will come out of the hide of the U.S. Army. We will do it. It’s a question of replacing the M–60 with newer and better weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think the White House should get involved in this.

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Godley) How many M–60s do you need? [for the FAR]

Dr. Kissinger: Fulbright would object if he knew there was a machine gun expert at the White House.

Mr. Godley: I can handle the situation if you can give me some machine guns for the FAR.

Mr. Sullivan: There is no need to equip the whole FAR with M–60s. We can hand out certain numbers as a sop to proven regular units.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we set aside a fixed number of machine guns for the FAR?

Gen. Cushman: In April we requested 187 M–60s, at a cost of $1.1 million.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have to give them all to Mac [Godley].

Mr. Sullivan: What about the helicopters? This is also a complex subject.

Gen. Cushman: During the rainy season, when the A–1s cannot fly cover, the gunships have to do it. The Thais have not supplied the pilots for the gunships.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the A–1s flying cover now?

Gen. Cushman: Not all the time. Sometimes the gunships do it.

Dr. Kissinger: If we had our choice, who would we want to fly the gunships?

Gen. Vogt: We do have a pilot problem. Perhaps the Thais can pick up the load.

Mr. Johnson: We would have a legal problem with the Fulbright amendment⁵ if we used Thai pilots.

Dr. Kissinger: Who flies the A–1s?

Gen. Vogt: Americans.

Mr. Sullivan: The slicks are operated by Air America crews.

Gen. Vogt: It’s easier for Americans to fly the A–1s because they fly from U.S. bases in Thailand. The helicopters need advance bases. We have had indications that the Thais are willing to fly the gunships. Someone reported to me that during a recent trip to Thailand, a Thai official told him that nobody had ever asked the Thais to fly gunships in Laos. He said they would be willing to do it.

Gen. Cushman: They have been asked. The official was probably afraid to admit it, though, before his superiors.

Mr. Sullivan: Can we provide the gunships?

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Alex, can we mention this in the other package?

Mr. Johnson: Sure. We will say Laotian aircraft flown by Thais.

Adm. Flanagan: We will have to work out the contractual arrangements.

Mr. Sullivan: We will get the aircraft from DOD.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s move now to the logistical support. Have we implemented the decisions we made at the June 8 meeting for logistical back-up in Thailand but operational control where it is now?

Adm. Flanagan: There is a lot of DOD money involved in these operations, so we feel we must plan and program. Last year, we were hit with multi-million dollar bills. An advance group will be there September 1. The whole group will be up at Udorn by December 31. We’re not far from saying that the fellow up there is merely a quartermaster.

Dr. Kissinger: Is everyone happy with this arrangement?

Mr. Godley: Over the long term, there is a need for a quartermaster function up there. The main thing, though, is that I don’t want him between me and 7/13 Air Force. I will, of course, keep him fully informed.

Mr. Packard: This can be worked out.

Dr. Kissinger: One final thing. We want to make sure we are opposed to all legal restrictions, even ceilings limiting us to what we are spending now. We still don’t want them. Bill [Sullivan] can you draft the negotiating cable in the light of what we discussed today?⁶ Dick [Kennedy] can you sum up the military decisions and circulate them?⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals 1971. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets except those that indicate omission of unrelated material are in the original. Although a Senior Review Group meeting on Laos was scheduled for August 10, no minutes have been found.
2. See Document 215.
3. The annual Defense Appropriations bill, which was approved in the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 4, was awaiting approval by the full Senate in September after the Congressional recess.
4. Kissinger visited Bangkok July 5 and 6. For his discussion with Thanom about the Thai SGU battalions, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 127.
5. The Fulbright Amendment, introduced and passed in 1970, prohibited the use of mercenaries.
6. The negotiating instructions were sent in telegram 150229 to Vientiane, August 17. For the Communists, the instructions suggested suspending the bombing of the area, but not aerial reconnaissance and intelligence operations; for Vang Pao, a military assistance package to protect him if the Communists were to break the agreement; and for Souvanna Phouma, a package to beef up the RLG military. The Department asked the Embassy to approach Souvanna and enlist his aid in gaining Vang Pao’s concurrence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 LAOS)
7. In a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Moorer, August 16, Kissinger summarized the decisions on Thai SGUs, Lao SGUs, A–1 helicopters, M–60 machine guns, and helicopter gunships. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–82, WSAG Meeting, Laos 8–10–71)