Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

221. Letter From Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol to President Nixon¹

Phnom Penh, June 19, 1971.

Mr. President:

Before I returned from Honolulu, you were good enough to mention, when you wished me a speedy recovery, that you shared my concern over the military and economic problems.

I thanked you sincerely for that touching message and especially expressed my appreciation for the medical care that had been lavished on me by eminent American doctors.

My health continues to improve, and so I am able to work more and more actively, and particularly to devote my efforts to adopting measures adequate to the defense of the country against the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Communist aggressors. Speaking from this increasingly active position, I now take the liberty of discussing with you problems in two areas that I have particularly at heart:

• National construction by means of general mobilization;
• Designing the structure of the Khmer national armed forces to meet any eventuality, even peace.

On the first point, our national construction is organized around simple principles easily understood by my fellow countrymen in the cities and rural areas:

• Democratically:
• The Government helps
• The people carry out
• The technical experts assist

With these ideas in mind, we have promoted general mobilization with a view to having all the citizens’ organizations contribute to the construction effort according to our general mobilization plan, which was communicated to you in my preceding letter.² With respect to this first point, this general mobilization is not aimed solely at defense, but is especially a war by organizations. This war by organizations is to cover gradually in this manner all aspects of our national construction process. Within this war by organizations, national construction should take on a form that we would prefer to be evolutionary in the sense of current progress, approaching a style similar to that of Israel, but which would also be typically Khmer.

I must point out, in this connection, that a Khmer delegation, composed of capable and active men, will soon go to Israel to learn on-the-spot about the methods used by that dynamic and courageous country in the various branches of its national construction, so that we may apply those methods to our own actions later.

We are well aware that the construction of a country at war involves all kinds of difficulties, engendered by the fact that we must fight everywhere, we must defend ourselves everywhere. However, we do not flinch before those difficulties.

In applying this construction policy and in conducting this war by organizations, we have assigned a prominent place to economic and social problems, and among these problems, we consider that feeding the population, providing relief to war refugees and victims, and providing jobs for the unemployed constitute the most urgent.

You yourself, Mr. President, have had the occasion to tell us of the interest with which you were following our efforts in these areas, as I have already said. Therefore, please be good enough to have competent American experts and technicians help us carry out these projects and use your influence with countries that are friends of the United States to arouse their interest in our projects and persuade them to give us their cooperation and assistance in these matters also.

I wish to remind you at this point that the Khmer Republic intends to follow a policy of regionalization of Southeast Asia and of cooperation with all its Asian neighbors. This cooperation must be carried out with respect for democratic principles, and above all with freedom of conscience for all. So far as we are concerned, that is to say, between Khmers, one of the goals of this policy is to convert the Khmer into a well-rounded whole man—respectable, hard working and enjoying a satisfactory standard of living in accordance with the formula “democratic, hard-working, and a consumer.”

With respect to the military aspect, after hard combat for more than a year, we have been able, thanks to you, to halt the enemy advance, and that picture which was so somber in April–May 1970, is now becoming increasingly brighter.

The total strength of 220,000 men that you were good enough to agree to equip for us has been reached in actual facts. However, that figure includes wounded, disabled, and dead, the total number of which is about 15,000 men. For the time being, these cannot be omitted from the total strength, although they are no longer very active combatants.

The organization of our present troops was adopted after consultation with the commanding officer of the American Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam; furthermore, we have just reorganized the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff of the Khmer Armed Forces so as to make the conduct of the war more efficient. This was also the thought of the United States representatives in South Viet-Nam.

As you know, that force of 220,000 men is intended for combat operations only to the south of the line passing through Oddor Méanchey–Siemréap–Kompong Thom–Kompong Thmar–North Kompong Cham–Krek towards the South Vietnamese border. But, for my part, I think that in the present, and especially in the future, combat situations, with possible Vietcong reinforcements coming either from South Viet-Nam or from Laos, that force could not cope fully with the enemy all the way to that line; we must note here that we have often been obliged to request the friendly South Vietnamese forces to intervene, particularly in the eastern and southern sectors of the country, which are sanctuary areas for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

In my letter of May 22, 1971 I stated my preocupations and concerns about improving our military positions by recovering areas temporarily under enemy control; in the perspective of a general cease-fire as a prelude to future negotiations, that is an absolute necessity. In order to attain that end, and also with a view to taking the initiative against the aggressors, it stands to reason that we are obliged to establish an additional force.

The first objective would be to reoccupy the region of the rubber plantations around Chamcar Andaung–Chup–Peamchéang–Krek–Mimot–Snuol, that is, the stand-fast zone where the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have established their principal sanctuaries and bases for launching their attacks against the Khmer Republic and the Republic of Viet-Nam. In order to reoccupy that zone, we would need an additional force of 50,000 men, which would bring the total of our forces to 270,000 men.

The next immediate objective would be a line to be established by us level with Kratié–Snuol. Later objectives would be the Stung Treng line, then the Labansiek RN 19 [National Highway 19]³ line, and, finally, the entire territory. I wish to specify that for our advance northward, I would proceed along the right bank of the Mekong, that is to say, approximately from Konpong Thmar towards Moeung Khong (Champasak).

Control of the area around Moeung Khong is also one of our objectives in order to prevent the Vietcong and North Vietnamese from using the Mekong.

In order to recapture all the rest of the areas occupied in the north and northeast of Cambodia, that is, Préah Vihear–Stung Treng–Rattanakiri–Kratié–Mondulkiri, another increase in forces of about 130,000 men would be needed. The 50,000 mentioned before plus 130,000, thus a total of 180,000 men.

To make this additional force of 180,000 men, thanks to your friendly assistance, I would again try to recruit 15,000 to 20,000 Khmer Krom men.

The National Khmer Armed Forces would then be a total force of 400,000 men.

With a force of that size, we believe we would be able to meet all contingencies, and, at the same time, relieve our South Vietnamese friends in the matter of the sanctuaries, and gain territory, without being surprised by the unforseen contingencies and the hazards of the Peace Talks.

The realization of that program allows high hopes for a final happy outcome of our country’s misfortunes. We must profit by and exploit the advantages won as soon as possible, especially since other problems of a logistic and diplomatic nature could arise at any moment.

I am making an urgent appeal to you so that you may agree to help us to undertake, as soon as possible, that campaign to recover our territory occupied by the enemy. Recruiting and equipping a first supplementary force of 50,000 men should, with your usual kindness, be decided upon in the near future, that is, right now; the recruitment of the second group of 130,000 men could then be completely accomplished at the beginning of the next fiscal year.

I know, Mr. President, the noble feelings and the ideal which inspire you, your great country, and your people in your determination to help us to fight fiercely to defend our liberty, to survive, and to remain independent while preserving our territorial integrity. Through me, the entire Khmer people once again express their deepest gratitude to you.

As for myself personally, I again wish to say that I remember I am enjoying a more and more active life thanks to your hospital services in Hawaii, which I am constantly praising. I shall take advantage of the first possible opportunity to go to greet you personally and, at that time, fully express my appreciation to you.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurance of my faithful friendship and my very high consideration.⁴

Lon Nol ⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 749, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Cambodia: Prime Minister, Lon Nol (1971). Secret. Translation prepared by the Department of State.
2. Dated May 22. (Ibid.)
3. Brackets are in the original.
4. In telegram 143184 to Phnom Penh, August 6, the Department transmitted an aide-mémoire for Lon Nol, which informed him that his request for assistance to increase the FANK force level was problematic given the resources currently available for assistance and the economic conditions in Cambodia and recommended that the GKR demobilize unfit troops, instill stronger discipline, continue its reorganization efforts, and focus on consolidating its hold in the southern part of the country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 CAMB) Swank reported in telegram 3882 from Phnom Penh, August 7, that even though Lon Nol was resigned to the fact that he would not get more support in FY 1972, he would likely raise the issue again. (Ibid.) On August 19, Nixon sent Lon Nol a reply in which he explained that “rather than attempting here to deal in detail with your proposals I am asking the Chargé d’Affaires in Phnom Penh to discuss these matters with you personally.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Cambodia: Prime Minister, Lon Nol (1971))
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Lon Nol signed the original. Cambodian text.