Office of the Historian

219. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1

Washington, June 15, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

P: With regard to Thieu meeting. I am wondering myself if it’s in his interest. We are not frozen on that and doing it for him. Before we ______ which would be for us. A meeting might—

H: It won’t get anything on that issue.

P: Problem of drugs2 and everything being pinpointed and aid—

H: Only if something comes from Henry’s exercise and we don’t want it in that forum.

P: His interest might not be in this when he is ahead. My political advice would be not to have too much Americans around him.

H: If Henry gets a favorable response we could talk with Thieu over there.

P: Is Henry planning to go with Agnew?

H: A little before and get started. He isn’t certain yet. He is still wrestling with the best schedule.

P: One way we might do it—go there and let it be in lieu—no problem with a statement. It will mean a lot to Thieu.

H: To have the President’s man.

P: Confidential talks. As for Rogers, he will understand that.

H: We will have that problem in any event. Especially if it’s a substitute for the other. He is concerned about other.

P: And since nothing will be said we will get no publicity.

H: Make a good case that it’s the better way. Only problem would be if something broke.

[Page 727]

P: We will get Bunker in soon and talk to him about this.3 You tell Henry we should consider whether our interests are served by rushing it over there. Turn it around on the ground. Thieu play his game and not hypo it at home. Flap on who got ______. I think the situation is difficult on both sides as far as the meeting is concerned. I think Laird gave it away. The problem is our going over there and coming out and saying nothing even what we say on ground combat will not go as far as Laird and Rogers go and it will appear that Thieu talked us out of it.

H: Only useful to say that ______. If we turn it down we should think about it.

P: That’s the problem. You will not get it that flat. In any event I think we should hold that—strong reconsideration. Don’t tell Rogers and let him think we are going ahead.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons 1971 (2 of 2). No classification marking. All omissions are in the original.↩
  2. Bunker and Abrams met with Thieu on May 3 to discuss narcotics and smuggling. As a result of their discussion, Bunker called for the following measures: establish a team of five senior and interministerial committees to develop a program; revise airport customs procedures and training and make personnel changes; reorganize the narcotics section of the National Police; restrict drug sales at pharmacies and limit access of U.S. troops; and undertake a nationwide publicity campaign. Bunker made Berger the principal contact to the GVN on these issues. (The Bunker Papers, Reports to the President From Vietnam, 1967–1973, pp. 838–846)↩
  3. See Document 220.↩