217. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman)1
Kissinger: You know, one of the problems with the—that the Vietnamese have is if they give us anything at all in Paris, even if it leads to another stalemate, if we could get any movement at all—
[Page 716]Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: —that looks like a serious negotiation—
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: —that would be a tremendous shot for public opinion.
Nixon: [chuckles] Yeah, you mean if they did it publicly.
Kissinger: So, that’s—that’s the tough problem they’re up against for June 26th.2
Nixon: [unclear] They know. They must know that—
Kissinger: Now, they are—I have had an analysis made, and I’ll send it in to you—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: —taking the Xuan Thuy interview3 as against what I said to them—
Nixon: Um-hmm?
Kissinger: —and they are obviously talking to us in their crooked way—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: I mean, this idea, for example, of separating military and political issues—which no one here in town will understand because—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —they don’t know what we’ve said to them, but that’s all through that interview. I’ve got the full text now. Not in an acceptable way, but the mere fact that they’re talking about it is, is interesting. But it may not—this is just a bitter pill for them to swallow; they may not be ready to do it. And then they’re pushing their infiltration very hard, even in the rainy season—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: But, that could mean two things. That could mean that they’re in desperate shape, too.
Nixon: Then we hit ‘em.
[unclear]
[Page 717]Kissinger: At the middle of the week, it’s always tough to tell, but it’s—I would say it’s certainly not above 30—4
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: —and it’s more likely to be at the low 20s.
Nixon: Where we were before?
Kissinger: Yeah, it’s—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: There’s no significant difference from last week. But you can never tell whether there’s one helicopter down, or whether some people died in a hospital—
Nixon: Yeah, that’s right.
Haldeman: Because we’ve brought them down to such low numbers that each [unclear].
Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah. [unclear] My God, before if you shot down a helicopter and lost 19, it wouldn’t make any difference.
Haldeman: Well—
Nixon: Nineteen in relation to 120 is nothing.
Kissinger: But—
Nixon: Nineteen in relation to 19 doubles it.
Haldeman: Doubles it.
Kissinger: But, if you look, for example, at the month, if it hadn’t been for these 33—
Nixon: Um-hmm?
Kissinger: —we would have had below 25 every week—
Nixon: Yeah. I sure want them to—I sure want to get some sort of work done. I mean, get the—Scali to get out the—play the casualty line. And, it’s that what we said has happened. We said it would go down after Cambodia. It did. We said it would go down after Laos. It did. Now, just keep pointing. In other words—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: —it’s a good point do, to go.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 517–4. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 9:37–10:36 a.m.↩
- Kissinger was to meet the North Vietnamese in Paris on June 26. See Document 223.↩
- According to Chalmers Roberts: “The top North Vietnamese representative at the Paris peace talks said today [June 8] that the prisoner of war issue, properly coupled with a total American withdrawal, could be settled while the Thieu–Ky regime is still in power in Saigon, but indicated that Hanoi will not agree if the United States intends to continue to arm and support the South Vietnamese forces.” See “N. Viets Demand Aid End: Thuy Outlines Requisites for POW Talks,” The Washington Post, June 9, 1971, p. A1.↩
- This discussion is about the declining weekly number of military personnel who lost their lives in theater.↩