194. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
Further conversation
P: On this POW release—is this thing they offered in Paris just an agreement to release if they do likewise? If so, it’s new.2
H: It’s an offer unilaterally to release them. It’s been done before.
P: It’s a _______ release but if it’s offered before why haven’t we done it? Conditional?
H: Part of repatriation of wounded and others are a proposal to put them into a neutral area.
P: They don’t want to go North?
H: A lot don’t but we want a reciprocal action.
P: Neutral areas suggested before.
H: No, that’s new.
P: Conditions on their responding in kind? Why different from exchanging POWs?
H: Easier way for the other side rather than turning them back to home country and more consistent with Geneva Accords.
P: So that I know what I am talking about—we will repatriate and return to neutral country if you do. Or regardless?
H: No, if reciprocal. Offer to return wounded we have done that.
P: Is that conditions on their return?
H: Done it unilaterally before and this is more.
P: We will return them anyway. 576 on a unilateral offer.
H: Put some across the DMZ. Turn them loose. Some may refuse to go. There is also evidence that there are communist _______ in camps pressuring men not to go. One didn’t want to go back for fear of what will happen to them and now new evidence—
P: 576 sick and wounded being repatriated.
H: We have 430.
P: Americans. MIA is 1200?
[Page 594]H: We don’t think there are too many of them. But that’s the figure.
P: But people who are don’t want to be forgotten.
H: Some held in SVN and some held in Laos.
P: 430 are in North.
H: Yes, sir.
P: 1200 is total year around figure? That includes 430?
H: Yes, sir.
P: SVN?
H: The estimate is very small.
P: If it’s small, it’s irrelevant. OK. I see—that’s fine, thank you.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]
H: We are in good shape. You are covered now. Today’s—one problem coming up _______ that Burchett3 has assurances that our prisoners will be released within 15 days of a date certain. It’s just beginning to move. He is a hack for Hanoi and Peking. It means Henry’s project will have to move fast. We haven’t heard from them but we need to talk with them officially and they will spread that story.
P: Henry doesn’t see the significance. Putting yourself in our position—They will play on the prisoners. They say they will release prisoners on a date certain and a lot of Americans will say let’s do it. Pass it to Henry. Nothing I can do on that is there?
H: No, I hope to hear.
P: The deliberation usually pays off but we have time blowing on our backs hard and the military like all of us think you cannot trade prisoners for defeat but many would. Especially POW wives. You are keeping in touch with them through Hughes?
H: Yes, sir.
P: Tell them we are keeping it in mind.
H: It should help them today. Nothing earthshaking but a new formulation.
P: There’s nothing Henry can do about it. Except moving up of the date. Everything really has to be moved up as soon as we can. The idea that we will meander to Paris—that’s why I said just give them one date.
H: It’s going to build in the next couple of weeks.
P: POW issue?
[Page 595]H: Yes. Speculation on it. We have to make sense of how we can reach it until we talk with these people. If they accept it we have something.
P: The main thing—you have to let the POW leaders in on the game. I can’t hold them otherwise. We have told them to wait and we are negotiating. But it may be that we have cried wolf too often.
H: We can hold them if the other side doesn’t say something to upset them. If they say what Burchett is saying officially it will upset them.
P: If they say release prisoners in 15 days we are hard pressed. What does Henry say?
H: We have the ceasefire to work into it. He and Bunker think that Thieu would accept a reasonable date—a year from Sept. would be attractive.
P: That may be too late. It’s awfully close to election date. It will look like that. Maybe June or July. It’s now a point whether it’s or it’s not irrelevant. The worst thing for Thieu is to _______ and have us tossed out on our _______. Congress can cut money. That’s a danger he doesn’t recognize and Henry doesn’t either.
H: That could happen.
P: You can’t _______ at Congress—and they will follow POWs. It’s a tough one. We have to get going fast. The whole timetable has to be accelerated.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons 1971 (2 of 2). No classification marking. All omissions are in the original.↩
- See Document 193.↩
- Wilfred Burchett was an Australian journalist with close ties to the North Vietnamese.↩