182. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
Washington, April 16, 1971.
SUBJECT
- Lam Son 719 Final Report
| Laos (Lam Son 719) | Cumulative Totals |
| Individual weapons | 5,100 |
| Crew-served weapons | 2,000 |
| Small arms ammunition (rounds) | 580,600 |
| Other assorted ammo (pounds) | 40,002,200 |
| Food (pounds) | 2,565,000 |
| Vehicles | 530 |
| Tanks | 80 |
| Petroleum (gallons) | 218,000 |
| Structures destroyed | 1,300 |
| Bunkers destroyed | 1,330 |
| Medical supplies (pounds) | 8,000 |
| Miscellaneous equipment & supplies (pounds) | 80,000 |
| Enemy KIA | 13,650 includes 4,400 KBA |
| U.S. KIA | 180 |
| ARVN KIA | 1,550 |
In a final report on Operation Lam Son 719, MACV makes the following observations on the effects of the operation:
- —The enemy’s aggressive reaction caused his forces to mass and they were thus exposed to Allied ground and air fire power.
- —The operation has shown the enemy that his sanctuaries are vulnerable. Thus, an offshoot of the operation will be fixing of significant enemy forces.
- —Fixing the enemy forces will assist in keeping them distant from the population of South Vietnam.
- —If there were any who still believed that this was a South Vietnamese “civil war”, the reports and pictures of the elaborate network of roads, trails and streams that link enemy activity from North Vietnam to the RVN should expose that fiction.
- —Detailed ground reconnaissance developed many lucrative target locations during the operation. This information is being used to refine the accuracy of continued air strikes against the enemy’s logistic system in Laos.
- —The experience gained in command and control of large combat formations, coordination of combined arms efforts and logistical support of large-scale operations will enhance RVNAF combat effectiveness.
- —The operation has underlined the progress which has been made in Vietnamization.
- —Lam Son 719 may be over for the RVNAF, but for the enemy it is still going on as B–52s, tac air and gunships continue to attack targets developed during February and March.
- —The operation appears to have widespread popular support in RVN.
- —Although Lam Son 719 was an important operation, it was only part of the total effort designed to disrupt the entire enemy system. Understandably, the total effect of this operation is difficult to quantify completely at this time, and all the results will not be known for many months.
- —Although it is too early to make a final judgment, Lam Son 719 may well prove to have been a pivotal point in the Indochina conflict.2
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 82, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam Operations in Laos and Cambodia, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Fazio forwarded it to Kissinger under an April 14 covering memorandum, indicating that he modified the original report from the Situation Room by rounding out the statistics as Kissinger instructed.↩
- On April 15, John S. Foster, Director of the Office of Research and Engineering, sent Laird an April 14 memorandum, prepared in his office, that reached a different conclusion: “Based on Lamson 719 data available, it is unlikely that the South Vietnamese will ever be able to cut off Laotian infiltration on their own-at least if they try to use the operational techniques of this campaign.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-197, Box 69, Laos 381 April)↩