178. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (Westmoreland)1
K: I have thought with nostalgia and regret of our conversation here many weeks ago. You were right.2
W: It’s evident.
K: I was uneasy and didn’t know what was wrong. I wish you had been wrong.
W: So do I. Formidable undertaking. So much depended on communications and helicopters.
K: I didn’t realize they hadn’t set up a headquarters for that.
W: They had two generals. Long and Than and then Dong who commands airborne. In retrospect we should have ______.
K: Sent one of our guys up.
W: A 4-star on the scene.
K: We came close. The other side wasn’t ______.
W: The operation was still successful. Our losses were heavier than might have been. Our materiel losses are shocking.
K: In helicopters?
W: That is public knowledge but 94 artillery pieces and tanks and APC.
K: I haven’t seen it.
W: Not revealed and shouldn’t be. It gives you a better idea of what happened. The personnel involved—you left the room. Dong I have no confidence in. The man you named earlier thought Louad fell flat on his face. He was relieved after Tet.
K: How did they think with these guys it could be done.
W: They have come a long way and learned as time has gone on. Give more credit than for running something as complicated as this. We would have been hard pressed to run it ourselves and too much for these little fellows.
[Page 538]K: I remember the briefing you gave to the WSAG a few months ago. If this war doesn’t ruin you, it breaks your heart.
W: It’s been an unhappy national experience. In retrospect—hind sight is always 20–20.
K: You had Atapu [Attopeu] pointed.
W: These things have to be planned in advance. We should have pulled advisors before to shake them down so they would have self-confidence. We should have stockpiled airborne ______. They take terrible casualties. We should be able to replace them. Build up 120% overstrike. These things have to be anticipated. Insufficient attention given to control of airspace where you have ______ on the ground. Complicated problems. If we do it over again these things will be thought through. Such a veil of secrecy Abe was afraid to take steps to ______ it. Too much secrecy in the plan.
K: And not adjusting it to conditions when we hit them.
W: ______ Not fully appreciate it puts a veil of caution on the whole thing. The operation was successful. Know advisors morale effect.
K: Only reports when it was going on.
W: It was like Tet offensive in that regard. Materiel losses when you see that it was most indicative thing on disorderliness and withdrawal (?).
K: I will get it from Haig.
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Vietnam.]
[W:] One postscript remark. Abe in the most difficult position you can hear of. Thieu took it over. Americans were taken out because Thieu talked to the field commanders. On one occasion we talked Thieu into a course of action and orders sent to L______ who talks with Thieu and reverses it. It’s awkward. You have to fully appreciate the position that Abe was in.
K: No problem with Abe. It’s a problem of you cannot say you learned from this experience because there will be no other one. I meant to call and tell you that your briefing at the end of Feb. was very clairvoyant.
W: Thank you for calling.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 9, Chronological File. No classification marking. All omissions are in the original. A typed note on the transcript indicates the conversation occurred in the afternoon.↩
- Apparent reference to the Lam Son operation.↩