Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

173. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, April 5, 1971, 1020Z.

12. Refs: A. WHS 1026.² B. WHS 1030.³ C. WHS 1031.⁴ D. WHS 1032.⁵

1. I had a very satisfactory talk with President Thieu at noon today.

2. I informed Thieu that the President would announce a further withdrawal of U.S. forces at 2100 EST Washington, April 7 (10:00 a.m., April 8 Saigon time). I drew on contents of reftels to explain factors which had entered into the President’s decision. I referred to the increasing political pressure from the Congress and from public opinion to bring about a speedier termination of American participation in the war, mentioning recent moves made in both the House and Senate.

3. I said that President Nixon has stood firm against these growing pressures. He is determined to achieve the goal upon which both our governments have agreed: the ability of the Government of South Vietnam to defend itself against aggression, and the right of its people to live under a government of their own choosing. In order to achieve this goal, it is absolutely essential for President Nixon to hold the support of U.S. public opinion so that the long-term U.S. assistance needed by South Vietnam will continue to be forthcoming. In order to do this, President Nixon has determined that it will be necessary to redeploy our troops at a somewhat faster rate than had been heretofore contemplated. He, therefore, plans to announce the redeployment of 100,000 U.S. troops from South Vietnam from May 1 to December 1, 1971.

4. I said that no one in the U.S. Government had been informed of this figure and it was, therefore, imperative that Thieu keep it exclusively to himself. If there should be any leak, it would create a most difficult situation.

5. I added that President Nixon recognized the need to retain a substantial number of troops through the October 3 presidential elections and that, therefore, 200,000 troops will remain in South Vietnam through that period. The heaviest withdrawals will be made during the latter part of October and November.

6. I then said that the President would like to arrange a meeting with President Thieu, but would not be in a position to make any announcement for a month. I emphasized it was essential, therefore, to maintain tight security on this.

I described a possible scenario for the meeting (ref A):

• —It should be possible for Thieu to say at the time of the meeting that he had been assured by President Nixon that U.S. force levels will remain above 200,000 through early October.
• —He might also say that he had informed President Nixon that ARVN forces would be prepared to take over the ground security of South Vietnam by 1 January 1972.
• —President Nixon would also reaffirm his intention of providing necessary air support to South Vietnam for a long as necessary.
• —President Nixon would be willing to assure Thieu of long-term economic aid.

7. Thieu raised no problem about the redeployment figure. He said “U.S. troop strength on December 1 will, therefore, be 184,000?” I affirmed that that was correct.

8. He made the following additional comments:

• —He was very much pleased at the prospect of a meeting and said that he thought it would be most helpful. With regard to timing, he hoped the meeting could be in late June or early July. He believes that if the meeting should be held after he announces his candidacy he would be open to criticism. He feels it is perfectly in order for him to meet with President Nixon as President of South Vietnam, but questionable that he should do so as a candidate.
• —He said that he felt that there were only three important subjects which would need discussion.

  A. Long range economic support. He hoped by that time to have some concrete plans to suggest.

  B. Acceleration of Vietnamization through strengthening of RVNAF with additional equipment. Lessons had been learned from Lam Son 719. We now know how the North Vietnamese are equipped, what kind of weapons they have, the manner in which they use them, and the kind of tactics they employ. There is no problem about RVNAF courage or morale. It is merely a question of having the right equipment. Thieu said many of their units had expressed regret that they had had no hand-to-hand combat.

  C. Continuation of air support until the RVN Air Force attains adequate strength. Thieu said that with the combination of our air support and RVNAF troops we could always defeat the enemy.

9. At the time of the President’s announcement, Thieu will make a brief statement saying that our governments have consulted in advance and that he agrees with the President’s decision. It will be similar to the statement he made at the time the President made his redeployment announcement in April 1970.⁶

10. I was both pleased and relieved at Thieu’s response. I feared that he might have difficulty with the increased withdrawals, but he interposed no problems, seemed confident and in good spirits.

11. Warmest regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A note indicates that it was sent to San Clemente.
2. Document 170.
3. In backchannel message WHS 1030 to Bunker, April 3, Kissinger indicated that Nixon expressed interest in meeting with Thieu in July. Kissinger also advised Bunker that troop withdrawals would total 100,000 between May 1 and December 1 and that he should reassure Thieu that Nixon was willing to formally commit to a generous long-term economic assistance package and would maintain 200,000 troops through early October. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. VI)
4. In backchannel message WHS 1031 to Bunker, April 3, Kissinger instructed Bunker to inform Thieu that he should not share withdrawal figures because only Rogers knew about them in Washington. He added that it was the lowest figure possible “given political problems here.” (Ibid.)
5. In backchannel message WHS 1032 to Bunker, April 4, Kissinger reported that Nixon promised to meet with Thieu but would withhold the announcement for a month for political reasons. (Ibid.)
6. On April 20, 1970, Nixon announced that he was withdrawing 150,000 troops by the spring of 1971. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 373–377.