Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

164. Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, March 23, 1971, 3:06–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Evaluation of Lam Son Operation

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. William Sullivan
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Dennis J. Doolin
  • Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett
• CIA
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. George Carver
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
  • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• OMB
  • Mr. James Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
  • General Alexander Haig
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge
  • Mr. Wayne Smith
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The WSAG discussed the impact of the Lam Son operation on the North and South Vietnamese armed forces and on the political situation in South Vietnam. It was agreed that:

1) the effect of Lam Son on the enemy logistical system and on enemy military capabilities in 1971–72 would be discussed at a WSAG meeting on March 25.

2) themes to be used in public information treatment of Lam Son would be discussed at the same meeting.

3) the Defense Department would obtain photographs illustrating enemy supply losses caused by Lam Son.

4) the Defense Department would provide information to answer inquiries generated by a CBS television interview with an American sergeant, who complained of inadequate support for his 175 mm. artillery unit operating near Khe Sanh.

[Omitted here are reports of the military situation of the Lam Son operation.]

Gen. Vogt: The ARVN could have gotten more supplies if they had been able to move along Route 914. They did seize more crew-served weapons than were taken in the whole Cambodian operation. All of these things will offset the negative effects of the operation on the ARVN.

One thing worth pointing out is that just seeing that the enemy is willing to take such heavy losses will have a sobering effect on the ARVN.

Dr. Kissinger: Sobering is the right word to describe the situation in view of those reports about North Vietnamese dead with rice wine in their canteens.

Admiral Moorer: They often get their people tanked up, especially the sappers.

Gen. Vogt: Lam Son has thrown the enemy timetable off. We were counting on an attack in I Corps that didn’t materialize. Lam Son probably pre-empted it.

As for the Toan Thang operation, it bought a lot of time for the Cambodian Government, which is now able to conduct operations north of Phnom Penh.

Dr. Kissinger: With General Tri’s death, are the units in Toan Thang fighting with determination?

Gen. Vogt: There has been only one good operation.

Admiral Moorer: Some changes in leadership are needed.

Gen. Vogt: Tri’s loss has been severely felt.

Admiral Moorer: There are political problems with removing one of the division commanders.

Gen. Vogt: The ARVN will be cheered by the fact that much of the ammunition destined for the south will never get there.

The factor that will have the most impact in both North and South Vietnam is the very very heavy losses the enemy suffered. I think our estimates are conservative. I think the ARVN have not made excessive claims; on occasion, we have counted more bodies than they reported. Furthermore, we have only been in a small percentage of the areas that were hit by bombing. In those areas that the ARVN did reach, the body count was heavy.

Mr. Johnson: Have you done a balance sheet showing the enemy strength when we went in and the losses they suffered? Accepting the fact that they suffered heavy losses, how were they able to show such strength?

Gen. Vogt: They had to divert infiltrators bound for the south. They can’t replace the leaders lost as a result of Lam Son.

Dr. Kissinger: Did we know about the tanks ahead of time, including how many there were?

Gen. Bennett: Yes.

Gen. Vogt: We saw them moving down through the Panhandle.

The meatgrinder effect of Lam Son may be its most decisive result. The enemy took terrific losses in order to gain a psychological victory.

Admiral Moorer: About the tanks, we knew there were some there but not how many.

Mr. Johnson: Accepting all of what you have said [about the meatgrinder effect], the North Vietnamese still had a hell of a lot of fight in them.

Gen. Vogt: Yes, but their tactics were suicidal. In one area alone we found 400 killed by B–52s.

They used human wave tactics like the Chinese in Korea. Their troops are completely indoctrinated. In other operations we have even found gunners chained to their guns.

Another plus of Lam Son is that the ARVN fought the best North Vietnamese units on what could be considered their home ground and unit for unit did a good job. Later on this will have a great effect on morale. They also learned a lot from the operation that they can use later.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you thinking they would go into Laos again?

Gen. Vogt: Yes, possibly. The staffs also learned a great deal from the operation.

Admiral Moorer: Initially they didn’t make adequate arrangements for fire coordination.

Gen. Vogt: The ARVN has unsettled the enemy with the knowledge that they can undertake this sort of operation, that South Laos is not inviolate. The enemy tank destruction was significant. It amounted to one-fourth to one-third of his total inventory. Some of those destroyed were T–54s, the best they had. The tac air stopped the tanks effectively.

Mr. Packard: They weren’t always able to destroy them.

Gen. Vogt: But they stopped them, and they were then destroyed by other means. Tac air, helicopters, and heavy weapons worked as a team.

The South Vietnamese know that the North Vietnamese committed a heavy proportion of their strategic reserves. This is a net gain for South Vietnam. Lam Son disrupted enemy plans to introduce additional forces into Cambodia and South Vietnam. This will have an effect on the in-country situation. We have already seen that in certain areas the regional and provincial forces have come alive and inflicted heavy losses.

Mr. Sullivan: In I Corps the removal of the 1st and 2nd Divisions resulted in a 5% decline in HES statistics in February. The percentage will probably be the same for March. Thus, pacification has suffered.

Gen. Vogt: But the number of enemy being killed by the regional and provincial forces is at an all-time high. This is a big plus, because it indicates a lowered level of enemy activity. I think this has proved the validity of Vietnamization.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good presentation. We will have to turn you loose on Senator McGovern² next.

Gen. Bennett: With regard to enemy tanks, we knew the North Vietnamese had about 230 in North Vietnam. We had some isolated pictures of tanks. However, the numbers which the enemy had [in the Lam Son area] exceeded what we had expected.

The North Vietnamese forces in the Lam Son area have lost 12,000 killed, of whom 6,000 were in combat units.

Dr. Kissinger: You don’t believe that figure is low?

Gen. Bennett: No. I accept that it is on the low side. The losses were primarily in the 304th and 308th divisions. The enemy has received some replacements, perhaps about 7,000. These are infiltrators that have been siphoned off.

The enemy has two options. He can continue along Route 9 toward Khe Sanh and launch an attack eastward in conjunction with the six regiments in the DMZ. The second option for the North Vietnamese would be to stay where they are and to continue attacks by fire. Their artillery is within range of Khe Sanh. I think the second option is more likely.

Dr. Kissinger: But if they have lost eight out of twelve regiments, how is it realistically possible that they could continue an attack along Route 9 against both US and South Vietnamese forces?

Gen. Bennett: That is why I consider this is not likely to happen. They need to rebuild their leadership cadres.

Dr. Kissinger: How long will the rebuilding take?

Gen. Bennett: Three or four months.

Dr. Kissinger: Then they could start another attack in August.

Gen. Bennett: That would be after the beginning of the rainy season. I don’t think they will continue the attack, but they can maintain contact. They have a problem in that on the other side of the South Vietnamese border there is no good road net.

Let’s look at what is happening elsewhere. In the highlands of MR 2 three regiments are concentrating near Ban Hep. This operation is independent of what they are doing near Khe Sanh. In the rest of Vietnam, they can stage high points of limited duration, but they don’t have the capability for continued operations.

Dr. Kissinger: Did Lam Son affect their ability to carry out the Ban Hep operation?

Gen. Bennett: Yes, because they haven’t been able to make maximum use of the dry season to shove supplies down the trail. Another problem for them in mounting an attack on Khe Sanh is that it would drain supplies bound for other areas, particularly South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have a session Thursday afternoon to go over the logistical situation.

Mr. Sullivan: Can we handle an enemy attack on Khe Sanh?

Gen. Bennett: If they choose the first option, we will have enough forces, assuming air support is still available.

Mr. Johnson: With US troops in Khe Sanh, they could raise our casualties by attacking. This would be a good psychological/political option.

Gen. Bennett: They have moved mortars and artillery into position. We will be getting heavy fire attacks along Route 9.

Admiral Moorer: They will be deterred by the thought of what we could do.

Dr. Kissinger: What could we do?

Admiral Moorer: We could resume the bombing up north. We could bring in the other two brigades of the 101st Airborne. They can’t assume we will just sit there if they try a full-scale attack.

Gen. Vogt: In the area from the DMZ to just south of Route 9 there are 15,000 RVNAF and 17,000 US troops. In the tier below, which extends to Da Nang, we have another 8,000 U.S. troops.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Bennett) In your personal judgement, are we from a strictly military standpoint better off in terms of the combat situation in I Corps?

Gen. Bennett: We are better off. There are both tangible and intangible reasons. Of the tangible reasons, the first is the disorganization caused in the orderly flow of enemy supplies.

Dr. Kissinger: That makes no difference in I Corps.

Gen. Bennett: So far it doesn’t.

Gen. Vogt: We are now stronger in I Corps than we have been for some months.

Dr. Kissinger: Since our units are going to be reduced, are we better or worse off given the losses suffered by both the South and the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Packard: We are much better off. Their supplies can’t move. Their relative strength is less.

Gen. Bennett: There has been a tremendous impact in terms of the number of units in North Vietnam that they have had to bring down to Laos as a result of Lam Son.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you handle the argument that if there had been no attack on Tchepone, the North Vietnamese would never have moved those units? Just being the devil’s advocate, I wonder if we can suppose that they would have used two home reserve units just for an attack on I Corps.

Gen. Bennett: I doubt it.

Admiral Moorer: Even so, from the standpoint of their overall situation, they will have to restore and supply these divisions. This has an impact on their whole position. They are fighting in five different places now.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everybody agree with the net assessment of the tactical situation that we are better off after Lam Son than we were before?

Mr. Doolin: Doesn’t this really depend more on how people look at the situation [than on what actually happened]?

Admiral Moorer: We are talking about this from the purely military standpoint, not the political.

Mr. Schlesinger: Considering the stakes—military, political, and symbolic—the President has in this operation, it would be a good idea to put out a white paper on it.

Dr. Kissinger: When one considers the success we have had with white papers!

Gen. Bennett: Nothing has been found in the Toan Thang area, possibly because there is nothing there to find.

Dr. Kissinger: Since Tri’s death, it seems that where the ARVN is, the enemy isn’t. Up near Snoul the ARVN ran into the enemy by mistake; they made a fast retrograde movement.

Gen. Bennett: The enemy won’t attack unless they can make a good fight.

Dr. Kissinger: Either there is nothing in that area, or the ARVN does not want to go into an area where caches might be. They go about in circles in areas where we know there are neither enemy forces nor caches. They are letting the enemy get out of the way.

Mr. Packard: The problem is leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Bennett) You think that there may be no caches there?

Mr. Carver: COMINT indicates there is a big supply area near Kratie. The enemy is trying to keep the ARVN out of that region by harassing them around Chup.

Mr. Sullivan: Why not go into Chup? One enemy unit got resupplied there.

Gen. Vogt: The ARVN has been in the area.

Mr. Sullivan: They have been in parts of it. But why don’t they go right through it?

Gen. Vogt: We know the ARVN is not being aggressive. General Abrams has told President Thieu about this. They are in the process of changing division commanders.

Gen. Bennett: One anomaly is that the fire attack rate is going up in MR 4. We don’t know how they are getting supplies. One theory is that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are at the point where they feel that because of stepped-up South Vietnamese activity they will lose their ammunition if they don’t use it.

Dr. Kissinger: When the North Vietnamese see the ARVN moving as it does in Cambodia, won’t their confidence increase?

Gen. Vogt: Yes, if the ARVN continues to behave as they are now.

Dr. Kissinger: If the North Vietnamese learn they can pick the area of combat, we will be back in some respects to the situation we used to face.

Gen. Vogt: The Cambodian Army is getting better. It is operating north of Route 7 in an area it has never been in before.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the impact of Lam Son on the South Vietnamese domestic situation?

Gen. Cushman: It will result in propaganda battles. There are several variables involved. The enemy wants to reconstruct his supply network in the Tchepone area, but he will also want to show that he has some sting left. Thus, he may try an attack in the north, perhaps in Quang Tri Province.

Another variable is the level of enemy attacks in the next few months. We believe the flow of supplies around Tchepone can replace the earlier losses in Cambodia and can sustain existing enemy activity without, however, permitting any increase.

The enemy will have problems because manpower losses have been very high, but they were higher in Tet 1968. This is a short-term loss. We believe Hanoi figures it can protect its supply lines even if at great cost. This will increase their confidence.

On the other hand, they will have to realize that they can’t go all out or raise the effort in South Vietnam or Cambodia significantly. They will see that they are no nearer to ending the war.

They may search for a way to thrash back at us. They will make an effort to show they are still around.

All of these things will affect political opinion. This operation will provide a springboard to Hanoi. It ended two weeks early. The U.S. press is on their side. Saigon will have to take steps to get the facts known. We have a campaign going on this, but it will have to be done overtly in Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sullivan) What do you think the impact will be in South Vietnam?

Mr. Sullivan: The facts will not be very important a month from now. What will be significant will be the attitudes of the South Vietnamese Government. We know the North Vietnamese will claim victory. I think the South Vietnamese ought to get on their white horse, too, treat these troops as heroes, and create the impression that they are satisfied that there is a significant balance in their favor.

One concern I have is what the North Vietnamese can do to exploit the rollback in pacification successes which we have observed in the northern provinces.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn’t they have done this anyway? If the Lam Son operation had not been conducted, wouldn’t their chances of hurting the pacification effort have been even greater?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes. The important thing is the impression which Saigon puts out. A fair, honest appraisal won’t gain any political advantages. This is something the President of the United States can’t do but that the President of South Vietnam can do.

I would be interested to know what Al Haig thinks about this.

Gen. Haig: I agree with what you have said. Thieu is a good barometer of the political situation in South Vietnam. He controls his press and is using it. He has said about Lam Son that: “You have a problem in the United States, but we have a victory here in Saigon.” He also thinks the enemy is going to try to seize terrain in South Vietnam in order to show that the South Vietnamese Government can’t protect its home terrain at a time when it is engaging in operations outside the country. The real problem is that some of Thieu’s political opponents, particularly Ky, are going to try to raise doubts about the operation.

Gen. Cushman: Our reading is that right now Lam Son is a plus in Saigon.

Gen. Haig: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: That is the important thing.

Gen. Cushman: But this view will be under attack.

Mr. Sullivan: I just sent out to several posts the Saigon backgrounder on this.

Mr. Johnson: The problem is that the enemy and the opponents of the operation are going to overstate their case and that we will overstate ours in reaction.

I don’t know about the international impact.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Japan?

Mr. Johnson: Knowing their press, I would say that they will conclude Lam Son was a defeat. The problem is how we counter this or whether we can do so.

Mr. Doolin: Lee Kuan-yew³ made a good statement referring to the “salutary effect” of the operation.

Mr. Sullivan: I think the international reaction will be that the operation failed to achieve its objectives. To try to combat this with statistics and figures will just get us into a mess.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no danger of that. We don’t have any figures.

Mr. Packard: The most effective thing we could do would be to have two more operations down there.

Dr. Kissinger: It would also be useful to have one plan that comes off.

Mr. Johnson: Last night I was talking to [Senator] Jack Miller⁴ about this. I pointed out to him that it wasn’t very long ago that we were fighting for possession of Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I have found that argument very effective. Also, you can say that they should look at the consumption requirements of the additional North Vietnamese units. We can forget about truck-kill figures.

Mr. Packard: An operation like Lam Son would have been unthinkable two years ago.

Mr. Johnson: It would help if we could develop this theme further.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We can use that theme and two others: that the enemy logistic flow has been cut down and that an enemy offensive has been pre-empted.

Mr. Johnson: That [the pre-emption of an enemy offensive] is kind of doubtful.

Mr. Doolin: We can say that they are carrying the war to the enemy outside of populated areas.

Mr. Sullivan: That’s a good point.

Mr. Johnson: We need to discuss this.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we do it? We have a meeting scheduled for Thursday afternoon on the logistical situation. Why don’t we each prepare some basic themes? Then we can get an agreed set of themes that we all should use. Each of us can do this and have them ready for discussion on Thursday afternoon. We can do this at the end of the meeting.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets except those that indicate the omission of unrelated material are in the original. In a March 23 briefing memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy and Holdridge noted that the purpose of the meeting was to make a preliminary assessment of Lam Son 719, but that the participants would not be informed of this until the morning of the meeting to ensure that they “will not be armed with arguments or pre-cooked factual base.” (Ibid., Box H–80, WSAG Meetings, Evaluation of Lam Son Operation 3–23–71)
2. Senator George S. McGovern (D–MT) was a noted critic of the war in Vietnam.
3. Lee Kuan Yew was the Prime Minister of Singapore.
4. Senator Jack Miller (R–IA).