140. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1
Nixon: All right, so what the main, main point is: what about all the hills we lost yesterday, and what’s the situation? Is it—at any rate are we ready to bug out, and so forth and so on, or not? I think I know the answers, but quickly tell us what has happened overnight, since—in the last 24 hours? Is it up, down, or sideways?
Moorer: All right, sir. First, this week we had this operation [Operation Toan Thang 01/71] down in the south in Cambodia and, as you know, there was very heavy fighting right there at [unclear] where over 200 of the enemy were killed—
Nixon: Good.
Moorer: —very light casualties on part of the South Vietnamese. The operations are continuing on schedule. As you know, sir, this operation will go ‘til 1 July, and then making a—
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: —deliberate, thorough—
Nixon: Yeah. Tom [Moorer], with regard to that operation, is it—could it be fairly safe to be said at the present time the death of Tri2 has not, to an appreciable extent, reduced the effectiveness—the verve of the operation [Lam Son 719]?
Moorer: Oh, that’s right. That’s quite true.
Nixon: In other words, they were able to change commands.
Moorer: We had the one report—
Nixon: This is not unimportant—
Moorer: —that the—
Nixon: In one, they thought it was Tri, only it didn’t—
Moorer: Yes, sir. We, we had one report that the—of course, the—that some of the senior commanders actually were—
Nixon: Yeah?
[Page 426]Moorer: —upset about his—
Nixon: [unclear]
Moorer: —actions. On the other hand, what they want is contact, they say, and then they are [unclear] go right back to—
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: —the very top [unclear].
Nixon: You’ve already answered this question. That’s—
Moorer: I think the answer to that’s no, sir—
Nixon: [unclear] agree on the answer to this question. You know, we all know from, from the historical thing. Everybody, everybody—I’ll ask it—almost everybody agrees that [unclear] had Stonewall Jackson been at Gettysburg, the South might have won the war. So, the general does make a difference.
Rogers: That’s right.
Laird: It would have made a difference—
Moorer: Mr. President—
Nixon: Huh?
Laird: It would have made a hell of a difference there.
Nixon: Because Stonewall Jackson would have, instead of marching those poor bastards across that [unclear].
[laughter]
Nixon: He’d have gone around and taken them from the rear. Go ahead.
Moorer: Yes, well, now I wanted to describe to you, I guess, a pretty significant thing we got over the evening. One is, as I told you when I briefed you on this plan, I think we left a—the idea for the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division to move prior on this highway here, 914, and for the 3rd Regiment to come across here. They are grouping these battalions now into—so that they’ll have their whole organization intact, of the—with the—this is what these movement flags mean as they move the 1st and the 3rd Regiments up into position. They’re moving there, as you know, they already—then there are reporters travelling this road, though, operating along this road, and there’s nary a bomb-free area from here, down to here. We’re not bombing in there because the ARVN is patrolling that road. Next, up here, where there’s been quite a bit of COMINT about Fire Support Base 31A. It was an area called Hill 31.3 And there’s some very heavy fighting in this area.
[Page 427]Nixon: Well, the score last night: they had lost 450 South Vietnamese killed?4
Laird: No, sir, that’s not correct.
Moorer: That’s not right. We don’t have reports. This battle is still going on, and they report as follows: that the South Vietnamese are, are dug in 200 meters from their previous position, and that the North Vietnamese have taken a part of the hill; that they are still fighting. [unclear] the fact is reported that 250 North Vietnamese dead, 100 along—right on the base, I think in the center of the base, and another 150 or so in the vicinity. Two kilometers to the east, they reported another 200 dead. And I think the radio this morning was talking about very large numbers of North Vietnamese casualties. That’s the first time that I’ve heard anything at that—in that direction. But, there’s been a, a series of attacks—tank fights. They’ve—
Nixon: What about Laird’s [unclear]?
Moorer: They reported 10 tanks destroyed: one by artillery and nine by Tactical Air. And then, there was a tank fight by—between the ARVN tanks and the North Vietnamese tanks along this Road 92, just at dusk—which would be just a day like this morning—where there were three North Vietnamese tanks destroyed and one South Vietnamese tank destroyed. So, the issue is a stalemate down there, but I think the significant thing is that the South Vietnamese are staying there and fighting. As you know, they brought the armored reinforcements up here, and they have linked up with one company, but the enemy has landed 2 or 3 kilometers from the group of North Viet—South Vietnamese that have dug in right adjacent to this position. And they’re still fighting, and I think that the, the fact that they are still there and holding on under this intensive fighting is an indication that they are certainly fighting well. The casualties are very heavy on the North Vietnamese side. I’m—I’m sure the forces of the South Vietnamese will suffer casualties, but the—in other words, I think the most encouraging part is that they didn’t break and, and blew ‘em away—
Nixon: Those people on Hill 31, they have been the survivors of that other hill we lost and moved in with them. Is that right—?
Moorer: No, sir. No, sir. That was—this was independent of that. That operation was back over here. This is a separate operation.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.
Moorer: What they did, and you’re quite correct, the 39th Battalion, in the first action that you were reported to, did join up with the 21st—
[Page 428]Nixon: Yeah?
Moorer: —but they were not related to this action over here.
Nixon: Now, with regard to General Abrams’ plan to replace the Airborne with the Marines—that’ll take about a week, or—?
Moorer: Yes, sir. I think so. I’ve asked him, though, what time then that’s going to be. If you look over here, you’ll see where these Marines are. You see, the green—
Nixon: Yeah?
Moorer: —indicates the position of the South Vietnamese. There are some of the Marines here. Some of them are back here in reserve; they’ll be brought forward—
Nixon: Uh-huh.
Moorer: —but, he’ll, he’ll move them in there in a few days, I—I’m pretty sure.
Nixon: Fine.
Moorer: And then at [unclear]. Also, he wanted to bring up that one brigade which would be moving in there to replace this one. I think it would come across. [unclear]—
Nixon: What about the balance of the reserves that he has in South Vietnam? He still has—after he moves these—he will still have [unclear] reserves in South Vietnam? But it—it—it—the point that Mel raised after our meeting yesterday was that—or maybe it was during the [unclear] meetings—the North Vietnamese were—must be making a major effort to, to cut off those, go to the rear of our force—the South Vietnamese forces that are on Route 9, and cut ‘em off. Is that—is that action—? What does our intelligence show in that respect?
Moorer: Well, there was an intelligence report to the effect that two regiments were moving almost directly south.
Nixon: Right.
Moorer: On—just down the line, more or less.
Nixon: Right.
Moorer: As you know, the—
Nixon: What are we doing? Just punishing them with air, or—?
Moorer: Yes, sir. We—we’re doing more than that. We’re putting out patrols, and, of course, when they get over there to the South Vietnamese side, then they are up against [unclear] forces. But we have right here a very large fire support base, and we have artillery, and we are covering this with 24-hour attacks. With all of that, General Abrams, of course, has all the intelligence. And, here again, there may be some enemy fire, but I think that—Mr. Helms will back me up—here, for the first time in a long time, we have the North Vietnamese willing, apparently willing, to commit as much as a battalion, which they haven’t done in a long, long time.
[Page 429]Nixon: Well, what the North Vietnamese are obviously doing, it seems is to—is to make a major effort—
Moorer: I think—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: Now they’re trying to conserve their forces. Not fighting in the Giap-fashion, but going all out to break the back of this thing. Is that correct?
Rogers: That’s correct. Did we get any intercepts that [unclear]? Do we have any conversations—?
Moorer: Yes, sir.
Rogers: You know what I mean—?
Helms: Well, we do have some conversations. Conversations saying, “Stand and fight.” I mean, definite orders to these units. This is the first time we’ve seen this in, oh, literally years.
Moorer: Not only that, but they’re establishing headquarters—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: You said what?
Moorer: They’ve established headquarters down here, sir, 70B they call it, to control the entire operation.5 Heretofore, they’ve been leaving the actions in the different base areas up to the local commanders. And, now, they have headquarters—
Nixon: Right. I assume that our Air—Air—Air Force, as usual, does not have the capacity to know how to hit such headquarters, is that correct?
Moorer: Well, sir, if they get the top men over at the headquarters, of course, they will lay the B–52 strikes on this target. [unclear] have to recognize that these generals move—
Nixon: Is that right—?
Moorer: —everyday. They move from one place to another. By the time you know they’re, uh—
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: [unclear] are reported to be down there in the Lam Son—or rather the Chup Operation, we did pick up the headquarters, laid down a B–52 strike, and killed the 20th Headquarters area here a few days ago.6
[Page 430]Nixon: One point, Dick, that concerned me, and I saw on television and so forth, and the news summaries, that our intelligence people are saying that our intelligence is inefficient, inadequate, bad, and that that’s the reason that we’re, we’re running into more resistance than was expected—
Helms: Mr. President, resistance is precisely what we expected. It’s—it’s been there, we outlined it before the plan ever kicked off—
Nixon: They both—they both—they both quote, “A high official said—”
Helms: What if that high official doesn’t know? When we were in here briefing you long before this operation kicked off, we identified all of those units surrounded on the map, and [unclear].
Moorer: We—we thought [unclear].
Nixon: I don’t suppose [unclear] find the high official who said this—
Helms: [unclear]
Nixon: All right. Go ahead.
Moorer: Well, sir, that’s our—that’s about it. As I say here, of course, it’s night over there, now. They’ll start in, again, first thing in the morning. General Abrams reports that General Lam is very resolute and—
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: And, now, one other interesting aspect of this is the sensors indicated, indicated in the last 24 hours, which just confirms what we talked about yesterday, I think, in the sense that if you look at what’s happening on these firebases. You see, here on [Route] 922, which is a route in through Base Area—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Moorer: —611, the traffic is down by nine trucks. In [Route] 9G, which, of course, is the one that they had tried again, is—well, they’ve got zero yesterday, and two northbound and five southbound today. This could have been—We do know that there’s something going on to put a strike in. We do know that there’s some enemy forces on that road, and so, these five trucks could have been, I suppose, anything. Let me turn to Route 99, which goes off to the south, where as we had, three or four days ago, 86 and 80, yesterday, we had 14 trucks and some of them were knocked off by air.
Nixon: Very important.
Moorer: And—But only, only 30. Then, you go to Route 914B, which is the one we’ve all been so interested in. They—the one that comes down here.
Laird: Yeah.
[Page 431]Moorer: It was a—
[unclear exchange]
Moorer: —the 23rd [of February]—
Laird: Going up the “Kissinger Trail.”
[laughter]
Moorer: The 23rd was a 100, the 24th was 84, yesterday 28, and today 17. And so, I think that, overall, there’s no question about the fact that they have slowed this, it appears. Now, I just had a briefing on the input through the passes.
Nixon: Yeah, and one aside: that very little figure is still valid, but [unclear]. The press will get it out, and so forth. In other words, there’s so many traps before this began and so many now [unclear]. These are things people understand, right?
Moorer: Well, we haven’t enough. I, I—I could give you some better charts and that’s it to show that and make that point, but not—Now, our intelligence indicates, also, that—and this is about five days old now, because it takes that long to accumulate—In any event, the input through those passes has been high. So, the point up to this, there’s still a tremendous amount of material north of this area we’re operating in.
Rogers: But that, Tom, is what I said is a source of confusion. You read in the papers, somebody says the—
Nixon: [unclear]—
Rogers: —it’s a lot more traffic—
[unclear exchange]
Rogers: Now, what it is: it’s traffic in, but not out. What we’re trying to do is cut it off. I mean, the traffic below Tchepone is greatly reduced.
Moorer: That’s right.
Rogers: But that, as you read—sometimes read in the papers—
Nixon: That’s what it’s all about.
[unclear exchange]
Moorer: It’s wrong. It’s just wrong.
Rogers: That’s right.
Moorer: Yeah, I mean, there’s no question about it.
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: [unclear] General Abrams, and watching the timing of these operations, and—they’re making their preliminary movements, and I’m sure that they are going to go right ahead. And I think it’s—Again, the encouraging thing is that the ARVN showed that in the worst kind of environment, they could—were willing to stand and fight.
[Page 432]Nixon: On Hill 31?
Moorer: Yes, sir.
Nixon: Well, or they lose it. If they do, so—so be it. The main thing is they fought.
Moorer: But the other side, Mr. President, we, we will never know how many they really lose. [unclear]
Moorer: [4 seconds not declassified]
Nixon: Yeah.
Moorer: —indirect [unclear], we’ll never know—
Nixon: Yeah. A question, with regard to the DMZ: the major purpose, of course, of statements in which we have deliberately left fuzzed up, with the North Vietnamese—the South Vietnamese, what they do in North Vietnam. The purpose of that, of course, is not because they’re going North. We all know that. They can’t do it without our support. But, I don’t think at this point, I think the main purpose of that is to tie those forces down. Isn’t that true, what I said?
Moorer: Exactly.
Nixon: That they have a free shot. They just move our guys out of there and come on over here.
Moorer: As you see, they have not reduced the total number of forces, at least going back there, though, right on the DMZ they—
Nixon: How many Americans—how many Americans across that section are facing the DMZ approximately?
Moorer: Well, in this general area, we have about 9,000.
Nixon: I see. Huh? Only 9,000?
Moorer: Yes, sir—
Laird: American combat troops.
Moorer: American combat forces right there, sir.
Nixon: Right.
Moorer: We’re talking about the helo operations, and support people, and add those people on Khe Sanh.
Nixon: Okay, at Khe Sanh. Did you mean the total at Khe Sanh, and clear across that whole bottom half of the DMZ, there’re only 9,000 American forces?
Moorer: There’s about nine—
Nixon: I know about combat. I want to know about all Americans. How many are in the region?
Moorer: [unclear]
Nixon: Oh, I mean the whole goddamn bunch. What is it?
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: 50,000?
[Page 433]Laird: [unclear] to Da Nang and through there—
Moorer: That’s right. It depends on how far you go, go south—
Nixon: All right.
[unclear exchange]
Moorer: But they—Traditionally, they have 8,000 up here, and we have about 9,000 in this blocking position.
Nixon: Now, the point—the point I’m making has nothing to do with how many combat, military, or any of that. It has to do with: how many Americans might be vulnerable, in the case that the people are going to be there when those in North Vietnam thought they had a free shot at coming across? Now, is it 9,000 combat? Or is it 25,000 or 50,000—
Moorer: [unclear]
Nixon: —Americans? Forget combat—
Moorer: Yes, sir. I think it’s about—Well, I think the figure’s 29,000 based on my knowledge—
Nixon: I’d like to verify it again. Get that figure—
Moorer: Should we go all the way down to—It depends on where you stop, Mr. President.
[unclear exchange]
Moorer: If you include all of Military Region I.
Nixon: Fine, Military Region I. That’s great. Just get me that there [unclear exchange] below the DMZ. That, really, is what this is all about. [unclear] Now, the second point is that, with regard to the, with regard to the whole business about [unclear] and so forth and so on, it, it—we, we—as we all know, in this room, the purpose of that is [unclear] just like your little running, your, your boat up there with 5,000 Marines on it, sending them for a field trip, with boats and the rest, to keep them worried over there, and at least tie down a few of their people, so that they don’t come running around over here and get these guys. Is that true?
Moorer: Yes, sir.
Laird: Now, we were—During the meeting with [unclear] said he wants more this week—
Nixon: Good.
Laird: —and—
Nixon: That’s all right.
Laird: —there is—we’ve been watching those pass areas up there and getting the best kind of intelligence that we can. Both CIA and DIA have been working closely together.
Nixon: Well—
[Page 434]Laird: There is a substantial amount up there, but I think it would be worthwhile, maybe—but I didn’t think it was going to be—
Nixon: [unclear]
Laird: —this weekend.
Nixon: We’ve got another week to go.
Laird: Because—
Nixon: I’m sorry, but, but we will present that, though. We—I’m going to talk about that. But, understand: it’s militarily that can have the effect of tying those people down. That’s all.
Moorer: It’s already doing it, sir. We’ve got intercepts—
Nixon: I know, I know, but I’d keep hitting that pass area.
Laird: Well, I think, probably, Monday, Tuesday, or sometime in there would be a good time to do it.
Nixon: Well, give us, though, before we do that there, that’ll be a decision, we want this group to sit, and we’ll, we’ll hear the arguments, and so forth. The second point is that I noted this morning—and I almost laughed about this—[American] infantry will be sent into Vietnam in order to rescue ‘em and so forth. [unclear] But, you know, I must say John Cooper7 came through. The only, the only bright thing we got in the news is where he said, “Why, of course, we’ve got go in and rescue people.” But the point that I make is this: was it necessary to say—I mean, ‘cause we’re rebuilding, the rest [unclear]? Well, it’s too late now.
Rogers: I always thought we always said that. Didn’t we always say—?
Laird: Well, we’ve said that in their testimony, Bill [unclear].
[unclear exchange]
Rogers: Who said that, though? I—
Laird: Lugar8 asked a question at the briefing: whether we’re going to continue search and rescue missions, with combat forces in the missions—
Nixon: Yeah.
Laird: —and we’ve always said that we would, Bill.
Rogers: Of course.
[Page 435]Nixon: That’s what Son Tay was about. Yeah. Only for that purpose, but not for going in there.
Laird: Not for combat purposes.
Nixon: [unclear] it’s a rather interesting thing, though, that’s picked up by the press [unclear].
Laird: It’s nothing new—see, there is nothing new.
Rogers: But where did—was it in a press briefing?
Nixon: No. Where was it said—?
[unclear exchange]
Laird: We had him use the same quotes we used before the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Rogers: Yes—no, no.
Nixon: You know what I would suggest? It’s something that’s very hard to get across to a press man, but in any event—because the press man always wants to come out of a press briefing and say—and have the guy say, “Gee, that was a good briefing,” and it’s only a good briefing when the son-of-a-bitch gets news.
[laughter]
Nixon: Don’t give ‘em news. I told Ziegler, for example, when they ask about, “What, what is the American position about supporting the North—South Vietnamese if they go north?” He says, “Gentlemen, I have nothing new on that. The President covered that completely at his press briefing. What’s the next question?”
Rogers: Hmm.
Nixon: Because I did cover it. I said, “Well, obviously, I don’t have anything with what the South Vietnamese are going to do [unclear]. As far as our policy, it will be solely dictated in terms of whether or not there’s a threat to our forces in the south.” And that’s true, we all know. Which, really, is, in effect, saying that we won’t—And then, if somebody—somebody did ask a question. He says, “Well, what if—what if there were such an operation, would it—and it required a combined thing, and so forth? What would you do?” And I said, “Why, of course, we have no plans to do anything like that.” But, you see, the point is, Mel, it makes news—
Laird: Yeah.
Nixon: —whenever a press secretary—and he does a good job—but whenever a press secretary, in answering a question, tries to give the answer directly, rather than telling the son-of-a-bitch in the press, “Gentlemen, I refer you to the Secretary’s comment on that. What’s the next question?” You see, but that’s not news, sir, because there is nothing new. Don’t you agree Bill?
Rogers: It’s very tough for them to say that, but that’s what they should—
[Page 436]Nixon: I do it all the time.
Rogers: —say, “You know, the Secretary said it at various testimonies—”
[Omitted here is additional conversation relating to the press.]
Nixon: You know, the, the other thing is—which I’m sure Abrams was shooting at—that the—up there in Laos, the South Vietnamese could just win one cheap one, just a cheap one. Yeah. Take a stinking hill. Carefully bring back a prisoner or two—anything. I’m sure that has all been brought up.
Moorer: [unclear] I mean, there’s a seizing of men, seizing of prisoners, and killing the 250 survivors—
Nixon: No, but they don’t believe those figures.
Rogers: Tom, there’s no sign of any—
Nixon: Prisoners.
Rogers: —demoralization—deterioration of the South Vietnamese?
Moorer: No—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: That’s the point that I’m worried about.
Rogers: I think we’ve got to—you’ve got to be sure that everybody out there’s very [unclear]. Even a sign of it, because we can get on it right away—
Nixon: Right.
Rogers: —so that it doesn’t [unclear].
Nixon: We mustn’t have—nothing. The South Vietnamese demoralization has been terribly important.
Moorer: Yes, sir. Well, we, we recognize—
Nixon: The North Vietnamese, I think they’d be getting it when we hit ‘em—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: What do you think, Dick?
Helms: That’s right. I think, the North Vietnamese are having a rough time. This time, the South Vietnamese stand their ground, and the operation will run out [unclear] when Mel came back from his trip. But they’ll stand and fight, and we can really clobber them, and so forth. They’ll not only take losses in men, but they’ll take losses in supplies.
Nixon: Right, right. Let me say, though—
[Omitted here is additional conversation relating to dealing with the media.]
Nixon: Well, also, the idea, for example, that we—that the operation changes: of course it changes. It changes if you run into a little resistance here, you move in another direction. The idea, though, that [Page 437] the, the great objective of this was the capture of Tchepone—of course, that may have gotten into the—got in to the dialogue early, but when you really come down to it, everybody in Washington, at least, has talked and chewed it to destruction. Isn’t that the word—?
[unclear exchange]
Kissinger: That’s one thing we had all agreed on at the WSAG.
Nixon: That’s right.
Kissinger: No press spokesman ever used the word Tchepone. We said, “disruption of enemy supplies, Base Areas 604 and 607—”
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 459–2. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 9:18–11:57 a.m.↩
- Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, in charge of the Chup Plantation operation inside Cambodia, died in a helicopter crash on February 23.↩
- The regiments mentioned by Moorer were part of the South Vietnamese Lam Son 719 force. The Hill 31 fight took place north of the axis of advance, Route 9, of the South Vietnamese into Laos. For a discussion of the battle, see Lam Son 719, by Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), pp. 81–88.↩
- According to one account, the South Vietnamese suffered 155 killed and missing in the battle and estimated that they had killed 250 of the enemy. (Ibid., p. 85)↩
- North Vietnamese corps-level organization formed in southern North Vietnam and central Laos in October 1970 to defend against an anticipated large attack by United States and South Vietnamese ground forces.↩
- Reference is to the 20th PAVN Rear Services Group.↩
- Senator John Sherman Cooper (R–KY).↩
- Senator Richard G. Lugar (R–IN).↩