Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 26, 1971, 10:40–11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Nixon
• Vice President Agnew
• Secretary of State William P. Rogers
• Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
• Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms
• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
• Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II
• Assistant to the President Henry A. Kissinger
• Ambassador George Bush, US Representative to the UN
• Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson
• Director, U.S. Information Agency, Frank Shakespeare
• General Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
• Colonel Richard Kennedy, NSC Staff

President Nixon: Our purpose here is to see where we are. I’ll ask Helms and Moorer to brief on Laos, and then I’ll ask Rogers and Sisco to brief on the Middle East.

[Director Helms briefed on the military situation in Laos.]²

President Nixon: What kind of numbers are we talking about in South Laos? We should keep this in mind. The North Vietnamese are attacking in north Laos. If they should attack and succeed, then the question will be asked: why didn’t they go up north?

Director Helms: All the Meos are in the north—none are in the south, they also have some Thais and others in the north. We’ll sit down to see if we can move some units from the south to the north. Those in the south are from that area.

President Nixon: Will a loss in the north be worth holding the western part in the south? We should consider this.

Director Helms: We will do that early in the week in the WSAG.

[Director Helms resumed his briefing.]

President Nixon: Do we have advisors in the south?

Director Helms: No, they are at Pakse.

President Nixon: The purpose of holding them out is purely political.

Director Helms: Yes. No one wants these to get captured.

[Director Helms resumed his briefing.]

President Nixon: What were the pictures in the paper this morning?

Director Helms: That was in the Panhandle.

[Director Helms resumed his briefing.]

President Nixon: The purpose of this meeting is to be sure that everyone has the background. How long has the Chinese road building been going on?

Director Helms: Two or three years.

President Nixon: There is no connection with what else is going on in Laos; the same is true of west Laos, where the North Vietnamese operate and the South.

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

Mr. Irwin: As a general proposition it’s a see-saw action in north Laos which has been going on since 1960.

Secretary Laird: It goes on each year.

President Nixon: The North Vietnamese are fighting on 4 fronts. How do they have so much punch in the north? Is there no attrition?

Director Helms: Since they have 2 divisions, they usually refurbish in the rainy season.

President Nixon: Could they take Laos anytime? Why don’t they?

Director Helms: Yes, they could.

Mr. Johnson: They are always concerned what is the reaction going to be to a move to Mekong.

President Nixon: We don’t want to get trapped into thinking that it’s all a reaction to the south Laos operation.

Secretary Rogers: They would have big new problems if they take over the Lao government.

President Nixon: A takeover would be a blatant issue.

Director Helms: The next deal may be worse than what the North Vietnamese have now.

Mr. Irwin: The Russians may be restraining them.

Mr. Johnson: They have nothing to gain from taking over the government.

[Director Helms resumed and concluded his briefing.]

President Nixon: What about the traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail? The news says there is a sharp disagreement between DIA and CIA on the amount of traffic moving. Is there disagreement?

Director Helms: No, we work together on this.

Secretary Rogers: They put more into Tchepone but less is moving south.

Secretary Laird: DIA puts the supplies higher up than CIA does.

Secretary Rogers: But they say it’s not getting south of Tchepone.

President Nixon: What can I do to get the press straight?

Dr. Kissinger: I share Bill Rogers’ analysis. They want to have supplies south. The more traffic in the shuttle that isn’t getting south, the less traffic there is in the south.

Mr. Irwin: That showed up yesterday.

Director Helms: There is no disagreement on facts.

President Nixon: I just wanted to be sure whether there was a disagreement.

Secretary Laird: There’s always a judgment factor.

Secretary Rogers: The Russians have now condemned the operation but were restrained.³ The Russians have finally concluded that the Chinese are now not going in.

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians used the same phraseology as the Chinese.

Secretary Rogers: They pointed out to Souvanna that the Chinese are keeping out because the Russians charge the Chinese with responsibility.

Director Helms: They still don’t know whether Thieu will go into North Vietnam. Their propaganda will rise for this.

President Nixon: There’s a resolution by Mondale⁴ making my statement specific that it’s limited to protection of our forces. That would give them a free ride. Mondale didn’t get Symington and many others to go with him.

Secretary Laird: They are whipsawing both ways. Some say the date is not soon enough; others say it’s too short.

President Nixon: The caucus was for January 1, 1973, and the others were for January 1, 1972. They are confused on what line to take. They all want to have a political line on what we do. The opponents take different lines—there’s the ‘73 group and the ‘72 group, and the get-out-now line. There’s the Jackson line (keep on until the POWs are free) and the why-are-we-there-at-all group.

Secretary Rogers: I’m concerned about the Thieu statement that he’ll try to keep the restrictions to keep us out.

President Nixon: We already said we won’t support him then. When will the South Vietnamese have to get out of Laos? We can decide to use dilatory action on the resolutions.

Admiral Moorer: We have to get out about 1 May because of the weather. The North Vietnamese take out their forces in the rainy season, though there may be some minor political action.

Secretary Rogers: Will there be a time when there is no combat activity in the area and we won’t have to keep so many sorties going in?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Secretary Rogers: We’ll hold Congress until then. We can fight them off.

Secretary Laird: They will use the Selective Service Act extension to put limitations on. We can defeat it by saying it’s not the place for those amendments. We can’t keep them bottled up.

Secretary Rogers: We’ll have trouble on the North Vietnam one.

Vice President Agnew: There’s talk of holding it to fixed-wing aircraft.

Secretary Rogers: We told them we can’t do that.

[Mr. Ziegler comes in at 11:20 a.m.]

President Nixon: Tom [Moorer], could you brief us?

Admiral Moorer: There are operations going on in the Chu Minh forest, in the Parrot’s Beak area, and on the Mekong to secure the convoys. There’s Operation Commando Hunt at the intersection of the key highways coming out of the passes, which began in October. In January we also added concentrations and moving trucks and personnel. We have naval forces off the coast for deception, complementing the Lamson operation. The Chup Plantation operations involve 17,000 South Vietnamese and three enemy divisions.

Now to come to Lamson 719. Originally it involved 10,000 South Vietnamese and the enemy were estimated to total 14,000. The enemy now total 28,000. The ARVN are going to reinforce; they’re moving Marines into action and will bring a Marine brigade up from the South. Also they will move additional units from the east of MR–I to the west. Abe Abrams now says that while the leadership of the ARVN Airborne needs improvement, the losses suffered by the North Vietnamese have been heavier than those suffered by the ARVN in recent fights. The 1st ARVN Division is good; its leadership is good and aggressive.

The logistics picture is as follows: On balance I feel we have significantly affected their ability to move supplies south. We still have tough fighting ahead. We can’t estimate fully the results of air attacks.

Secretary Rogers: Do we have pictures? From gunships, etc.? We should get them out to the press.

Admiral Moorer: South of the 19th parallel the enemy has 8,000 men along the DMZ, and they could bring 8,000 more down to the operation area. There are 20,000 in the operation; this total could be 44,000. They deem this so important that they are bringing forces in. Their losses put a great burden on the enemy. But we’ll have tough fighting ahead.

Secretary Rogers: Can we keep our men off TV immediately after the battle?

Secretary Laird: The problem is newsmen at the base camp areas. There are so many of them that that’s a problem, too. It’s hard to keep them busy.

President Nixon: The problem is exaggeration. The press corps loads their statements. The reporters are young and literate and they don’t win prizes for saying that all is well. Now the situation is whether the South Vietnamese should take more reporters with them.

Secretary Laird: The reporters don’t want to go with them.

President Nixon: The situation now is that the press and the editors are against the war, so they will report this way. We have to keep a sense of perspective and have patience that this will pass. The prime question is whether the operation will work. All of us must realize we face a tough period ahead. How is the ARVN fighting? I gather they are fighting well and have the staying power needed for the weeks that are needed. We can’t win against the press but we have to try and use our big guns—Bill and Mel and Abrams are briefing and that is good. We have to remember that it’s rough and will continue to be. But the real point is whether the operation militarily will work.

Secretary Laird: We have to watch for an attack from North Vietnam against our forces at Khe Sanh.

Secretary Rogers: Can’t we get the leaders of our forces on the ground to cut off the statements on an individual basis?

Vice President Agnew: That might make a bigger story.

Secretary Rogers: Not if it’s voluntarily done.

Secretary Laird: We are trying to get the story across in the right way—but they don’t want favorable stories.

President Nixon: We have to try it but we have to recognize we are fighting a tough problem. We can’t keep the stories from coming. The best thing is to give the press something to do.

[The meeting then turned to a discussion of the Middle East.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, Minutes of Meetings, NSC Minutes, Originals 1971. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original. A handwritten notation at the top of the first page reads, “NSC Meeting: Laos.”
2. Helms’ briefing paper is attached but not printed.
3. During a meeting with Kissinger on February 26, Dobrynin handed him a note from the Soviet leadership that protested U.S. support of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos. One phrase of particular concern to Kissinger was “members of the Socialist community would not remain indifferent onlookers in case of new aggressive action by the United States against the DRV.” See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 128.
4. On February 25, Senator Walter Mondale (D–MN) proposed a resolution prohibiting U.S. forces from supporting a South Vietnamese ground attack into North Vietnam without prior and explicit approval from Congress.