134. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1
1945—Telecon With PRESUS—22 February 1971—Incoming
One minute for the President, sir.
PRESUS: Hello. Ans: Yes sir, Mr. President.
PRESUS: I just wanted to get your own evaluation of how the situation is going. Ans: As we expected we had that trouble with the one battalion, but I have talked with Gen Abrams two or three times. Consequently [Page 412] I feel and, as you know, the plan is now to jump off into Tchepone in the next two or three days, with two brigades of the Airborne Battalion and I think, Mr. President, we just have to stay with this thing. I think it is going to come out all right. It is true that the movement has been slow but they are in the process of establishing their firm logistics and fire support bases. And, as you know, we feel that at least two battalions of the 102d NVN regiment were rendered ineffective as a result of this action over the weekend and, subsequent to that time, they have laid on a large-scale air and artillery attack in this area. I have asked for pictures of the enemy and weapons, etc., that they reported if they possibly can. It is a tough one. Routes 9 and 914 have been cut and we have now about 1200 more guerrilla up at Highway 23 watching to see how the situation develops. From intercepts we know that the enemy is reorienting his entire structure in that direction but have not, as yet, seen any movement but probably will in a day or so. I think when they get into the Tchepone area things will start to really move. As you know, they are going down the high ground between Highway 9 and Highway 914 en route to Tchepone and two brigades are scheduled to be airlifted in there. We are expecting alot of fighting and the enemy certainly is putting his major attention to this particular operation because they realize how critical this is.
PRESUS: First of all, we expected them to fight and, secondly, we aren’t going to win all of the battles—we are going to win some and lose some. Ans: Yes, sir. The FSB are digging in and, as you noted on the map, that particular one was the most exposed because it was right up there in the path of all the reenforcements coming down from NVN and it was a helluva fight and they laid on a lot of fire power and I think they got the results they wanted. So far as the overall exchange between the NVN and the SVN I believe it is highly favorable so far as the SVN are concerned.
PRESUS: I see in The Star tonight where it states to the effect that 1,000 SVN are now surrounded. That certainly is a surprise. I saw nothing in any of the reports of our own on this. Ans: I don’t know what they could possibly be thinking of. As you know the 39th Battalion joined the 21st just slightly to the southwest but we don’t have any reports of that kind.
PRESUS: How is the morale of the SVN? Ans: Good. From time to time you are going to hear reports such as from our friend, Tuckman, who reported incorrectly that we had Americans dressed in SVN uniforms—he is going to be on the air tonight on ABC with some interview with a SVN—the press will make a lot of that.
PRESUS: The main thing is how it really comes out in the end. This day-to-day stuff doesn’t matter much—it’s the end result which counts the most. Ans: I have asked Gen Abrams to submit right away [Page 413] and then, as a matter of course, every Friday his personal evaluation and conceptual plan for the following week. In addition, Mel Laird has also sent him a message requesting that he hold either “backgrounders” or other reporting which is generated from the Saigon area.
PRESUS: Yes, we want positive statements from there but they have to be true. Ans: You don’t have to worry about that, Mr. President, Gen Abrams is a hard man to get to talk.
PRESUS: On the other hand we don’t want the press to be reporting every little skirmish as losing the war either and we’ll have that great humming bee going back here. We want to keep the war in the proper perspective. The main thing I am concerned about is the SVN. I don’t want them to lose confidence in themselves—I don’t want them to suffer defeat and hope that that can stay in there another month. Ans: I think they can stay longer than that.
PRESUS: What was the result of that? Ans: They discussed the current situation and the SVN were very firm in their determination. They were not discouraged—they recognize they are going to have more casualties and they are willing to take them. Not long ago, about Christmas, they stated they were willing to lose over 1,000 in this effort but, of course, they haven’t lost nearly that much as yet.
PRESUS: Another thing, these people are capable of putting one or two more corps in couldn’t they? Ans: Yes. You may have noted they anticipate some rather heavy fighting below in MR–1 after we leave in June. This certainly will have significant effects on the NVN.
PRESUS: I would hope in Laird’s briefing you would emphasize to him that this was planned with a big military advance in MR–1 and that in this case it has prevented the killing of a lot of Americans and that, due to the SVN courage and valor the SVN have now cut off supplies, etc. Ans: I think we are doing real well with our interdiction efforts by air and we are going to see some movement of trucks south of Highway 9 by a large shuttle effort to take them out of Base Area 611.
PRESUS: What was this Air Force guy’s idea in saying that the amount of traffic in the trail had doubled since this started? Ans: The point is, Mr. President, it is erroneous and, in fact the roads are cut two or three times by the SVN—between Highway 92 and 914 and Highway 9. So I don’t know where he got that information from. We do make up a weekly report on the results as we estimate them in terms of input and throughput. But this report is usually lagging the real world by about ten days. I don’t know where he was picking up his information from but I am trying to find out right now.
PRESUS: Why in the hell is he talking to the press? Ans: I just don’t know, sir . . .
PRESUS: I can’t understand it either. The talking should be coming from Abrams or Weyand. Ans: Yes, sir, these other people shouldn’t be [Page 414] talking at all. But, what happens, as you know, some of these reporters drift into the Ready Rooms or something like that and begin to ask leading questions and more or less write the story and ask the questions later. These young people just don’t have a feel for the consequences.
PRESUS: The main thing here is to win and it simply means having the SVN suffer a bit but not at the risk of defeat. They have already done a lot and they must continue to take whatever casualties that they have to in order to hold their ground and stay in there because that is all we need. Ans: They have 10,000 men yet in reserve plus the Marine Brigade so they will be put in there. Gen Abrams reports that Gen Lam is confident in MR–1 that he can handle the situation although there will be, as I said, heavy fighting. Their morale is good. I have been over there two or three times and their enthusiasm and drive is superb but on the other hand, you get a young pilot in there who has only been there a short time and he makes all these statements and being quoted as saying that this is the worse part of the war he has ever been in and the papers pick that up as being five years, you see. Actually, I think the operations are going exactly as we expected them to.
PRESUS: And we’ve inflicted a helluva lot of damage on them. Ans: Yes, sir we have killed about the equivalent of three battalions.
PRESUS: The way I look at it is similar to Grant and the Wilderness. Grant lost twice as much as Lee lost in battles but he won the war. These people are in in the war in SVN and they can’t lose. Ans: Of course, we have this operation down in the Chup Plantation area.
PRESUS: I understand there is going to be a big battle? Ans: Yes sir and Gen Tri is ready to meet it with his forces. We have an airlift into Cholon (?) coming up Highway 5 north of the enemy which is located between Highway 75 and Highway 7.
PRESUS: Is there a chance of putting it through? Yes
PRESUS: A chance he might win the skirmish? Yes, the NVN will react to his presence along the routes there and, as you may know, some of these units have been there since last May just sitting there and waiting for the supplies to come down and we have every indication that Tri will be in for a big fight.
PRESUS: Can Tri handle it? Yes, sir.
PRESUS: Will they get closer to the supplies? Yes, sir, he has got 17,000 men over there near the highways.
PRESUS: Okay, Admiral, just be sure that when you talk to Abrams you let him know that I am not concerned about the day-by-day problems. He must not be too worried about that. But we do have to tackle the public relations people over there and here and if things don’t come out all right in the end we’ll back him all the way and continue to hammer [Page 415] them using everything we can to ensure it isn’t lost. Ans: I know that it is real tough on you, too, sir.
PRESUS: Oh, I’m not worried about that. They will lose other battles but the main thing is to win in the end. Ans: This is right and that is just what we are doing.
PRESUS: Fine, Admiral.
- Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. No classification marking.↩