Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

373. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, July 13, 1971, 0001Z.

1879. Subj: Chirep-Japanese Suggestion for Pro-GRC Initiative.

1. Japanese PermRep Nakagawa on instructions asked to see Bush urgently July 12. Referring to reports co-sponsors of Albanian res planning to submit their draft agenda item prior to July 15, Nakagawa said Japan wished US if possible or a third country to take advantage of imminent submission of traditional Albanian item to submit pro-GRC proposal first. Although initial presentation was somewhat vague, after series of questions Nakagawa said GOJ hoped US or third party would submit pro-GRC draft res to UN Secretariat in immediate future with understanding such draft would be held pending submission of Albanian-type item. When Albanian item submitted, pro-GRC draft res would then have priority.

2. In response to further questions, Nakagawa said pro-GRC draft res could either be simple DR res or modified IQ res (decision to expel GRC subject to two-thirds vote). We explained our understanding that Albanians and co-sponsors were planning to submit not only agenda item but explanatory memo and draft AR res as well. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to have pro-GRC draft res circulated prior to AR res submitted at same time item given to Secretariat. If, contrary to expectations, Albania did not attach draft res at time item submitted, then Japanese approach might be considered. Best approach to meet GOJ concern would be prior submission of pro-GRC draft agenda item with draft res attached.

3. Bush noted difficulty for US since US policy not yet decided. In event US not able to accede to GOJ request, would Japan be willing to submit pro-GRC item and res? Nakagawa said his instructions spoke only of third countries if US not in position submit pro-GRC draft res (it clear Japanese would have difficulty acting alone or even in concert with us). We asked about possibility of Australia or New Zealand. Nakagawa said difficulty was that both of these countries believe SC seat should go to PRC and if this put in draft res difficulties with GRC would ensue.

4. Bush said would report Japanese request to Dept.

5. Comment: We agree with Japanese that it would be preferable to have priority for pro-GRC draft res since it not at all certain that we could win a fight on priority. Therefore, without prejudice to what position we may subsequently adopt, there is merit in the US (with others if they can be quickly rounded up) submitting item neutrally worded “the problem of the representation of China” and attaching a modified IQ res declaring decision to expel GRC subject to two-thirds vote. We could always modify our draft res prior to actual debate in GA in late Sept or early Oct.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and Taipei.