Attachment
CHIREP SCENARIO
President decides to try out the dual representation approach with US
co-sponsorship and initial silence about the Security Council.
Through Ambassador McConaughy,
US informs GRC of decision and US
plan to seek support. At same time, US frankly tells GRC that although this first effort
will be silent on Security Council seat, preliminary information
makes it appear that any DR resolution will have to state that
Security Council seat should go to PRC if it is to succeed. US adds that building 2/3
requirement explicitly into resolution may also prove a limiting
factor.
US actively seeks co-sponsors and agreement on text, as well as
support within GA from countries who
may not be prepared to cosponsor. We find that support will be
inadequate unless the Security Council seat is explicitly awarded to
Peking in resolution as tabled, or unless US signifies it will
acquiesce in amendment to that effect.
[Page 724]
Option One
Through Ambassador McConaughy, or through a special envoy—in either
case employing a letter from President Nixon—US tells GRC
that unless GRC is prepared to
acquiesce on the Council seat, US will announce publicly it has
tried to develop support for what it considers a reasonable solution
and has found international support. US will thank these supporters,
but will go on to state that since neither PRC nor GRC will accept
this solution, US will not engage in exercise in futility by
proposing it. US, therefore, will simply support an Important
Question resolution and will oppose Albanian resolution. In event
other nations propose dual representation formula that US considers
reasonable and equitable, US would vote for it. US tells GRC that, in our opinion, inevitable
result of this course of action would be GRC expulsion under Albanian resolution, requests early
GRC decision.
US informs GOJ, GOA, GNZ of above approach to GRC and asks them to weigh in as well.
If GRC sticks to its opposition, or
if GRC temporizes, US will make
public announcement described above.
Option Two
Through Ambassador McConaughy,
or through special envoy—in either case employing a letter from
President Nixon—US tells
GRC that despite opposition of
both PRC and GRC, US considers dual representation plus Security
Council seat to PRC to be a
reasonable solution and will press on for its adoption by Assembly
in the hope that when the moment for decision comes, either or both
parties will accept. US will point out our belief dual
representation is in both our interests as the only alternative
would be GRC expulsion under the
Albanian resolution and will emphasize the eroding effect on US
ability to maintain its security commitment and close cooperative
relations should GRC either walk out
or be ejected from UN.
US informs GOJ, GOA, and GNZ of above approach to GRC and urges them to weigh in as well.
US continues to work for dual representation and tables resolution
even if Chiang is opposed or temporizes.
Option Two-A
If, in response to above approach, GRC advises that it will not walk out if dual
representation resolution with Security Council seat to PRC is passed, but will only walk out
if PRC accepts and enters UN on that basis, US will press for dual
representation resolution with Security Council seat included. If it
is adopted, probable result would be that PRC refuses to enter and GRC can remain if it wishes. If PRC should accept dual representation plus Security
Council seat and enter UN on [Page 725] this basis, it will be up
to GRC to make ultimate decision
(even though advised by US and other friends) whether it will walk
out or remain.
Advantages of Option One
- 1.
- Under this option, US will not have to oppose publicly the
wishes of the GRC.
- 2.
- It would be clear that we had made every reasonable effort to
protect GRC place in UN; responsibility for leaving
UN would clearly be placed on
GRC.
- 3.
- Would be consistent with position taken by Secretary with
Ambassador Shen.
- 4.
- Would be least annoying to Peking since PRC will see this as leading to
earlier entry into UN.
- 5.
- Would place US in reasonably good position with American
public opinion; we would have demonstrated our desire for a
reasonable and equitable solution.
- 6.
- Would avoid the necessity for the US formally to sponsor
PRC entry.
- 7.
- Would dispose of the Chirep
issue, albeit in a manner which we will not like.
Disadvantages of Option One
- 1.
-
GRC would be expelled under
Albanian resolution.
- 2.
- Possibility of last minute change of mind by GRC would be ruled out.
- 3.
- Might give the appearance that US has allowed
Chiang a veto on significant areas of
US foreign policy formulation.
- 4.
- Would be tacit admission by US that IQ is just a gimmick to delay Assembly decision and
in any case is a “second best” formula.
Advantages of Option Two
- 1.
- Would hold open the door to a later GRC change of mind.
- 2.
- Would be seen by American and international public opinion as
a realistic and equitable policy and would demonstrate that our
hands are not tied by Chiang.
- 3.
- Even if GRC walks out, this
may be preferable to their expulsion (assuming the resolution
passes) since the latter would reduce them to the status of a
non-state in the eyes of many.
- 4.
- It would keep the door open for the very remote possibility
that the PRC might be willing to
enter the UN on the basis of dual
representation.
- 5.
- If PRC refused to enter on
this basis, onus would be on Peking.
[Page 726]
Disadvantages of Option Two
- 1.
- Would be considered by PRC as
an additional, but not unexpected, unfriendly act and could
interfere with further movement toward normalization.
- 2.
- Given our very late start (we would be well into August at
that point), there would be no assurance of passage of the dual
representation resolution.
- 3.
- It would open the US to charges by those who are concerned
only with getting the PRC in
that we were simply trying to find a new way of keeping the
PRC out of the UN.
- 4.
- It would not resolve the Chirep issue. It would be back next year.
