372. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and International Organization Affairs (De Palma) to Secretary of State Rogers 1


  • Chirep—Scenario for Dealing with GRC on Dual Representation

Here is a suggested scenario for dealing with the GRC in the event the President decides in favor of some form of dual representation. The scenario assumes that our soundings will continue to show that a dual representation strategy has little chance for success unless the resolution contains language to the effect that Peking should have the Security Council seat. If the later soundings do not indicate this, our problems with the GRC would be greatly lessened.



President decides to try out the dual representation approach with US co-sponsorship and initial silence about the Security Council.

Through Ambassador McConaughy, US informs GRC of decision and US plan to seek support. At same time, US frankly tells GRC that although this first effort will be silent on Security Council seat, preliminary information makes it appear that any DR resolution will have to state that Security Council seat should go to PRC if it is to succeed. US adds that building 2/3 requirement explicitly into resolution may also prove a limiting factor.

US actively seeks co-sponsors and agreement on text, as well as support within GA from countries who may not be prepared to cosponsor. We find that support will be inadequate unless the Security Council seat is explicitly awarded to Peking in resolution as tabled, or unless US signifies it will acquiesce in amendment to that effect.

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Option One

Through Ambassador McConaughy, or through a special envoy—in either case employing a letter from President Nixon—US tells GRC that unless GRC is prepared to acquiesce on the Council seat, US will announce publicly it has tried to develop support for what it considers a reasonable solution and has found international support. US will thank these supporters, but will go on to state that since neither PRC nor GRC will accept this solution, US will not engage in exercise in futility by proposing it. US, therefore, will simply support an Important Question resolution and will oppose Albanian resolution. In event other nations propose dual representation formula that US considers reasonable and equitable, US would vote for it. US tells GRC that, in our opinion, inevitable result of this course of action would be GRC expulsion under Albanian resolution, requests early GRC decision.

US informs GOJ, GOA, GNZ of above approach to GRC and asks them to weigh in as well.

If GRC sticks to its opposition, or if GRC temporizes, US will make public announcement described above.

Option Two

Through Ambassador McConaughy, or through special envoy—in either case employing a letter from President Nixon—US tells GRC that despite opposition of both PRC and GRC, US considers dual representation plus Security Council seat to PRC to be a reasonable solution and will press on for its adoption by Assembly in the hope that when the moment for decision comes, either or both parties will accept. US will point out our belief dual representation is in both our interests as the only alternative would be GRC expulsion under the Albanian resolution and will emphasize the eroding effect on US ability to maintain its security commitment and close cooperative relations should GRC either walk out or be ejected from UN.

US informs GOJ, GOA, and GNZ of above approach to GRC and urges them to weigh in as well.

US continues to work for dual representation and tables resolution even if Chiang is opposed or temporizes.

Option Two-A

If, in response to above approach, GRC advises that it will not walk out if dual representation resolution with Security Council seat to PRC is passed, but will only walk out if PRC accepts and enters UN on that basis, US will press for dual representation resolution with Security Council seat included. If it is adopted, probable result would be that PRC refuses to enter and GRC can remain if it wishes. If PRC should accept dual representation plus Security Council seat and enter UN on [Page 725]this basis, it will be up to GRC to make ultimate decision (even though advised by US and other friends) whether it will walk out or remain.

Advantages of Option One

Under this option, US will not have to oppose publicly the wishes of the GRC.
It would be clear that we had made every reasonable effort to protect GRC place in UN; responsibility for leaving UN would clearly be placed on GRC.
Would be consistent with position taken by Secretary with Ambassador Shen.
Would be least annoying to Peking since PRC will see this as leading to earlier entry into UN.
Would place US in reasonably good position with American public opinion; we would have demonstrated our desire for a reasonable and equitable solution.
Would avoid the necessity for the US formally to sponsor PRC entry.
Would dispose of the Chirep issue, albeit in a manner which we will not like.

Disadvantages of Option One

GRC would be expelled under Albanian resolution.
Possibility of last minute change of mind by GRC would be ruled out.
Might give the appearance that US has allowed Chiang a veto on significant areas of US foreign policy formulation.
Would be tacit admission by US that IQ is just a gimmick to delay Assembly decision and in any case is a “second best” formula.

Advantages of Option Two

Would hold open the door to a later GRC change of mind.
Would be seen by American and international public opinion as a realistic and equitable policy and would demonstrate that our hands are not tied by Chiang.
Even if GRC walks out, this may be preferable to their expulsion (assuming the resolution passes) since the latter would reduce them to the status of a non-state in the eyes of many.
It would keep the door open for the very remote possibility that the PRC might be willing to enter the UN on the basis of dual representation.
If PRC refused to enter on this basis, onus would be on Peking.
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Disadvantages of Option Two

Would be considered by PRC as an additional, but not unexpected, unfriendly act and could interfere with further movement toward normalization.
Given our very late start (we would be well into August at that point), there would be no assurance of passage of the dual representation resolution.
It would open the US to charges by those who are concerned only with getting the PRC in that we were simply trying to find a new way of keeping the PRC out of the UN.
It would not resolve the Chirep issue. It would be back next year.
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Winthrop Brown and Feldman and cleared by Shoesmith, William A. Brown, Armitage, and Pedersen.