Office of the Historian

300. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, October 15, 1970, 0026Z.

2464. Subj: Chirep. Refs: USUN 2302; SecState 167550.2

1.
MisOffs (Newlin and Romine) went over ground in reftels with Hsueh (GRC) October 14. US and GRC anticipated shifts coincided in cases of Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile and Malaysia. This resulted in GRC estimated vote on Albanian res of 49–53–24.
2.
MisOffs then informed Hsueh of possible trouble in cases of: Colombia, Peru, Italy, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Cameroon, CAR, Sierra Leone and Tunisia.
3.
Hsueh took our most pessimistic estimate (USUN 2302) with sangfroid observing that it unlikely that worst would eventuate in all cases. We agreed and said our present forecast was for adoption of IQ res and defeat of Albanian res with much narrower margin than last year.
4.
We agreed to following division of labor:
A.
GRC to make further efforts both here and in capitals with: Bolivia, where GRC has active Spanish speaking Ambassador; Cameroon; CAR (Hsueh says Bokassa is still in Taipei and that CAR vote is safe); Mauritius; Guyana; Peru; Sierra Leone.
B.
US similarly to approach: Colombia, Iceland, Fiji, Luxembourg, Morocco and Tunisia.
5.
Hsueh said Indonesian PermRep Abdulgani has told him again that Indonesia will be absent from room at time vote taken.
6.
Hsueh agreed that if other side dropped expulsion para from Albanian res or brought about separate vote on operative paras (in expectation admission para would achieve two-thirds majority while expulsion para would receive only simple majority and would be eliminated) would face us with difficult situation. Hsueh agreed that in event Albanian res were to receive simple majority there would be serious difficulty when it came to plenary adoption of report of Credentials Committee. He also agreed GRC would be placed in very precarious position in SC.
7.
GRC mission, he said, had been concentrating on lobbying but he promised to reflect on above contingencies and to consult further on best tactics.
Yost
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.↩
  2. See Document 298 and footnote 3 thereto.↩