298. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1
2302. Subj: Chinese Representation in the UN. Ref: USUN 408, March 12, 1970.2
- In our basic analysis (reftel) we concluded that maintenance of our present tactics seems likely to lead to early replacement (1971 or 1972) of GRC by PRC throughout the UN system. We also noted that successful conclusion of the negotiations between Canada and the PRC on recognition coupled with further defections in Latin America could result in a plurality for the Albanian resolution (to seat PRC, and expel GRC) at the 25th GA. This latter contingency now appears to be a very real possibility due to unfavorable trends in most of the geographic groups and the impact that the establishment of Canadian-PRC ties is likely to have.
- Our latest voting estimate in which we have assumed the worst in almost all cases of doubt gives the Albanian resolution a slight plurality this year (51–49–27) as contrasted with last year’s eight vote margin in our favor (48–56–21). However, we estimate that the worst will not occur in all cases and our current best forecast (subject to revision) is that we can again: (a) obtain adoption of the Important Question (IQ) resolution (estimated vote 66–47–12); (b) narrowly defeat the Albanian resolution with either a tie vote or a one or two votes margin in our favor.
- Obviously, our projected outcome on the Albanian resolution is much too close for comfort even if we did not have to contend with the built-in variables of a 127-member General Assembly. A few last minute shifts such as those that occurred last year (Mauritius, Ghana) coupled with possible absences of mavericks (both Baroody of Saudi Arabia and El Farra of Jordan are now listed to vote with us against the Albanian resolution) could lead to a 51–47–29 result.
- Although we would still be protected at this GA by the prior adoption of the IQ resolution, we would have to face the consequences that would flow from the fact that a simple majority opposes our position on Chirep. This could lead to a close floor fight at this session on the Credentials Committee’s report. Even more difficult would be a credentials fight at the next session of the Security Council because [Page 521]a majority of Council members already recognize the GRC. (For example, Zambia might raise credentials in SC using majority vote in GA on AR as springboard.)
- Likely and possible shifts by regions follow:
- Chile from abstain to yes
- Bolivia from no to abstain
- Colombia from no to abstain
- Peru from no to abstain
- Canada from abstain to yes
- Italy from abstain to yes
- Luxembourg from no to abstain
- Kuwait from abstain to yes
- Cambodia from yes to abstain
- Fiji estimated to abstain
- Cameroon from no to abstain
- Central African Republic from no to abstain
- Analysis by groups:
It is only prudent to assume that Chile, under Allende, will move from last year’s abstention on the AR to a yes vote. There are firm indications that Bolivia, Colombia and Peru will follow the lead given by Chile last year and will shift from a no vote to abstention. In addition, Peru will vote no on IQ resolution.
We have assumed the successful completion of Canada’s negotiation with Peking will be reflected in Canada’s vote on Chirep, i.e., Canada recognizes only Peking as the Government of China. In addition, there are firm indications that Italy will swiftly follow in Canada’s footsteps and that Italy’s negotiation with the PRC will also be completed by the time the vote is reached. Luxembourg has announced that it will follow Belgium’s shift of last year and will abstain on the AR.
The strong statement by Kuwait FonMin in the general debate in favor of Peking’s admission is generally considered to foreshadow a [Page 522]shift from an abstention to a yes vote. Note comment in para. 3 above on Baroody and El Farra.
The only good news is that we anticipate Cambodia will shift from a yes vote to an abstention. Although we had hoped that ASPAC members would be able to work on Fiji thereby obtaining a much needed no vote, we gather from Australia that Fiji is most likely to abstain. We have heard rumor that Indonesian FonMin Malik, while in NY, told his Mission Indonesia would no longer be absent during Chirep and Korean votes. Moreover, Indonesia would support PRC and NK. We assume ASPAC members will, as before, continue to work on Amb. Abdulgani to be absent.
There has been some uncertainty over the vote of the Central African Republic. While Amb. Liu tells us that the GRC has a firm commitment, all of us recognize that Bokassa is mentally unstable. To be on the safe side, we have carried CAR in the abstention column and we will be checking as we get closer to the vote. We also anticipate that Cameroon will shift from a no to an abstention. Our present expectation is that Equatorial Guinea will again abstain. However, Macias is in about the same mental state as Bokassa and we cannot exclude a last-minute shift to a yes vote.
- Parsons (UK) told us Oct. 6 that his Mission had just completed Chirep vote estimate and he concluded vote on AR would be a tie. We note this estimate also shared by Embassy’s Taipei 4328.3 Would appreciate Department’s latest estimate.
- For obvious reasons we have not yet shared above with GRC mission.4
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.↩
- Document 288.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On October 10 the Department advised Yost that it generally agreed with his forecast and analysis of the vote, but added that Malaysia, Tunisia, and Sierra Leone were possible swing votes. When discussing the situation with the Republic of China’s UN Mission, Yost was advised to say that the United States would concentrate on Tunisia, Malaysia, Luxembourg, Fiji, and Colombia; the GRC should concentrate on Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Guyana. The GRC could ask Japan to approach Kuwait or Peru, and its advice on tactics should be sought. (Telegram 167550 to USUN, October 10; ibid.)↩