20. Editorial Note

In National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 5, dated January 21, 1969, Henry Kissinger informed the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the President had directed the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia to prepare a study of alternative U.S. policies with regard to the full range of U.S.-Japanese issues. A Treasury representative was specifically designated to sit on the NSC Group for this study. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 5)

In response to NSSM 5, an undated paper prepared by the Interdepartmental Review Group for East Asia was transmitted under cover of an April 28 memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis of the NSC Secretariat to the Office of the Vice President, the Office of the Secretary of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Director of Emergency Preparedness, with copies to the Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Davis’ memorandum noted that revisions had been made pursuant to a discussion in the Review Group on April 25. Part V (pages 35-43) of the paper covered U.S.-Japan economic issues and identified key policy matters for the United States as “(1) trade, and (2) US balance of payments considerations, particularly the implication of US military expenditures in Japan.” The NSSM 5 response paper and an “agreed summary paper” that Davis circulated to the same addressees on April 29 were intended for discussion at an April 30 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) The summary paper noted that the NSC meeting would “concentrate on Okinawa and other security issues” but it was recognized that trade, balance of payments, and aid policy issues were “an integral part of Japan policy and that they should be considered, particularly in developing a negotiating position on Okinawa.” (Ibid.) See Document 17 for the Department of the Treasury’s dissent from the economic approach being taken by the NSC Interdepartmental Group. That dissent was repeated in an April 25 memorandum from John C. Colman, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, and Anthony J. Jurich, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to the NSC Review Group on NSSM 5. (Attached to memorandum from Petty to Kennedy, May 5; Washington National Records Center, Department of the Treasury, Secretary’s Memos/Correspondence: FRC 56 74 7, Memos to the Secretary, May-June 1969)

The National Security Council took up the NSSM 5 response paper during a 10:30 a.m.-12:11 p.m. meeting in the Cabinet Room on April 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central [Page 52] Files, President’s Daily Diary) Pursuant to the NSC meeting, on May 28 Kissinger sent National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13 to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence setting out the President’s decisions on U.S. policy toward Japan. NSDM 13 dealt primarily with defense/security/Okinawa matters, but the first decision related to economic issues: “We shall basically pursue our current relationship with Japan as our major partner in Asia, seeking ways to improve this relationship from the viewpoint of U.S. national interests and to seek an increasingly larger Japanese role in Asia.” (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 13)