Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

423. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director (Hughes) and Deputy Director (Denney)¹

Washington, December 6, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Guyana

There follows a review of recent 303 Committee actions on Guyana. It provides operational background that you may find of use in your review of SNIE 87.2–67.² 303 Committee action has been predicated on the assumption that Jagan is a Communist or an accurate facsimile of one, and that his becoming Prime Minister of Guyana would be disastrous for Guyana, would prove a dangerous stimulus to Castro, and would introduce an unacceptable degree of instability into the Caribbean area.

The final paragraph of the Estimate, on the significance of a Jagan victory, has therefore attracted a good deal of attention in ARA, and CIA/DDP as it has gone through its several revisions. In its earlier forms the paragraph reflected a judgment inconsistent with that which motivated the policy decisions of the 303 Committee; in its latest form the inconsistency has considerally diminished. For its part, DDC finds the current version acceptable.

On 10 April 1967 the 303 Committee approved a proposal to provide Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of the Guyanan Peopleʼs National Congress with covert support in the next national elections.³ The cost of the assistance necessary to assure a Burnham victory over Cheddi Jagan of the Peopleʼs Progressive Party was estimated at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Some of this was to go to Burnhamʼs coalition partner, the United Force.

Committee approval was grounded in the belief that as Prime Minister Jagan would be an instrument of Communist influence in Latin America. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] paper embodying the proposal noted that during Jaganʼs years (1961–4) as head of the government, some 50 PPP youth trained in Cuba in guerrilla warfare, a “Guyana Liberation Army” was organized and equipped largely with Cuban weapons, and $3,000,000 of Soviet bloc funds entered Guyana for the support of the PPP.⁴ The paper also stated that some 90 PPP youths were currently being trained (?educated?) in Bloc countries and that in Guyana Jaganʼs Accabre College was training Guyanan youth in Marxist thought.

The paper forecast that the vote would be an extremely close thing even if Burnham had our assistance. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggestion, adopted by the Committee, was to make 12 equal monthly payments to Burnham to help him in revitalizing his party and in organizing his absentee vote strength. If Burnhamʼs electoral prospects appeared bleak, [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. These measures, it was hoped, would forestall the necessity of exile of Jagan, or his detention, or coup dʼétat after the elections.

The Committeeʼs approval was attended by a recommendation by the Executive Secretary for a quarterly progress report on the progress of the campaign. On 7 August [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported to the 303 Committee that some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the original sum had been committed, that a [2½ lines of source text not declassified]. In oral presentation an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] representative noted that the vote might go as high as 350,000 (instead of the 278,000 previously predicted) and that the increase was expected to be largely Indian and therefore pro-Jagan.⁵ The race, he said, would be nip-and-tuck all the way. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] disposition at the moment, and that of ARA, is to continue to rely on the electoral process in Guyana (no matter how much that process will need “adjustment”), [2 lines of source text not declassified]. If it does, the issue will be submitted to the 303 Committee for review.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guyana 1969, 1970. Secret.
2. Document 424.
3. See Document 421.
4. Information on Soviet Bloc assistance to Jaganʼs government was attached at Tab A; see footnote 4, Document 421.
5. The minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee of August 7 reported [text not declassified] the estimated voting figures. The minutes recorded that Rostow and [text not declassified]. (Memorandum from Donald S. MacDonald to Sayre; ibid., Guyana, 1969, 1970)