Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, May 18, 1965, 0320Z.

1132. Deptel 1140.² GRC has no capability for taking any effective independent action against Hainan except for covert air drop or sea infiltration of few individuals. Even these actions unlikely to succeed without US technical assistance. Any larger scale action would require US support. Hainan is far beyond range of GRC fighters, and without air cover, no GRC air-borne or sea-borne attempt on any significant scale could succeed. GRC leaders, including President Chiang, are well aware of this.

While Vietnam situation undoubtedly has brought Hainan more into forefront of GRC’s strategic thinking recently, no GRC official has proposed to us GRC action against Hainan. We would prefer not to go to GRC on basis of press stories to urge them not to take action which they have not indicated to us they intend to take, and which they well know they could not undertake anyway without US support.

Possibility remains that ChiComs might be misled by statements in Taiwan press, particularly should GRC undertake infiltration attempt or even leaflet drop against Hainan. Recommend that if demarche considered necessary for this reason, it be directed toward discouraging press statements and those small-scale actions which GRC capable of taking on its own. We would not say to GRC there may be virtue in keeping ChiComs guessing, but rather place emphasis on danger of misleading ChiComs and thus provoking undesirable ChiCom reaction toward Vietnam. If such demarche is made while bombing of North Vietnam suspended, GRC likely to attribute significance to timing. We cannot judge here whether this desirable or not and request further instructions, both as to line proposed above and timing of demarche.³

Wright

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong.
2. Telegram 1140 to Taipei, May 14, instructed the Embassy to raise with the GRC the recent calls in the Taiwan press for an invasion of Hainan Island, conveying the feeling that, “while there probably some virtue in keeping ChiComs guessing re GRC intentions toward Hainan, US would be strongly opposed to such an attack.” (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1167 to Taipei, May 20, replied that the Department did not have a demarche in mind but an informal indication of U.S. views; it requested that the Embassy find an appropriate time and channel to convey U.S. concern. (Ibid.) Telegram 1151 from Taipei, May 21, reported that this had been done. (Ibid.)